Law Commons^™

Disclosure's Purpose, Hillary A. Sale

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The United States securities regulatory infrastructure requires disclosure of a wide array of information both by and about covered companies. The basic purpose of the disclosures is to level the playing field – for investors, for issuers, and for the public. Although investor protection is the disclosure goal often touted, this article develops the purposes of disclosure extending beyond investors to issuers and the public. Indeed, the disclosure system is designed to level the playing field for issuers— addressing confidentiality concerns, for example. In addition, the system helps to promote confidence in the markets, which, in turn, enables growth and …

Fintech And The Innovation Trilemma, Yesha Yadav, Chris Brummer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Whether in response to roboadvising, artificial intelligence, or crypto-currencies like Bitcoin, regulators around the world have made it a top policy priority to supervise the exponential growth of financial technology (or "fintech") in the post-Crisis era. However, applying traditional regulatory strategies to new technological ecosystems has proven conceptually difficult. Part of the challenge lies in the tradeoffs involved in regulating innovations that could conceivably both help and hurt consumers and market participants alike. Problems also arise from the common assumption that today's fintech is a mere continuation of the story of innovation that has shaped finance for centuries.

This Article …

Mandatory Disclosure In Primary Markets, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Mandatory disclosure—the idea that companies must be legally required to disclose certain, specified information to public investors—is the first principle of modern securities law. Despite the high costs it imposes, mandatory disclosure has been well defended by legal scholars on two theoretical grounds: ‘Agency costs’ and ‘information underproduction.’ While these two concepts are a good fit for secondary markets (where investors trade securities with one another), this Article shows that they are largely irrelevant in the context of primary markets (where companies offer securities directly to investors). The surprising result is that primary offerings—such as an IPO—may not require mandatory …

Financial Contracting With The Crowd, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Equity crowdfunding is broken. The current model imposes too many burdens on entrepreneurs in exchange for too little money. For alternative models, this Article looks to the time-tested venture capital financial contract, and the recent experience of initial coin offerings (ICOs). ICOs made headlines over the past two years, as the means by which blockchain technology companies raised billions of dollars to launch new cryptocurrency ventures. Although their novelty as a monetary and investing device is well known, ICOs also presented significant, unappreciated insights into financial contracting.

ICOs furnished an unprecedented experiment into how bargains would look if entrepreneurs raised …

Fiduciary Law In Financial Regulation, Howell E. Jackson, Talia B. Gillis

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter explores the application of fiduciary duties to regulated financial firms and financial services. At first blush, the need for such a chapter might strike some as surprising in that fiduciary duties and systems of financial regulation can be conceptualized as governing distinctive and nonoverlapping spheres: fiduciary duties police private activity through open-ended, judicially defined standards imposed on an ex post basis, whereas financial regulations set largely mandatory, ex ante obligations for regulated entities under supervisory systems established in legislation and implemented through expert administrative agencies. Yet, as the chapter documents, fiduciary duties often do overlap with systems of …