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Full-Text Articles in Law
A Process For Politics, Anna Gelpern
A Process For Politics, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
I argue that consistent and public process observance has a distinctly valuable function in sovereign debt restructuring, with no precise equivalent in national insolvency regimes. National regimes reflect the distribution bargains of their enactment, presumptively legitimate and binding. Debtors and creditors allocate insolvency losses in their shadow, with liquidation as a backstop and politics just outside the frame. All else equal, the restructuring process has a harder job with sovereign debt. There is no liquidation backstop and no default distribution scenario. Each crisis resolution episode must allocate losses from scratch among the country’s citizens, foreign and domestic creditors, and other …
Cacs And Doorknobs, Anna Gelpern, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Cacs And Doorknobs, Anna Gelpern, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In response to debt crises, policy makers often feature Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds among the pillars of international financial architecture. However, the content of official pronouncements about CACs suggests that CACs are more like doorknobs: a process tool with limited impact on the incidence or ultimate outcome of a debt restructuring. We ask whether CACs are welfare improving and, if so, whether they are pillars or doorknobs. The history of CACs in corporate debt suggests that CACs can be good, bad or unimportant depending on their vulnerability to abuse and the available alternatives, including bankruptcy and debt …
Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern
Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The sovereign debt restructuring regime looks like it is coming apart. Changing patterns of capital flows, old creditors’ weakening commitment to past practices, and other stakeholders’ inability to take over, or coalesce behind a viable alternative, have challenged the regime from the moment it took shape in the mid-1990s. By 2016, its survival cannot be taken for granted. Crises in Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine since 2010 exposed the regime’s perennial failures and new shortcomings. Until an alternative emerges, there may be messier, more protracted restructurings, more demands on public resources, and more pressure on national courts to intervene in disputes …
Count The Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses In Sovereign Bonds, Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller, Brad Setser
Count The Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses In Sovereign Bonds, Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller, Brad Setser
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
On August 29, 2014, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) published new recommended terms for sovereign bond contracts governed by English law. One of the new terms would allow a super majority of creditors to approve a debtor’s restructuring proposal in one vote across multiple bond series. The vote could bind all bond holders, even if a series voted unanimously against restructuring, so long as enough holders in the other series voted for it. An apparently technical change, awkwardly named “single-limb aggregated collective action clauses (CACs)” promised to eliminate free-riders for the first time in the history of sovereign bond …