Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 9 of 9

Full-Text Articles in Law

Transitive Counterparty Risk And Financial Contracts, Manuel A. Utset Jul 2013

Transitive Counterparty Risk And Financial Contracts, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


Financial System Engineering, Manuel A. Utset Apr 2013

Financial System Engineering, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes And Time-Inconsistent Preference, Manuel A. Utset Jan 2013

Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes And Time-Inconsistent Preference, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


The False Promise Of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: Evidence From Executive Pensions And Deferred Compensation, Kelli A. Alces, Brian D. Galle Oct 2012

The False Promise Of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: Evidence From Executive Pensions And Deferred Compensation, Kelli A. Alces, Brian D. Galle

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


Complex Financial Institutions And Systemic Risk, Manuel A. Utset Apr 2011

Complex Financial Institutions And Systemic Risk, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


Managerial Entrenchment And Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory And Evidence From A Recessionary Market, Jay B. Kesten Jan 2010

Managerial Entrenchment And Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory And Evidence From A Recessionary Market, Jay B. Kesten

Scholarly Publications

Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and valuation of takeover premiums. The mainstream view, both of academics and market participants, is that entrenchment reduces accountability to shareholders and amplifies agency costs, thus decreasing shareholder wealth. Two influential studies (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) and Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003)) present empirical evidence consistent with this conclusion, finding statistically significant negative correlations between entrenchment and …


Strategic Governance, Kelli A. Alces Jan 2008

Strategic Governance, Kelli A. Alces

Scholarly Publications

Creditors exercise significant power over financially distressed corporations, thereby pushing corporate managers further into the realm of unprofitable risk aversion. The heavy hand of creditor power and the threats creditors are able to make to managers’ professional stability and success misalign senior officers’ incentives by undermining their freedom to make wealth-maximizing decisions on behalf of the corporation. The importance of independent managerial decision making is paramount in the law of corporate governance and that independence has been inefficiently undermined by the exertion of oppressive creditor control. This Article resolves the problem by creating a mechanism to balance shareholder and creditor …


Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory Of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, Manuel A. Utset Jan 2002

Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory Of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


The Discipline Of Institutions And The Disciplining Of Banks, Manuel A. Utset Jan 1995

The Discipline Of Institutions And The Disciplining Of Banks, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.