Law Commons^™

An Empirical Investigation Of Third Party Consumer Litigant Funding, Ronen Avraham, Anthony Sebok

Cornell Law Review

No abstract provided.

Can Soft Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central Bank's Supervision Of Behavior And Culture, John M. Conley, Cynthia A. Williams, Lodewijk Smeehuijzen, Deborah E. Rupp

Cornell International Law Journal

Financial regulation has traditionally been "hard": national legislatures and regulators (and sometimes international bodies) require certain kinds of behavior and forbid others, on pain of business sanctions, fines, or even criminal penalties. When a financial crisis happens, the usual after-the-fact response is more hard regulation-new laws, stricter regulations, and often entirely new regulatory agencies.That pattern goes back at least to the 1929 market crash that precipitated the Great Depression.

But the fact that financial crises still occur is leading many observers to wonder if more hard regulation is the best way to prevent the next one. However elaborate the regulatory …

Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua R. Mitts, Robert E. Bishop

Cornell Law Review

We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both informed trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund-nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation's stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund's slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate governance. …