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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Problematic Forgotten Buyback, Yesha Yadav
The Problematic Forgotten Buyback, Yesha Yadav
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Totaling in excess of $100 billion dollars in transactions annually, debt buybacks allow a company to repurchase bonds from investors, rewriting bargains and stripping away creditor control rights in the process. This Article shows that regulation systematically underprotects bondholders in the context of debt buybacks. It makes three points. First, bondholders confront information asymmetries that enable issuers to buy back creditor claims cheaply. Regulation imposes near negligible requirements on issuers to disclose information about the transaction. Lacking fiduciary protection, bondholder interests are vulnerable to being extinguished by issuers in the interests of promoting those of shareholders and managers. Second, buybacks …
Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz
Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.
The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, Mitu Gulati
The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief—over 50 percent of 2012 GDP—with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents—particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors—that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.
Cds Zombies, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
Cds Zombies, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the contract interpretation strategies adopted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for its credit derivatives contracts in the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The authors argue that the economic function of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) after Greece is limited and uncertain, partly thanks to ISDA’s insistence on textualist interpretation. Contract theory explanations for textualist preferences emphasise either transactional efficiency or relational factors, which do not fit ISDA or the derivatives market. The authors pose an alternative explanation: the embrace of textualism in this case may be a means for ISDA to reconcile the competing political …
Hedge Fund Activism In The Enforcement Of Bondholder Rights, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Hedge Fund Activism In The Enforcement Of Bondholder Rights, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
Activist hedge funds have transformed how bondholders respond to violations of their contractual rights. Insurance companies and mutual funds, the traditional investors in bonds, often slept on their rights and turned active only little and late. Hedge funds, by contrast, seek out opportunities for activism in order to make profits. In the wake of their activism, hedge funds have not only benefitted themselves, but their fellow bondholders as well. Alas, the remedy scheme for violations of bondholders rights – in particular, the centrality of the acceleration remedy – introduces its own set of imperfections. When treasury interest rates have increased …
Bond Covenants And Creditor Protection: Economics And Law, Theory And Practice, Substance And Process, William W. Bratton
Bond Covenants And Creditor Protection: Economics And Law, Theory And Practice, Substance And Process, William W. Bratton
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article examines contractual protection of unsecured financial creditors in US credit markets. Borrowers and lenders in the United States contract against a minimal legal background that imposes the burden of protection on the lender. A working, constantly updated, set of contractual protections has emerged in response. But actual use of available contractual technology varies widely, depending on the level of risk and the institutional context. The credit markets sort borrowers according to the degree of the risk of financial distress, imposing substantial constraints only on the borrowers with the most dangerous incentives. At the same time, the contracting practice …
Sovereign Debt Reform And The Best Interest Of Creditors, William W. Bratton, G. Mitu Gulati
Sovereign Debt Reform And The Best Interest Of Creditors, William W. Bratton, G. Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
In April 2002 the International Monetary Fund introduced a sovereign bankruptcy proposal only to be rebuffed by the United States Treasury. Where the IMF wanted a mandatory bankruptcy regime, the Treasury wanted to solve distress problems with contractual devices. Sovereign bondholders and sovereign issuers themselves flatly rejected both proposals, even though they were nominally the beneficiaries of both proponents. This Article addresses and explains this bondholder reaction. In so doing, it takes a highly skeptical view of the IMF's proposal even as it shows that the incentive structure surrounding sovereign lending renders untenable the Treasury's contractarian proposal. The Article's analysis …
Interpreting Indentures: How Disequilibrium Economics And Financial Asset Specificity Support Narrow Interpretation, Houman B. Shadab
Interpreting Indentures: How Disequilibrium Economics And Financial Asset Specificity Support Narrow Interpretation, Houman B. Shadab
Articles & Chapters
No abstract provided.
An Economic Analysis Of The Potential For Coercion In Consent Solicitations For Bonds, Royce De R. Barondes
An Economic Analysis Of The Potential For Coercion In Consent Solicitations For Bonds, Royce De R. Barondes
Faculty Publications
This Article examines why issuers frequently cannot present bondholders with an offer that draws on collective action problems to force the acceptance of the offer by the bondholders. The analysis is restricted to publicly offered bonds. For a number of reasons, privately placed debt presents fewer opportunities for coercion. A prior business relationship among various purchasers, which facilitates cooperation, may be more likely with respect to privately placed debt. Privately placed debt often has more significant protection for the bondholders than public debt with the same level of seniority