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Full-Text Articles in Law
Dismantling Large Bank Holding Companies For Their Own Good And For The Good Of The Country, Tamar Frankel
Dismantling Large Bank Holding Companies For Their Own Good And For The Good Of The Country, Tamar Frankel
Faculty Scholarship
This paper suggests that bank holding companies are in fact “financial malls.” I demonstrates the problems that they pose for the financial system, not only by size but by inefficient and inappropriate concentration. The article suggests restructuring of bank holding companies by introducing more market discipline to the various “shops” in the mall as well as concentrating services for the purpose of efficiency. The Article concludes with suggestion that rather than imposing a restructure by law it may perhaps be possible to entice managements that look to the long-term future to follow a restructure voluntarily.
Interbank Discipline, Kathryn Judge
Interbank Discipline, Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined – a dramatic rise in interbank discipline. The Article demonstrates that today's large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, They also have the infrastructure, competence, and information required to be fairly effective monitors and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile. Interbank discipline thus affects bank risk taking, discouraging banks from taking some types of …
Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, Eric J. Gouvin
Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, Eric J. Gouvin
Faculty Scholarship
This Article considers the federal banking regulation regime implemented in response to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. The first section of the Article examines the moral hazard problem created by the presence of the deposit insurance scheme and the market discipline debate that has attempted to correct the moral hazard problem. The Author argues that the law has evolved to make bank holding companies the primary enforcers of market discipline. The Article’s second section examines the specific regulatory changes that have been designed to create an incentive for bank holding companies to impose discipline on …