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Pay For Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation For Risk Regulation, Frederick Tung
Pay For Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation For Risk Regulation, Frederick Tung
Faculty Scholarship
Excessive risk taking by firm managers did not originate with the Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Though bankers had special incentives to take big risks in the period before the Crisis, the incentive effects of equity-based compensation have been understood for some time. Among other things, equity compensation tends to induce greater risk taking by aligning managers’ risk preferences with those of equity holders. Longstanding government guaranties of bank liabilities additionally served to intensify bankers’ risk taking incentives.
I propose to ameliorate this gambler’s incentive with a new approach to compensation at the largest banks, one that explicitly accounts for the …