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Full-Text Articles in Law

A Narrow View Of Transnational Fiduciary Law, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2023

A Narrow View Of Transnational Fiduciary Law, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Fiduciaries frequently confront transnational situations. Yet, even as people, products, and capital have become more mobile, scholars have until recently given little attention to the transnational dimensions of fiduciary law.

This chapter conceptualizes transnational fiduciary law, a term that marries the fields of fiduciary and transnational law. It identifies two primary understandings of the concept and explores their scope and possible content.

Under the first interpretation of this composite concept, the term transnational qualifies what fiduciary scholars have conventionally understood as fiduciary law. Transnational fiduciary law, on this view, encompasses the application of fiduciary law to transnational problems and situations. …


Comments On Proposed Rules For Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, And Projections, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2022

Comments On Proposed Rules For Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, And Projections, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In March 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission released proposed rules for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), shell companies, and projections. In this comment letter, filed with the SEC, I provide a critical assessment of this proposal.

The SEC proposed far-reaching changes intended to enhance investor protections and align disclosure and liability rules in de-SPACs more closely with those in traditional IPOs. An under-appreciated feature of the proposed reforms is that they would subject de-SPACs to provisions closely modeled on Rule 13e-3 of the Exchange Act, which applies to going-private transactions, including management buyouts. Intended to tackle potential conflicts of …


The Further Erosion Of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions, Spac Mergers, And Direct Listings, Andrew F. Tuch, Joel Seligman Jan 2022

The Further Erosion Of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions, Spac Mergers, And Direct Listings, Andrew F. Tuch, Joel Seligman

Scholarship@WashULaw

This Article examines the decades-long decline of investor protections enshrined in the Securities Act of 1933, most notably Section 11, which imposes near strict liability on corporate insiders and certain secondary actors, primarily underwriters. The provision, the most potent in the federal securities regulatory arsenal, popularized the concept of outside gatekeepers and transformed practices in securities offerings, making due diligence a byword for careful investigation of facts whether required by legal process or otherwise. The measures required by Section 11 restored confidence in US capital markets in the wake of the Great Depression and have been instrumental in these markets’ …


M&A Advisor Misconduct: A Wrong Without A Remedy?, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2021

M&A Advisor Misconduct: A Wrong Without A Remedy?, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Merger and acquisition ("M&A") transactions are among the most high profile of corporate transactions. They are also among the most contentious, with around eighty percent of all completed deals litigated in recent years. And yet investment banks—essential advisors on these deals—have generally succeeded spectacularly in avoiding liability, an anomaly considering the routine nature of deal litigation and the frequency with which they face lawsuits in their other activities. This article examines this anomaly, explaining the doctrinal and practical reasons why it arises. In doing so, it puts in context aiding and abetting liability, a recently-successful shareholder strategy to bring M&A …


Managing Management Buyouts: A Us-Uk Comparative Analysis, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2021

Managing Management Buyouts: A Us-Uk Comparative Analysis, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This chapter comparatively assesses U.S. and U.K. law governing management buyouts (MBOs), focusing on the duties of directors and officers in these systems. The analysis casts doubt on persistent but mistaken perceptions about U.S. and U.K. corporate fiduciary duties for self-dealing. The U.K. no-conflict rule is seen as strict, the U.S. fairness rule as flexible and pragmatic. As the analysis for MBOs demonstrates, these fiduciary rules operate similarly, tasking neutral or disinterested directors with policing self-dealing, enabling commercially sensitive responses to conflicts of interest. The analysis also reveals stronger formal private enforcement of corporate law and more robust disclosure rules …


Introduction: The Rise Of Fintech, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2020

Introduction: The Rise Of Fintech, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This foreword introduces "The Rise of Fintech," a series of essays published in a symposium issue of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy. The contributions examine the structure of firms and markets, considering fintech activities occurring within existing firms and regulatory perimeters and activities that spill over the boundaries we currently take for granted. The contributors examine the emerging regulatory responses to fintech, taxonomizing them. They consider which regulatory approaches, or ecosystems, will best help fintech to develop. They examine how fintech applies to fundraising, examining initial coin offerings (ICOs) and equity crowdfunding, techniques that attract attention for …


The Foundations Of Anglo-American Corporate Fiduciary Law, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2019

The Foundations Of Anglo-American Corporate Fiduciary Law, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

How does legal doctrine form, why does it change, and why do doctrines with a common starting point, in legal systems with a shared heritage, diverge? This essay reviews and critiques a book by David Kershaw that addresses these questions. The book charts the evolution of corporate fiduciary law in the United Kingdom and United States and, comparing the two systems, explains how and why the respective legal regimes evolved as they did. Kershaw weighs in on contested U.S. scholarly debates, confronting the common claim that doctrinal change is less the product of internal logic or strict precedent than a …


Proxy Advisor Influence In A Comparative Light, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2019

Proxy Advisor Influence In A Comparative Light, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

The reform of proxy advisors is on the U.S. regulatory agenda, with debate focusing on the extent of influence that these actors exert over institutional investors and corporate managers. But the debate examines the U.S. position in isolation from other systems. If we broaden our focus, we see that the factors usually cited for proxy advisors’ influence exist similarly in the United Kingdom but that proxy advisors there exert significantly weaker influence than they do in the United States. Why this difference when we would expect a similar role for proxy advisors in both systems based on the presence of …


Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict And Fairness, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2019

Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict And Fairness, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Scholars have long disagreed on which of two rules is more effective when a fiduciary engages in self-dealing. Some defend the “strict” no-conflict rule, which categorically bans self-dealing. Others prefer the “flexible” and “pragmatic” fairness rule, which allows self-dealing if it is fair to beneficiaries. The centrality of this debate cannot be overstated: corporate law as a field is fundamentally concerned with self-dealing by fiduciaries. Yet a lack of firm data means that this debate has dragged on for decades, with no end in sight. This article makes a simple but powerful point: the entire debate is somewhat misguided because, …


Fiduciary Principles In Banking Law, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2019

Fiduciary Principles In Banking Law, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

When are banks fiduciaries of their customers and clients? This question is of more than theoretical interest given the organizational structure of modern financial institutions and the broad-ranging functions they perform. In this chapter of the Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, I canvass fiduciary principles in banking law. I consider when fiduciary duties exist and what they require, the range of remedies available for breach, and the various techniques banks use to exclude or modify fiduciary duties. One puzzling feature of the legal landscape is that clients bring actions less often than banks’ size and conduct might suggest, which contributes …


The Remaking Of Wall Street, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2017

The Remaking Of Wall Street, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This Article critically examines the transformation of the financial services industry during and since the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. This transformation has been marked by the demise of the major investment banks and the related rise of a set of powerful players known as private equity firms or alternative asset managers – pools of assets structured as private funds. First, this Article argues that private equity firms now mirror investment banks in their mix of activities; ethos of entrepreneurialism, innovation, and risk-taking; role as “shadow banks”; and overall power and influence.

These similarities might suggest that private equity firms pose …


The Limits Of Gatekeeper Liability, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2017

The Limits Of Gatekeeper Liability, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Gatekeeper liability – the framework under which actors such as law firms, investment banks and accountants face liability for the wrongs committed by their corporate clients – is one of the most widely used strategies for controlling corporate wrongdoing. It nevertheless faces well-recognized flaws: gatekeepers often depend financially on the clients whose conduct they monitor; to carry out their gatekeeping function, gatekeepers rely on individuals – often their employees – whose interests diverge from their own; and major transactions typically involve multiple gatekeepers, each with specific areas of expertise and information, which produces both gaps and overlaps in the gatekeeping …