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The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor For Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, Steven L. Schwarcz, Ori Sharon
The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor For Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, Steven L. Schwarcz, Ori Sharon
Faculty Scholarship
U.S. bankruptcy law grants special rights and immunities to creditors in derivatives transactions, including virtually unlimited enforcement rights. This article argues that these rights and immunities result from a form of path dependence, a sequence of industry-lobbied legislative steps, each incremental and in turn serving as apparent justification for the next step, without a rigorous and systematic vetting of the consequences. Because the resulting “safe harbor” has not been fully vetted, its significance and utility should not be taken for granted; and thus regulators, legislators, and other policymakers—whether in the United States or abroad—should not automatically assume, based on its …
Santa Anna And His Black Eagle: The Origins Of Pari Passu?, Benjamin Chabot, Mitu Gulati
Santa Anna And His Black Eagle: The Origins Of Pari Passu?, Benjamin Chabot, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most debated issues in international finance is the meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds. The clause is ubiquitous; it is in almost every single foreign-law sovereign bond out there. Yet, almost no one seems to agree on its meaning. One way to cut the Gordian knot is to track down the origins of the clause. Modern lawyers may have simply copied the clause from the documents of their predecessors without understanding its meaning. But surely the people who first drafted the clause knew what it meant. Four enterprising students at Duke Law School may …
The Gathering Storm: Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Liabilities, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati
The Gathering Storm: Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Liabilities, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
The contingent liabilities of a sovereign, such as guarantees of the debts of third parties, can normally be kept off the balance sheet of the sovereign guarantor. That is their charm. As the debt to GDP ratios of many developed countries approach red-zone levels, contingent liabilities are increasingly being favored over direct, on-the-balance-sheet, borrowings.
But what happens if a country carrying large contingent liabilities needs to restructure its debt? The borrower dare not leave its contingent claims out of the restructuring. To do so would risk undermining the financial predicates of the sovereign’s economic recovery program should the beneficiaries of …