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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Enduring Ambivalence Of Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner
The Enduring Ambivalence Of Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
Prevailing theories of corporate law tend to rely heavily on strong claims regarding the corporate governance primacy and legitimacy of either the board or the shareholders, as the case may be. In this article I challenge the descriptive power of these theories as applied to widely held public corporations and advance an alternative, arguing that corporate law is, and will remain, deeply ambivalent - both doctrinally and morally - with respect to three fundamental and related issues: the locus of ultimate corporate governance authority, the intended beneficiaries of corporate production, and the relationship between corporate law and theachievement of the …
Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, Merritt B. Fox
Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, Merritt B. Fox
Michigan Law Review
The United States was hit by a wave of corporate scandals that crested between late 2001 and the end of 2002. Some were traditional scandals involving insiders looting company assets - the most prominent being Tyco, HealthSouth, and Adelphia. But most were what might be called "financial scandals": attempts by an issuer to maximize the market price of its securities by creating misimpressions as to what its future cash flows were likely to be. Enron and WorldCom were the most spectacular examples of these financial scandals. In scores of additional cases, the companies involved and their executives were sued by …
What Else Matters For Corporate Governance?: The Case Of Bank Monitoring, Frederick Tung
What Else Matters For Corporate Governance?: The Case Of Bank Monitoring, Frederick Tung
Faculty Scholarship
We address a crucial but underappreciated question: what else besides corporate law matters for corporate governance? We take the novel view that corporate governance must involve more than corporate law. Corporate scholars focus almost exclusively on corporate law mechanisms for controlling managerial agency costs. We contend, however, that contracting parties also attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm. In particular, we hypothesize that banks, by monitoring firms in connection with their loans, enhance firm value for the benefit of shareholders.
We examine over one-thousand public firms for the period 1990-2004 to test the value of bank …
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Charles K. Whitehead, Ronald J. Gilson
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Charles K. Whitehead, Ronald J. Gilson
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The traditional law and finance focus on agency costs presumes that the premise that diversified public shareholders are the cheapest risk bearers is immutable. In this Essay, we raise the possibility that changes in the capital markets have called this premise into question, drawn into sharp relief by the recent private equity wave in which the size and range of public companies being taken private expanded significantly. In brief, we argue that private owners, in increasingly complete markets, can transfer risk in discrete slices to counterparties who, in turn, can manage or otherwise diversify away those risks they choose to …
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles K. Whitehead
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles K. Whitehead
Faculty Scholarship
The traditional law and finance focus on agency costs presumes that the premise that diversified public shareholders are the cheapest risk bearers is immutable. In this Essay, we raise the possibility that changes in the capital markets have called this premise into question, drawn into sharp relief by the recent private equity wave in which the size and range of public companies being taken private expanded signficantly. In brief, we argue that private owners, in increasingly complete markets, can transfer risk in discrete slices to counterparties who, in turn, can manage or otherwise diversify away those risks they choose to …
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles K. Whitehead
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead