Law Commons^™

Bankruptcy For Banks: A Tribute (And Little Plea) To Jay Westbrook, David A. Skeel Jr.

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In this brief essay, to be included in a book celebrating the work of Jay Westbrook, I begin by surveying Jay’s wide-ranging contributions to bankruptcy scholarship. Jay’s functional analysis has had a profound effect on scholars’ understanding of key issues in domestic bankruptcy law, and Jay has been the leading scholarly figure on cross-border insolvency. After surveying Jay’s influence, I turn to the topic at hand: a proposed reform that would facilitate the use of bankruptcy to resolve the financial distress of large financial institutions. Jay has been a strong critic of this legislation, arguing that financial institutions need to …

A No-Tribunal Sdrm And The Means Of Binding Creditors To The Terms Of A Restructuring Plan, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

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The paper addresses two discrete but related and essential attributes of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). It first considers the merits and feasibility of an SDRM that would provide a procedure for proposing and adopting a restructuring plan for a sovereign debtor’s debt which would not involve any tribunal or administrator (a No-Tribunal SDRM). The No-Tribunal SDRM would undertake the restructuring as if the sovereign debtor and its creditors were subject to the Model CAC regime. In addition to embodying a novel and interesting structure for an SDRM—and one that eliminates the difficult hurdle of identifying a satisfactory tribunal—adoption …

A Framework For A Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The Kiss Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) And Other Guiding Principles, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

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Given the ongoing work on a multilateral restructuring process for sovereign debt in the UN, consideration of the content and implementation of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is timely. The framework and content of the SDRM proposed here differs from earlier proposals in several important respects. For the classification and supermajority voting of claims in the approval a restructuring plan, it would mimic the structure and operation of the model collective action clauses (Model CACs) proposed by the International Capital Markets Association. Restructuring under a qualified sovereign debt restructuring law (QSDRL) would be guided by four principles: (i) observe …

The Cape Town Convention’S Improbable-But-Possible Progeny Part Two: Bilateral Investment Treaty-Like Enforcement Mechanism, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

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This Essay is Part Two of a two-part essay series that outlines and evaluates two possible future international instruments. Each instrument draws substantial inspiration from the Cape Town Convention and its Aircraft Protocol (together, the “Convention”). The Convention governs the secured financing and leasing of large commercial aircraft, aircraft engines, and helicopters. It entered into force in 2006. It has been adopted by sixty-six Contracting States (fifty-eight of which have adopted the Aircraft Protocol), including the U.S., China, the E.U., India, Ireland, Luxembourg, Russia, and South Africa.

This Part of the Essay explores whether an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) feature …

The Bankruptcy Code’S Safe Harbors For Settlement Payments And Securities Contracts: When Is Safe Too Safe?, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

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This Article addresses insolvency law-related issues in connection with certain financial-markets contracts, such as securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements (repos), swaps and other derivatives, and master netting agreements. The Bankruptcy Code provides special treatment—safe harbors—for these contracts (collectively, qualified financial contracts or QFCs). This special treatment is considerably more favorable for nondebtor parties to QFCs than the rules applicable to nondebtor parties to other contracts with a debtor. Yet even some strong critics of the safe harbors concede that some special treatment may be warranted. This Article offers a critique of the safe harbor for settlement payments, …

Reconciling The Dormant Conflict: Crafting A Banking Exception To The Fraudulent Conveyance Provision Of The Bankruptcy Code For Bank Holding Company Asset Transfers, Cassandra Jones Havard

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Banking law and bankruptcy law clash. This is most evident when a bank holding company (parent company) becomes insolvent after it has made an asset transfer to its financially troubled bank subsidiary.

The Bankruptcy Code (Code) governs the insolvency proceedings of the bank holding company. Predictably, the parent company's trustee, appointed for the protection of all the creditors of the bankrupt entity, uses the fraudulent conveyance provision of the Code to have any asset transfers that were made to the bank subsidiary returned to the debtor's estate. The good faith exception to that provision will protect the asset transfer only …

Back To The Parent: Holding Company Liability For Subsidiary Banks — A Discussion Of The Net Worth Maintenance Agreement, The Source Of Strength Doctrine, And The Prompt Corrective Action Provision, Cassandra Jones Havard

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Given the statutory goal of parental accountability, this Article focuses on a narrow issue: Whether parental guarantees are the most effective regulatory tool for shielding the federal deposit insurance fund from losses when insured banking subsidiaries that are members of a multibank holding company system are insolvent. This Article posits that a needed complement to parental guarantees is temporary substantive consolidation of a holding company's affiliated banks. This would require the parent company to combine the assets of its banking siblings to facilitate the reorganization of a financially troubled subsidiary. Temporary enterprise consolidation is a necessary regulatory tool because it …