Law Commons^™

When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry

ExpressO

As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—have become increasingly important. Unfortunately, the patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute technologies and discouraging the development of complementary technologies. This paper explains how an optional patent purchase system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the implications of such a system.

Restraints On Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Beginning with the work of Joseph Schumpeter in the 1940s and later elaborated by Robert W. Solow's work on the neoclassical growth model, economics has produced a strong consensus that the economic gains from innovation dwarf those to be had from capital accumulation and increased price competition. An important but sometimes overlooked corollary is that restraints on innovation can do far more harm to the economy than restraints on traditional output or pricing. Many practices that violate the antitrust laws are best understood as restraints on innovation rather than restraints on pricing.

While antitrust models for assessing losses that result …

The Importance Of History To The Design Of Competition Policy Strategy: The Federal Trade Commission And Intellectual Property Law, William E. Kovacic

Seattle University Law Review

The Article's framework for considering the value of history in shaping strategy is the effort of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to apply its competition policy powers to issues involving intellectual property (IP). The Article chooses the example of intellectual property because of its importance to the modern work of the FTC and the increasingly significant place that intellectual property and, more generally, technology-driven innovation hold in the field of competition policy. To provide context for the discussion, Part II of the Article presents a profile of the FTC's modern competition policy initiatives concerning intellectual property. Part III then reviews …

Patent Ships Sail An Antitrust Sea, Joseph Scott Miller

Seattle University Law Review

The deeper truths evoked by patent ships sailing an antitrust sea are three. First, free competition is the pervasive, baseline reality, the background norm; patent protection is the temporary, partial exception. Second, we grasp both patent and antitrust policy with a common science: economics. Third, although neither patent nor antitrust law doctrines are good tools for fixing fundamental problems in the other body of law, both bodies of law help us better understand the shortcomings of the other. I explore these ideas in turn, below.

Independent Ink At The Crossroads Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property Law: The Court's Holding Regarding Market Power In Cases Involving Patents And Implications In Cases Involving Copyrights, Leonard J. Feldman, Rima J. Alaily, Chad D. Farrell

Seattle University Law Review

By eliminating the market power presumption for patent holders, Independent Ink calls into question the presumption's continued validity for tying arrangements involving copyrights. While the Court's holding directly applies only to patents, we present three reasons why, after Independent Ink, the presumption can no longer be viable in antitrust lawsuits challenging a tying arrangement involving a copyrighted product. First, the Court's rationale for eliminating the presumption including citations to extensive academic writings, agency guidelines, and legislative amendments precludes the presumption's continued application in any other context. Second, copyrights are significantly less likely than patents to confer market power because …