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Full-Text Articles in Law

A Look Back In Time: Analyzing The Success And Value Of The 2014 Amendments To Rule 2a-7 And Reporting On Form N-Cr In Light Of The March 2020 Market Events, Jocelyn Near Apr 2024

A Look Back In Time: Analyzing The Success And Value Of The 2014 Amendments To Rule 2a-7 And Reporting On Form N-Cr In Light Of The March 2020 Market Events, Jocelyn Near

Catholic University Law Review

Money market funds have frequently been a target of regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Perhaps the most expansive regulation came as a response to the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck.” The SEC’s misguided 2014 reforms exacerbated the inherent risks of money market funds, including the risk of runs and first mover advantage, particularly with the implementation of Form N-CR. Form N-CR requires a money market fund to publicly report when various events occur, including when a retail or government money market fund’s current net asset value per share deviates downward …


Loophole Entrepreneurship, Brian M. Sirman Dec 2023

Loophole Entrepreneurship, Brian M. Sirman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

All entrepreneurs seek favorable legal or regulatory treatment for their businesses. Sometimes this leads an entrepreneur to build a business within a gap in the law—a loophole. In so doing, these “loophole entrepreneurs” may avoid steep regulatory compliance costs that otherwise would beset (or perhaps prohibit) their businesses, thereby gaining advantages over competitors. Despite these benefits, loophole entrepreneurship is fraught with risks. Loopholes, by nature, are fragile, and their contours are often uncertain. Moreover, the stigma of “exploiting a loophole” (which connotes unfairness or deception) can provoke ill will among competitors, policymakers, and the public.

The ranks of loophole entrepreneurs …


Law School News: Omshehe Wins Top National Prize With Securities Regulation Article 11-4-2022, Michael M. Bowden Nov 2022

Law School News: Omshehe Wins Top National Prize With Securities Regulation Article 11-4-2022, Michael M. Bowden

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.


Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman Oct 2022

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman

Faculty Scholarship

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets. If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place, the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.

During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition …


The Environmental, Social, Governance (Esg) Debate Emerges From The Soil Of Climate Denial, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman Oct 2022

The Environmental, Social, Governance (Esg) Debate Emerges From The Soil Of Climate Denial, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman

Faculty Scholarship

It has been almost six decades since Rachel Carson’s ominous warning of pending environmental disaster. During 2019 the United Nations requested urgent action from world leaders, given that “just over a decade is all that remains to stop irreversible damage from climate change.” With every passing year, damage resulting from destructive climate change causes increased pain, suffering, death and massive property loss. During 2020 and 2021 alone, severe weather events have included: destructive fires in California; record breaking freeze, power outage, and threat to the electrical grid in Texas; continuation of disruptive drought in U.S. Western states; and record-breaking high …


Third Party Moral Hazard And The Problem Of Insurance Externalities, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman Jan 2022

Third Party Moral Hazard And The Problem Of Insurance Externalities, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

Insurance can lead to loss or claim-creation not just by insureds themselves, but also by uninsured third parties. These externalities—which we term “third party moral hazard”—arise because insurance creates opportunities both to extract rents and to recover for otherwise unrecoverable losses. Using examples from health, automobile, kidnap, and liability insurance, we demonstrate that the phenomenon is widespread and important, and that the downsides of insurance are greater than previously believed. We explain the economic, social and psychological reasons for this phenomenon, and propose policy responses. Contract-based methods that are traditionally used to control first-party moral hazard can be welfare-reducing in …


How To Sue An Asue? Closing The Racial Wealth Gap Through The Transplantation Of A Cultural Institution, Cyril A.L. Heron Feb 2021

How To Sue An Asue? Closing The Racial Wealth Gap Through The Transplantation Of A Cultural Institution, Cyril A.L. Heron

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Asues, academically known as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (or ROSCAs for short), are informal cultural institutions that are prominent in developing countries across the globe. Their utilization in those countries provide rural and ostracized communities with a means to save money and invest in the community simultaneously. Adoption of the asue into the United States could serve as the foundation by which to close the racial wealth gap. Notwithstanding the benefits, wholesale adoption of any asue model runs the risk of cultural rejection because the institution is foreign to the African American community.

Drawing upon principles of cultural and …


Regulating Financial Guarantors, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2021

Regulating Financial Guarantors, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

To improve financial regulation, scholars have engaged in extensive research over the past decade to try to understand why systemically important financial firms engage in excessive risk-taking. None of that research fully explains, however, the unusually excessive risk-taking by financial guarantors such as bond insurers, protection sellers under credit-default-swap (CDS) derivatives, credit enhancers in securitization transactions, and even issuers of standby letters of credit. With tens of trillions of dollars of financial guarantees outstanding, the potential for failure is massive. This Article argues that financial guarantor risk-taking is influenced by a previously unrecognized cognitive bias, which it calls “abstraction bias.” …


Coercive Competition: A New Paradigm For Culture And Conduct Risk Management, Stephen Scott Feb 2020

Coercive Competition: A New Paradigm For Culture And Conduct Risk Management, Stephen Scott

Seattle University Law Review

Ultimately, this is an Article about human behavior, its causes and consequences. A subject so vast does not confine itself to any one, narrow, academic swim-lane and neither do I. Rather, I have afforded myself the luxury of borrowing liberally from a range of disciplines and their associated literatures, seeking to weave a coherent narrative that allows us to ask “what are we to do?” and to posit an approach to identifying responsive ideas that at least warrant some consideration.


The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody Jul 2019

The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody

Karen Woody

This Article posits that the success of macroprudential regulation will depend on four factors. First, the economic philosophy of the central banker in charge of the domestic institution with jurisdiction over macroprudential regulation will prove crucial in the implementation of adopted regulation. If, like Chairman Greenspan, the banker is averse to the exercise of the Central Bank's regulatory oversight authority, then no amount or volume of policy or regulation will prevent or mitigate systemic risks and the accompanying shocks. Second, a sufficiently deep level of international cooperation is required to mitigate regulatory arbitrage, without being so broad that the ensuing …


Grants, Nicholson Price Ii May 2019

Grants, Nicholson Price Ii

Articles

Innovation is a primary source of economic growth and is accordingly the target of substantial academic and government attention. Grants are a key tool in the government’s arsenal to promote innovation, but legal academic studies of that arsenal have given them short shrift. Although patents, prizes, and regulator-enforced exclusivity are each the subject of substantial literature, grants are typically addressed briefly, if at all. According to the conventional story, grants may be the only feasible tool to drive basic research, as opposed to applied research, but they are a blunt tool for that task. Three critiques of grants underlie this …


Remembering Financial Crises: The Risk Implications Of The Rise Of Institutional Investors In Project Finance, David J. Park Jan 2018

Remembering Financial Crises: The Risk Implications Of The Rise Of Institutional Investors In Project Finance, David J. Park

Michigan Law Review

Barely a decade ago, a cascading sequence of market failures threatened to topple the global financial system. Public responses to the recent Financial Crisis were immediate and drastic to resuscitate the global economy while attempting to make the markets safer. Many financial services sectors have since recovered to pre-crisis levels. One such industry is project finance, which comprises various financing arrangements often used to fund long-term infrastructure or industrial projects. Curiously, significant post-crisis banking regulations and other global credit enhancement initiatives are pushing banks out of project finance and giving rise to institutional investors. This Comment argues that animated institutional …


Finance And Growth: The Legal And Regulatory Implications Of The Role Of The Public Equity Market In The United States, Ezra Wasserman Mitchell Apr 2017

Finance And Growth: The Legal And Regulatory Implications Of The Role Of The Public Equity Market In The United States, Ezra Wasserman Mitchell

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The important study of the relationship between finance and economic growth has exploded over the past two decades. One of the most significant open questions is the role of the public equity market in stimulating growth and the channels it follows if it does. This paper examines that question from an economic, legal, and historical perspective, especially with regard to its regulatory and corporate governance implications. The US market is my focus.

In contrast to most studies, I follow both economic history and the actual flow of funds in addition to empirics and theory to conclude that the public equity …


Financial Reform: Making The System Safer And Fairer, Michael S. Barr Jan 2017

Financial Reform: Making The System Safer And Fairer, Michael S. Barr

Articles

In the fall of 2008, the financial crisis crushed the U.S. economy and plunged the country into the Great Recession. The crisis shuttered American businesses, cost millions of Americans their jobs, and wiped out home values and household savings. The macro effects hit hardest and were the longest lasting for those least able to bear the brunt of the crisis. It was devastating to middle-income families and perhaps even more so to low- and moderate-income households, who had little financial buffer (Barr 2012a). Financial stability, never robust for these families, dropped precipitously (Barr and Schaffa 2016). Both in the United …


The Systematic Risk Of Private Funds After The Dodd-Frank Act, Wulf A. Kaal Sep 2015

The Systematic Risk Of Private Funds After The Dodd-Frank Act, Wulf A. Kaal

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was created under the Dodd-Frank Act with the primary mandate of guarding against systemic risk and correcting perceived regulatory weaknesses that may have contributed to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) collects data pertaining to private fund advisers in order to facilitate FSOC’s assessment of non-bank financial institutions’ potential systemic risks. Evidence that the SEC’s data collection encounters accuracy and consistency problems might hamper FSOC’s ability to evaluate the systemic risk of private fund advisers. The author shows that while the SEC’s data plays a crucial role in all …


Private Equity Investments In Microfinance In India, Hugh Manahan Sep 2015

Private Equity Investments In Microfinance In India, Hugh Manahan

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

A trail connects a skyscraper in Manhattan’s Financial District to a tiny food stand in a village in the southeast Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Initially wild and overgrown, the trail now resembles a well-developed road, cleared and shaped. The trail does not connect customers to call centers or raw materials to laborers; the path connects lenders seeking abnormal returns on their investments to borrowers living in poverty. This is the path of private equity investments in microfinance. Microfinance is a powerful financial innovation that has changed personal finance in many parts of the world. While microfinance began as non-profit …


Trust And Control: The Value Effect Of Venture Capital Term Sheet Provisions As Risk Allocation Tools, Jason M. Gordon, David Orozco Sep 2015

Trust And Control: The Value Effect Of Venture Capital Term Sheet Provisions As Risk Allocation Tools, Jason M. Gordon, David Orozco

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The parties to a venture funding agreement are in a state of coopetition. The parties account for perceived risk in the entrepreneur-investor relationship through varying levels of control demanded from and trust afforded to the other party. The level of risk perceived by each party may differ along individual aspects of the prospective equity deal. The provisions of the term sheet delineate the subjective risk perceptions of each party to the transaction by allocating control or trusting a party with decision-making rights. When negotiating term sheet provisions, a party should seek to understand and recognize the risk perceived by the …


Keeping Up With The Joneses: A Model Systemic Risk Reporting Regime For The Canadian Hedge Fund Industry, Andrew Mcgarva Apr 2015

Keeping Up With The Joneses: A Model Systemic Risk Reporting Regime For The Canadian Hedge Fund Industry, Andrew Mcgarva

Dalhousie Law Journal

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a regulatory model by which Canadian securities regulators may monitor the systemic risk contributed to by the Canadian hedge fundindustry The bases for this modelare recent regulatory reform initiatives adopted in the U.S. and Europe. There, securities regulators have adopted Form PF and AIFMD, respectively, to monitor the systemic risk contributed to by hedge funds. However, the features of those regimes are not necessarily appropriate for the Canadian industry. The appropriateness ofthe features of Form PFandAIFMD for the Canadian hedge fund industry is evaluated on two criteria: the average industry fund size, …


The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody Jan 2015

The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, Behzad Gohari, Karen E. Woody

Scholarly Articles

This Article posits that the success of macroprudential regulation will depend on four factors. First, the economic philosophy of the central banker in charge of the domestic institution with jurisdiction over macroprudential regulation will prove crucial in the implementation of adopted regulation. If, like Chairman Greenspan, the banker is averse to the exercise of the Central Bank's regulatory oversight authority, then no amount or volume of policy or regulation will prevent or mitigate systemic risks and the accompanying shocks. Second, a sufficiently deep level of international cooperation is required to mitigate regulatory arbitrage, without being so broad that the ensuing …


Insider Trading In Derivatives Markets, Yesha Yadav Jan 2015

Insider Trading In Derivatives Markets, Yesha Yadav

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The prohibition against insider trading is becoming increasingly anachronistic in markets where derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS) operate. Lenders use these instruments to trade the credit risk of the loans they extend. By design, CDS appear to subvert insider trading laws, insofar as lenders rely on what looks like insider information to transfer or externalize the risk of a loan to another institution. At the same time, the harm caused by using insider information in CDS markets can depart radically from the harms envisioned under existing case law. In the traditional account of insider trading, shareholders systematically lose against …


Real Estate Investment By Bank Holding Companies And Their Risk And Return: Nonparametric And Garch Procedures, Scott Deacle, Elyas Elyasiani May 2014

Real Estate Investment By Bank Holding Companies And Their Risk And Return: Nonparametric And Garch Procedures, Scott Deacle, Elyas Elyasiani

Business and Economics Faculty Publications

We investigate the association between real estate investment by US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) and their return, risk and risk-adjusted returns. Three portfolios are formed of BHCs according to whether they do or do not invest in real estate, strictness of the regulation on real estate investment and the ratio of real estate investment to assets. Wilcoxon tests of differences in portfolio returns, risk, risk-adjusted returns and value at risk between each pair of portfolios are conducted to determine how engagement in real estate, stricter regulation and increased real estate investment affect BHC performance. These effects are also investigated within …


Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee May 2014

Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

Credit rating agencies are important institutions of the global capital markets. If they had performed properly, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 would not have occurred. This article offers the simplest fix proposed thus far, and it is contrarian. This Article accepts the central role of rating agencies in the regulation of bond investments, the realities of a duopoly, and the issuer-pay model of compensation. The status quo is the baseline. The role of regulation should be to create the conditions necessary to induce competition. This article proposes that a small, recurring portion of revenue earned by the largest rating agencies …


Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee Apr 2014

Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

Credit rating agencies are important institutions of the global capital markets. If they had performed properly, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 would not have occurred. This article offers the simplest fix proposed thus far, and it is contrarian. This Article accepts the central role of rating agencies in the regulation of bond investments, the realities of a duopoly, and the issuer-pay model of compensation. The status quo is the baseline. The role of regulation should be to create the conditions necessary to induce competition. This article proposes that a small, recurring portion of revenue earned by the largest rating agencies …


Financial Institution Executive Compensation: The Problem Of Financially Motivated Excessive Risk-Taking, The Regulatory Response, And Common Sense Solutions, Jesse D. Gossett Jan 2014

Financial Institution Executive Compensation: The Problem Of Financially Motivated Excessive Risk-Taking, The Regulatory Response, And Common Sense Solutions, Jesse D. Gossett

Jesse D Gossett

This article addresses the issue of executive compensation at financial institutions as it relates to encouraging excessive risk-taking at these firms. First, I examine the economics of compensation and its relationship to risk-taking at financial firms. Next, I take a critical look at compensation provisions of Dodd-Frank (and to a lesser extent, Sarbanes-Oxley) and describe not only what Dodd-Frank does, but more importantly what it does not do. I then make specific recommendations for rules regulators should adopt under Dodd-Frank for the purpose of using compensation plans as a way of reducing excessive risk at financial institutions. I make these …


Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those consequences could be mitigated. To that end, the article differentiates defaults caused by insolvency from defaults caused by illiquidity. The latter, which are potentiated by rollover risk (the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt), are not only plausible but have occurred in the past. Moreover, the ongoing controversy over the federal debt ceiling and the rise of the shadow-banking system make these types of defaults …


The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks And Clearinghouses Under Regulation, Felix B. Chang Jan 2014

The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks And Clearinghouses Under Regulation, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Consolidation in the financial industry threatens competition and increases systemic risk. Recently, banks have seen both high-profile mergers and spectacular failures, prompting a flurry of regulatory responses. Yet consolidation has not been as closely scrutinized for clearinghouses, which facilitate trading in securities and derivatives products. These nonbank intermediaries can be thought of as middlemen who collect deposits to ensure that each buyer and seller has the wherewithal to uphold its end of the deal. Clearinghouses mitigate the credit risks that buyers and sellers would face if they dealt directly with each other.

Yet here lies the dilemma: large clearinghouses reduce …


Behaviorism In Finance And Securities Law, David A. Skeel Jr. Jan 2014

Behaviorism In Finance And Securities Law, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, I take stock (as something of an outsider) of the behavioral economics movement, focusing in particular on its interaction with traditional cost-benefit analysis and its implications for agency structure. The usual strategy for such a project—a strategy that has been used by others with behavioral economics—is to marshal the existing evidence and critically assess its significance. My approach in this Essay is somewhat different. Although I describe behavioral economics and summarize the strongest criticisms of its use, the heart of the Essay is inductive, and focuses on a particular context: financial and securities regulation, as recently revamped …


E-Commerce And Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons From Paypal, Lawrence J. Trautman Oct 2013

E-Commerce And Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons From Paypal, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

What are the major risks perceived by those engaged in e-commerce and electronic payment systems? What development risks, if they become reality, may cause substantial increases in operating costs or threaten the very survival of the enterprise? This article utilizes the relevant annual report disclosures from eBay (parent of PayPal), along with other eBay and PayPal documents, as a potentially powerful teaching device. Most of the descriptive language to follow is excerpted directly from eBay’s regulatory filings. My additions include weaving these materials into a logical presentation and providing supplemental sources for those who desire a deeper look (usually in …


A More Realistic Approach To Directors' Duties, Michelle M. Harner Sep 2013

A More Realistic Approach To Directors' Duties, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Expectations for what fiduciary duties can achieve in the corporate context are unrealistic. This segment of the law—and the alleged deficiencies therein—are blamed for corporate scandals, securities fraud, failed business plans, and even a company's insolvency. Risk is, however, inherent in business, and human beings are flawed. Fiduciary duty law cannot change these basic facts. To the extent we think it can, we will continue to be disappointed and frustrated. This essay considers recasting (and to a greater extent codifying) directors’ duties in a positive frame to help foster better director oversight. It does not suggest that codifying greater clarity …


Government Policy And Moral Hazard In The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, Ariana Abrams Jun 2013

Government Policy And Moral Hazard In The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, Ariana Abrams

Honors Theses

The US government has invested over $3 trillion in financial assistance programs and bailouts for ailing companies affected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This paper analyzes the different government policy efforts in response to the collapse of the U.S. financial sector and whether these efforts increased the risk of moral hazard for small, medium, and large banks. Moral hazard occurs when a company has an incentive to take greater risks than it otherwise would, because the company gains all the benefits from excessive risk-taking, but does not bear all of the losses. I measure moral hazard through the debt-to-equity ratio, …