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Principal Costs: A New Theory For Corporate Law And Governance, Zohar Goshen, Richard Squire
Principal Costs: A New Theory For Corporate Law And Governance, Zohar Goshen, Richard Squire
Faculty Scholarship
The problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law. Many leading scholars advocate reforms that would reduce agency costs by forcing firms to allocate more control to shareholders. Such proposals disregard the costs that shareholders avoid by delegating control to managers and voluntarily restricting their own control rights. This Essay introduces principal-cost theory, which posits that each firm’s optimal governance structure minimizes the sum of principal costs, produced when investors exercise control, and agent costs, produced when managers exercise control. Both principal costs and agent costs can arise from honest mistakes (which generate competence costs) and …