Law Commons^™

The Trouble With Investment Banking: Cluelessness, Not Greed, Will Bunting

San Diego Law Review

We assume that the set of marketable financial instruments can be divided into two distinct categories: (1) easy to price and (2) difficult to price, and then isolate two behavioral effects as most important with respect to securities trading in difficult-to-price securities; specifically, the "house money effect" and the "earned money effect." It is shown that these behavioral effects discourage profitable investment in research effort.

We then argue that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) safe harbor should not apply to investment banks that issue/underwrite difficult-to-price securities. We also advocate for the return of the private investment banking partnership …

The Dangerous Illusion Of International Financial Standards And The Legacy Of The Financial Stability Forum, Cally Jordan

San Diego International Law Journal

In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, and the criticism directed towards the International Monetary Fund, in particular, for not having seen it coming, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was created in 1999 under a mandate from the G7 ministers of finance and central bank governors. The Asian Financial Crisis arose suddenly, spread rapidly, and spared neither developed nor developing economies in the region, although some fared much better than others. In retrospect, the causes of the crisis were obvious and the consequences predictable. Contagion entered the financial lexicon. Thus, the role of the FSF was to promote financial …

Overseeing Controlling Shareholders: Do Independent Directors Constrain Tunneling In Taiwan?, Yu-Hsin Lin

San Diego International Law Journal

This Article intends to explore the extent to which independent directors constrain tunneling by controlling shareholders in Taiwan. Taiwan serves as an appropriate jurisdiction for research since the private benefits agency problem is prevalent among Taiwanese public companies. A further twist in Taiwan?s case is that independent directors were newly introduced to Taiwan?s corporate boards, which follow dual-board system where the traditional monitoring function is served by statutory supervisors, instead of board committees, which adds to the complexity in analyzing the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining tunneling activities. Part II reviews relevant literature and lays the foundation for this …

A Test Case In International Bankruptcy Protocols: The Lehman Brothers Insolvency, Jamie Altman

San Diego International Law Journal

Part II of this Article, explains the competing theories underlying bankruptcy systems: universalism and territorialism. Part III details various statutory solutions to international bankruptcy problems. Next, Part IV analyzes the provisions of the Lehman Protocol in depth. Part V then examines the precedent upon which the Lehman Protocol relies. Part VI assesses potential threats to the Protocol?s success. This leads to Part VII, which contains suggestions for future protocols. Finally, Part VIII concludes.