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In Defense Of Penalizing (But Not Punishing) Civil Disobedience, David Lefkowitz
In Defense Of Penalizing (But Not Punishing) Civil Disobedience, David Lefkowitz
Philosophy Faculty Publications
While many contemporary political philosophers agree that citizens of a legitimate state enjoy a moral right to civil disobedience, they differ over both the grounds of that right and its content. This essay defends the view that the moral right to civil disobedience derives from (or is a facet of) a general right to political participation, and the characterization of that right as precluding the state from punishing, but not from penalizing, those who exercise it. The argument proceeds by way of rebuttals to criticisms of both claims recently advanced by Kimberley Brownlee. While in some cases those criticisms fail …
Should The Law Convict Those Who Act From Conviction? Reflections On A Demands-Of-Conscience Criminal Defense, David Lefkowitz
Should The Law Convict Those Who Act From Conviction? Reflections On A Demands-Of-Conscience Criminal Defense, David Lefkowitz
Philosophy Faculty Publications
How should the judge or jury in a just criminal court treat a civil disobedient, someone who performs a conscientiously motivated communicative breach of the criminal law? Kimberley Brownlee contends that all else equal a court of law should neither convict nor punish such offenders. Though I agree with this conclusion, I contend that Brownlee mischaracterizes the nature of the criminal defense to which civil disobedients are entitled. Whereas Brownlee maintains that such actors ought to be excused for their criminal breach, I argue that they ought to enjoy a justification defense. Acts of civil disobedience are not (morally) wrongful …
Blame And The Criminal Law, David Lefkowitz
Blame And The Criminal Law, David Lefkowitz
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Many retributivists appear to presume that the concept of blame that figures in their accounts of just punishment is the same one people employ in their interpersonal moral relationships. David Shoemaker contends that this presumption is mistaken. Moral blameworthiness, he maintains, tracks only the meaning of a person's action––his reasons for acting as he did––while criminal blameworthiness, which he equates with liability to punishment, tracks only the impermissibility of an agent's action. I contest the second of these two claims, and in doing so defend the retributivists’ presumption. First, I argue that the purpose of a criminal trial can be …