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Full-Text Articles in Law
A Model Of Optimal Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch
A Model Of Optimal Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze incentive-efficient government bailouts within a canonical model of intra-firm moral hazard. Bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard of firms and managers in two ways. First, they make them less averse to failing. Second, the taxes to fund bailouts dampen their incentives. Nevertheless, if third-party externalities from keeping the firm alive are strong, bailouts can improve welfare. Our model suggests that governments should use bailouts sparingly, where social externalities are large and subsidies small; eliminate incumbent owners and managers to improve a priori incentives; and finance bailouts through redistributive taxes on productive firms instead of forcing recipients to repay in …
Pay For Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation For Risk Regulation, Frederick Tung
Pay For Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation For Risk Regulation, Frederick Tung
Faculty Scholarship
Excessive risk taking by firm managers did not originate with the Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Though bankers had special incentives to take big risks in the period before the Crisis, the incentive effects of equity-based compensation have been understood for some time. Among other things, equity compensation tends to induce greater risk taking by aligning managers’ risk preferences with those of equity holders. Longstanding government guaranties of bank liabilities additionally served to intensify bankers’ risk taking incentives.
I propose to ameliorate this gambler’s incentive with a new approach to compensation at the largest banks, one that explicitly accounts for the …