Law Commons^™

Now Streaming: How Streaming Services Are Following In The Antitrust Footsteps Of Hollywood’S Golden Age, Megan Elizabeth Norris

University of Miami Business Law Review

The entertainment industry is undergoing quite the transformation following the recent termination of the Paramount Consent Decrees, which effectively regulated the industry to prevent monopolization and promote competition for almost a century. The industry now faces a drastic surge in the utilization of streaming services and a new wave of antitrust issues.

“With great power comes great responsibility;” however, the dominant streaming companies in the industry have raised suspicion about emerging anticompetitive concerns. While long overdue, the termination of the Paramount Consent Decrees leaves a gaping hole in antitrust policy regarding the nuanced business practice of streaming platforms. Existing antitrust …

Reviving Antitrust Enforcement In The Airline Industry, Jonathan Edelman

Michigan Law Review

The Department of Transportation (DOT) has broad but oft overlooked power to address antitrust issues among airlines through section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act. However, the DOT’s unwillingness to enforce antitrust more aggressively may be translating into higher fares and fees for airline travelers.

More aggressive antitrust enforcement is urgently needed. Recent research has revealed a widespread practice of common ownership in the airline industry, whereby investment firms own large portions of rival airline companies. Although this practice leads to higher prices and reduced competition, antitrust regulators, from the DOT to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade …

Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, And The Prophylactic Role Of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

For decades, the major United States airlines have raised passenger fares through coordinated fare-setting when their route networks overlap, according to the United States Department of Justice. Through its review of company documents and testimony, the Justice Department found that when major airlines have overlapping route networks, they respond to rivals’ price changes across multiple routes and thereby discourage competition from their rivals. A recent empirical study reached a similar conclusion: It found that fares have increased for this reason on more than 1000 routes nationwide and even that American and Delta, two airlines with substantial route overlaps, have come …

The End Of Antitrust History Revisited, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

This Review engages Tim Wu’s book, The Curse of Bigness, to explain the significance of the current rupture in antitrust and to situate it within a broader intellectual trajectory. Debates over the foundational purpose of antitrust are not new, and examining how this latest clash fits alongside previous contestations is essential for understanding what has yielded the current contestability and assessing the competing visions.

Part I of this Review summarizes Wu’s chief contributions in his recent work, focusing on three tenets that form the basis of the book. Part II offers an analytic breakdown of the overhaul in antitrust …

Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality To The Law Of Predatory Pricing, C. Scott Hemphill, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

This Feature offers a roadmap for bringing and deciding predatory pricing cases under the Supreme Court’s restrictive Brooke Group decision. Brooke Group requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant set a price below cost and had a sufficient likelihood of recouping its investment in predation. This framework, which was adopted without any contested presentation of its merits, has endured despite its flaws. Beyond this framework, the Court opined in dicta that predation is implausible.

We identify points of flexibility within the Court’s framework that permit an empirically grounded evaluation of the predation claim. Under the price-cost test, a plaintiff …

Market Power And Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution And Its Discontents, Lina M. Khan, Sandeep Vaheesan

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, economic inequality has become a central topic of public debate in the United States and much of the developed world. The popularity of Thomas Piketty’s nearly 700-page tome, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, is a testament to this newfound focus on economic disparity. As top intellectuals, politicians, and public figures have come to recognize inequality as a major problem that must be addressed, they have offered a range of potential solutions. Frequently mentioned proposals include reforming the tax system, strengthening organized labor, revising international trade and investment agreements, and reducing the size of the financial sector.

One …

What Iron Pipefittings Can Teach Us About Public And Private Power In The Market, Sandeep Vaheesan

Indiana Law Journal

Government restrictions on competition, whether in the market for cars, hotel rooms, or taxicabs, have attracted a great deal of attention of late. As a basic matter, government is not exogenous to the market: a functioning state is, in reality, a precondition for modern markets. Because it establishes the rules necessary for markets to develop and potentially flourish, government unavoidably shapes the bounds and structures of the private economic sphere. And more specifically, public limitations on competition are not intrinsically hostile to the interests of ordinary Americans and can, in fact, advance vital social goals, such as full employment and …

A Neo-Chicago Approach To Concerted Action, William H. Page

William H. Page

In this article, I offer an approach to concerted action that builds on traditional Chicago School analyses of the issue, but adds a focus on the role of communication. Chicago scholars uniformly identify cartels as the primary target of antitrust enforcement. They have also established much of the framework within which courts and economists analyze concerted action. George Stigler’s seminal theory of oligopoly, which sought to identify the determinants of effective collusion, has spawned an enormous literature in game theory that models the pricing behavior of oligopolists. Richard Posner’s early analysis of tacit collusion - rivals’ coordination of noncompetitive pricing …

All-Units Discounts As A Partial Foreclosure Device, Yong Chao, Guofu Tan

Yong Chao

All-units discounts (AUD) are pricing schemes that lower a buyer’s marginal price on every unit purchased when the buyer’s purchase exceeds or is equal to a pre-specified threshold. The AUD and related conditional rebates are commonly used in both final-goods and intermediate-goods markets. Although the existing literature has thus far focused on interpreting the AUD as a price discrimination tool, investment incentive program, or rent-shifting instrument, the antitrust concerns on the AUD and related conditional rebates are often their plausible exclusionary effects.

In this article, we investigate strategic effects of volume-threshold based AUD used by a dominant firm in the …

Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, And Antitrust Law, George A. Hay

George A. Hay

No abstract provided.

Strategic Effects Of Three-Part Tariffs Under Oligopoly, Yong Chao

Yong Chao

The distinct element of a three-part tariff, compared with linear pricing or a two-part tariff, is its quantity target within which the marginal price is zero. This quantity target instrument enriches the firm's strategy set in dictating the competition to a specific level, even in the absence of usual price discrimination motive. With general differentiated linear demand system, the competitive effect of a three-part tariff in contrast to linear pricing depends on the degree of substitutability between products: competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated, yet softened when two products are more substitutable.

Parallel Exclusion, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars and courts have long debated whether and when "parallel pricing" – adoption of the same price by every firm in a market – should be considered a violation of antitrust law. But there has been a comparative neglect of the importance of "parallel exclusion" – conduct, engaged in by multiple firms, that blocks or slows would-be market entrants. Parallel exclusion merits greater attention, for it can be far more harmful than parallel price elevation. Setting a high price leaves the field open for new entrants and may even attract them. In contrast, parallel action that excludes new entrants both …

A Neo-Chicago Approach To Concerted Action, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

In this article, I offer an approach to concerted action that builds on traditional Chicago School analyses of the issue, but adds a focus on the role of communication. Chicago scholars uniformly identify cartels as the primary target of antitrust enforcement. They have also established much of the framework within which courts and economists analyze concerted action. George Stigler’s seminal theory of oligopoly, which sought to identify the determinants of effective collusion, has spawned an enormous literature in game theory that models the pricing behavior of oligopolists. Richard Posner’s early analysis of tacit collusion - rivals’ coordination of noncompetitive pricing …

Teoria Unificada Da Colusão: Uma Sugestão De Regulação Dos, Ivo T. Gico

Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr.

A legislação concorrencial brasileira caracteriza toda e qualquer forma de abuso do poder econômico como uma infração à ordem econômica. A principal conduta delitiva é a formação de cartel. A maior dificuldade na implementação de uma política pública contrária à cartelização dos mercados é a caracterização jurídica de um acordo entre concorrentes, principalmente, no contexto oligopolístico. Nossa hipótese é a seguinte: se a lei brasileira não exige a presença de um acordo para a caracterização do delito administrativo, deveria ser juridicamente possível condenar a coordenação indevida de ações entre concorrentes mesmo na ausência de acordo. Não obstante, como a colusão …

An Oligopoly Analysis Of At&T'S Performance In The Wireline Long- Distance Markets After Divestiture, Paul W. Macavoy

Federal Communications Law Journal

"The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective."' Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18-19, 2008.

The antitrust law books promise competition from breaking up the monopoly firm in a Sherman Act case remedy. Not in this case; the question is what "kind" of oligopoly.

A Model Of Abstract Cooperation In Games Of Uncertainty, Hillel Bavli

Fordham Urban Law Journal

The idea that evolutionary processes natrually propel a state of affairs toward a higher, perhaps more complex or advanced, state of affairs is one that may extend to any context characterized by a dynamic time frame, including ogliopoly moelds of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The author argues that, contrary to the popular assertion that coordinated pricing necessarily requires voluntary coordination, oligopoly markets may evolve to a state of cooperation—one of collective profit maximization—absent a conscious state of coordination among the players, or even knowledge of such cooperation. While Professor Donald Turner proposes a theory of cooperation based on forward-looking consideration of …

Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, And Antitrust Law, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: The Need For Legislation, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Oligopoly Power Under The Sherman And Clayton Acts -- From Economic Theory To Legal Policy, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And The Consumer Interest, Kenneth S. Carlston, James M. Treece

Michigan Law Review

Public control of business in the United States has proceeded, in most sectors of the economy, on the assumption that free, open competition in the market should be the primary regulator. It is felt that consumer welfare will be maximized by such an organization of the economy. Courts, governmental agencies, and, to a certain extent, private agencies have performed the role of ensuring that free markets are not displaced by other, less desirable alternatives.