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Full-Text Articles in Law
The U.S. Dual Banking System And Interest Rate Exportation: Challenging The Valid-When-Made Doctrine In California V. Office Of The Comptroller Of The Currency, Todd P. Stephenson
The U.S. Dual Banking System And Interest Rate Exportation: Challenging The Valid-When-Made Doctrine In California V. Office Of The Comptroller Of The Currency, Todd P. Stephenson
Georgia State University Law Review
This Comment explores the extension of interest rate exportation to nonbank entities through the valid-when-made doctrine and its subsequent legal challenge in the 2022 court case California v. OCC.
Wanted: A Prudential Framework For Crypto Assets, Lee Reiners, Sangita Gazi
Wanted: A Prudential Framework For Crypto Assets, Lee Reiners, Sangita Gazi
Arkansas Law Review
This Article summarizes the limited publicly available data on banks’ exposure to crypto assets and offers several specific examples of how U.S. banks engage in crypto-related businesses. It then examines past guidance issued by U.S. bank regulators and explains why this guidance lacks sufficient detail to clarify the prudential requirements associated with the various crypto-related activities in which banks are engaged. The Article then assesses the adequacy of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s final prudential standard for crypto-asset exposures, issued in December 2022, and finds that the measure fails to adequately address the unique risks various crypto-asset activities pose …
Why Do Banks Fail Together? Evidence From Executive Compensation, Deniz Anginer, Jinjing Liu, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun
Why Do Banks Fail Together? Evidence From Executive Compensation, Deniz Anginer, Jinjing Liu, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Recent bank failures have elicited extensive interest about the causes, focusing on incompetence of bank executives, policymakers, bank regulators and supervisors and even uninsured depositors. Yet, before we can prescribe solutions to bank failures, we need to identify the correct causes of the underlying problems. We argue that the problem is not so much with incompetence of executives, depositors, or regulators per se, but rather with managerial incentives.
We provide both a conceptual basis as well as empirical evidence to show that bank executives have incentives to increase systemic risks in order to maximize the benefits of bank bailouts. Consequently, …