Law Commons^™

Moral Limits Of Dworkin's Theory Of Law And Legal Interpretation, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

At the foundation of Justice for Hedgehogs is a commitment to moral objectivity – the doctrine that there are right answers to moral questions. This nicely complements Dworkin’s legal theory, which holds that right answers to legal questions depend on right answers to moral questions. Without the doctrine of moral objectivity, Dworkin could not reasonably maintain, as he does, that law provides determinate answers to legal questions.

Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, And The Legacy Of Slavery And Jim Crow, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Chattel slavery was a brutally cruel, repressive, and exploitative system of racial subjugation. When it was abolished, the former slaveholders owed the freedmen compensation for the terrible wrongs of enslavement. Ex-slaves sought reparations, especially in the form of land, but few received any sort of recompense. The wrongs they suffered were never repaired.

No one alive today can be held accountable for the wrongs of chattel slavery, and those who might now be called upon to pay reparations were not even born until many decades after slavery ended. For some scholars, the lack of accountable parties makes current reparations claims …

Open Texture And The Possibility Of Legal Interpretation, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

This essay concerns the possibility of interpreting law. It is always possible to interpret law in the weak sense, which assigns meaning it is not assumed the law previously possessed. My concern here is interpretation in the strong sense, which, if successful, reveals meaning that lies hidden in the law. Theories of legal interpretation have recently received much theoretical attention. The received theory of law's open texture suggests that this interest is misplaced.

Rethinking "Original Intent", David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Although Dred Scott v. Sandford is one of the Supreme Court's most controversial decisions, it is not often taught or read. But its approach to constitutional interpretation is by no means outdated, and its historical importance has not diminished. So it seems a good example to consider.