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Banking and Finance Law

University of Cincinnati College of Law

Financial regulation

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Regulation Of Equity Index Futures, Lin (Lynn) Bai Jan 2020

The Regulation Of Equity Index Futures, Lin (Lynn) Bai

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Equity index futures are one of the most actively traded derivative instruments in financial markets around the world. Advancements in trading and clearing technologies transformed the marketplace over the past two decades. Regulation drastically changed to keep pace with the market’s development. New rules have been implemented covering trading activities, risk management, market surveillance, and customer protection. Legal literature on the regulation of this important financial instrument is surprisingly antiquated. Existing papers were written decades ago and do not reflect the true metes and bounds of today’s regulatory landscape. This paper fills the void. It provides a comprehensive discussion of …


Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion In Derivatives Markets, Felix B. Chang Jan 2016

Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion In Derivatives Markets, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The reluctance of antitrust to condemn parallel exclusion permits oligopolies to be entrenched. This is because parallel exclusion—multiple-firm conduct that inhibits market entrants—cannot satisfy the current strictures of monopolization, which is understood to prohibit single-firm conduct. Yet this is an outdated way of conceptualizing monopolization. An expansion of monopolization—to cover parallel, non-collusive acts by an oligopoly—is due.

To push the law toward recognizing parallel exclusion, this Article examines concentration in the markets for financial derivatives, which are perennially dominated by the same big banks. Even after losses under first-generation antitrust claims, the dominant derivatives dealers have found ways to retain …


The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks And Clearinghouses Under Regulation, Felix B. Chang Jan 2014

The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks And Clearinghouses Under Regulation, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Consolidation in the financial industry threatens competition and increases systemic risk. Recently, banks have seen both high-profile mergers and spectacular failures, prompting a flurry of regulatory responses. Yet consolidation has not been as closely scrutinized for clearinghouses, which facilitate trading in securities and derivatives products. These nonbank intermediaries can be thought of as middlemen who collect deposits to ensure that each buyer and seller has the wherewithal to uphold its end of the deal. Clearinghouses mitigate the credit risks that buyers and sellers would face if they dealt directly with each other.

Yet here lies the dilemma: large clearinghouses reduce …


Death To Credit As Leverage: Using The Bank Anti-Tying Provision To Curb Financial Risk, Felix B. Chang Jan 2014

Death To Credit As Leverage: Using The Bank Anti-Tying Provision To Curb Financial Risk, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Today, the need for nimble financial regulation is paramount. The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill has not prevented further scandals and will not stop banks from selling risky products. Yet one understudied law is a surprisingly versatile device that has the potential to temper financial risk: the Bank Holding Company Act’s Anti-Tying Provision. The Anti-Tying Provision prohibits banks from requiring borrowers to purchase additional products in order to obtain a loan. It applies antitrust principles to bank sales and lending practices. Under antitrust law, a seller cannot condition the availability of one item (the desired product) on the consumer’s purchase of …