Law Commons^™

Law, Fugitive Capital, And Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation, Walter J. Kendall Lll

Walter J. Kendall lll

No abstract provided.

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …

Federalism And Fiduciaries: A New Framework For Protecting State Benefit Funds, Richard E. Mendales

Richard E. Mendales

The financial crisis has underlined difficulties faced by states and their subdivisions in paying benefits to their employees. The most spectacular example is Detroit's bankruptcy, but state and local employers across the country face sharp cuts in benefits as their employers fight for solvency. A federal solution such as ERISA is precluded by considerations of federalism and the impracticability of getting major legislation through Congress. This Article proposes an alternative solution: a uniform state code, following other uniform state laws such as the Uniform Commercial Code, that states could adopt to govern both state and local plans. It would finance …

Financial Armageddon Routs Law Again, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos

Nicholas L Georgakopoulos

This essay, after highlighting the unique aspects of financial markets, offers a mostly rational account for financial crises, centering on the 2008 crisis as an example. The thesis is that market participants overestimate the duration of high productivity growth due to new technologies and produce occasional—and likely unavoidable—bubbles. Considering potential changes in the regulation of financial markets, the conclusion is grim. Regulators appear to have exhausted the effective legal levers against overestimations of continued high growth. The legislative responses to the last few crises were likely unproductive. The sole (but still unrealistic) effective protection would be the constitutional development of …