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Full-Text Articles in Law
Regulating Financial Guarantors, Steven L. Schwarcz
Regulating Financial Guarantors, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
To improve financial regulation, scholars have engaged in extensive research over the past decade to try to understand why systemically important financial firms engage in excessive risk-taking. None of that research fully explains, however, the unusually excessive risk-taking by financial guarantors such as bond insurers, protection sellers under credit-default-swap (CDS) derivatives, credit enhancers in securitization transactions, and even issuers of standby letters of credit. With tens of trillions of dollars of financial guarantees outstanding, the potential for failure is massive. This Article argues that financial guarantor risk-taking is influenced by a previously unrecognized cognitive bias, which it calls “abstraction bias.” …
The Evolution Of Contractual Terms In Sovereign Bonds, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Eric A. Posner
The Evolution Of Contractual Terms In Sovereign Bonds, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
In reaction to defaults on sovereign debt contracts, issuers and creditors have strengthened the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; debtors may engage in excessively risky activities using …