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Articles 1 - 30 of 189
Full-Text Articles in Law
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Senior Honors Theses
Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …
The Progressives' Antitrust Toolbox, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Progressives' Antitrust Toolbox, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The period 1900 to 1930 was the Golden Age of antitrust theory, if not of enforcement. During that period courts and scholars developed nearly all of the tools that we use to this day to assess anticompetitive practices under the federal antitrust laws. In subsequent years antitrust policy veered to both the left and the right, but today seems to be returning to a position quite similar to the one that these Progressive adopted. Their principal contributions were (1) partial equilibrium analysis, which became the basis for concerns about economic concentration, the distinction between short- and long-run analysis, and later …
Antitrust Error Costs, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust Error Costs, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The idea that consideration of error costs should inform judgments about actions with uncertain consequences is well established. When we act on imperfect information, we consider not only the probability of an event, but also the expected costs of making an error. In 1984 Frank Easterbrook used this idea to rationalize an anti-enforcement bias in antitrust, reasoning that markets are likely to correct monopoly in a relatively short time while judicial errors are likely to persist. As a result, false positives (recognizing a problem when there is none) are more costly than false negatives. While the problem of error cost …
The Invention Of Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Invention Of Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The long Progressive Era, from 1900 to 1930, was the Golden Age of antitrust theory, if not of enforcement. During that period courts and Progressive scholars developed nearly all of the tools that we use to this day to assess anticompetitive practices under the federal antitrust laws. In a very real sense we can say that this group of people invented antitrust law. The principal contributions the Progressives made to antitrust policy were (1) partial equilibrium analysis, which became the basis for concerns about economic concentration, the distinction between short- and long-run analysis, and later provided the foundation for the …
The Alarming Legality Of Security Manipulation Through Shareholder Proposals, Artem M. Joukov, Samantha M. Caspar
The Alarming Legality Of Security Manipulation Through Shareholder Proposals, Artem M. Joukov, Samantha M. Caspar
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholder proposals attract attention from scholars in finance and economics because they present an opportunity to study both quasidemocratic decision-making at the corporate level and the impact of this decision-making on firm outcomes. These studies capture the effect of various proposals but rarely address whether regulations should allow many of them in the first place due to the possibility of stock price manipulation. Recent changes to shareholder proposal rules, adopted in September 2020, sought to address the potential for exploitation that some proposals create (but ultimately failed to do so). This Article shows the potential for apparently legal stock price …
Consumer Welfare & The Rule Of Law: The Case Against The New Populist Antitrust Movement, Elyse Dorsey, Geoffrey A. Manne, Jan M. Rybnicek, Kristian Stout, Joshua D. Wright
Consumer Welfare & The Rule Of Law: The Case Against The New Populist Antitrust Movement, Elyse Dorsey, Geoffrey A. Manne, Jan M. Rybnicek, Kristian Stout, Joshua D. Wright
Pepperdine Law Review
Populist antitrust notions suddenly are fashionable again. At their core is the view that antitrust law is responsible for a myriad of purported socio-political problems plaguing society today, including but not limited to rising income inequality, declining wages, and increasing economic and political concentration. Seizing on Americans’ fears about changes to the modern US economy, proponents of populist antitrust policies assert the need to fundamentally reshape how we apply our nation’s competition laws in order to implement a variety of prescriptions necessary to remedy these perceived social ills. The proposals are varied and expansive but have the unifying theme of …
The Economics And Antitrust Of Bundling, Rajeev R. Bhattacharya
The Economics And Antitrust Of Bundling, Rajeev R. Bhattacharya
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
This article explains the economics and antitrust of bundling. I first show that popular arguments such as demand complementarities, economies of scope, and price discrimination are not sufficient. I then detail potentially anticompetitive factors such as leverage and opacity. I then use simple examples to show how variation in consumer valuations explains bundling and is not anticompetitive. Finally, I explore other business judgment rule explanations for bundling.
Framing The Chicago School Of Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Fiona Scott Morton
Framing The Chicago School Of Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Fiona Scott Morton
All Faculty Scholarship
The Chicago School of antitrust has benefited from a great deal of law office history, written by admiring advocates rather than more dispassionate observers. This essay attempts a more neutral stance, looking at the ideology, political impulses, and economics that produced the Chicago School of antitrust policy and that account for its durability.
The origins of the Chicago School lie in a strong commitment to libertarianism and nonintervention. Economic models of perfect competition best suited these goals. The early strength of the Chicago School of antitrust was that it provided simple, convincing answers to everything that was wrong with antitrust …
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Price Theory And Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, Alan J. Meese
Price Theory And Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has exerted a strong influence over the law of vertical restraints in the past two decades, leading the Supreme Court to abandon much of its traditional hostility toward such agreements. Chicago's success has provoked a vigorous response from Populists, who support the traditional approach. Chicago, Populists claim, has improperly relied upon neoclassical price theory to inform the normative and descriptive assumptions that drive its analysis of trade restraints generally and of vertical restraints in particular. This reliance is misplaced, Populists assert, because the real world departs from that portrayed by price-theoretic models and, at …
Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese
Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Economic Theory, Trader Freedom And Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. V. Khan And The Continuing Incoherence Of Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Economic Theory, Trader Freedom And Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. V. Khan And The Continuing Incoherence Of Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
No abstract provided.
Cartel Practices And Policies In The World War Ii Era, Caleb Yoken
Cartel Practices And Policies In The World War Ii Era, Caleb Yoken
Honors Theses
The goal of this thesis is to examine cartels in the World War II era: how and why they operated, why they existed, and any assistance they may or may not have received from their respective governments. This thesis, in particular, will focus on three countries, the United States, Germany, and Britain. Cartels are typically defined through the lens of monopolized business activity that can deal with anything from petroleum and steel to pharmaceuticals, and take actions to restrict output and raise prices to eliminate their competition. The research finds that cartels that operated in Europe during this era were …
Copyright Arbitrage, Kristelia A. García
Copyright Arbitrage, Kristelia A. García
Publications
Regulatory arbitrage—defined as the manipulation of regulatory treatment for the purpose of reducing regulatory costs or increasing statutory earnings—is often seen in heavily regulated industries. An increase in the regulatory nature of copyright, coupled with rapid technological advances and evolving consumer preferences, have led to an unprecedented proliferation of regulatory arbitrage in the area of copyright law. This Article offers a new scholarly account of the phenomenon herein referred to as “copyright arbitrage.”
In some cases, copyright arbitrage may work to expose and/or correct for an extant gap or inefficiency in the regulatory regime. In other cases, copyright arbitrage may …
Infracompetitive Privacy, Greg Day, Abbey R. Stemler
Infracompetitive Privacy, Greg Day, Abbey R. Stemler
Scholarly Works
One of the chief anticompetitive effects of modern business lies in antitrust’s blind spot. Platform-based companies (“platforms”) have innovated a business model whereby they offer consumers “free" and low-priced services in exchange for their personal information. With this data, platforms can design products, target consumers, and sell such information to third parties. The problem is that platforms can inflict greater costs on users and markets in the form of lost privacy than efficiencies generated from their low prices. Consumers, as examples, spend billions of dollars annually to remedy privacy breaches and, alarmingly, participate unwittingly in experiments designed to manipulate their …
Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Economic Commitments, Jonathan Baker
Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Economic Commitments, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
This article shows how the norm supporting governmental action to protect and foster competitive markets was harmonized with economic rights to contract and property during the 19th century, and with the development of the social safety net during the 20th century. It explains why the Constitution, as understood today, does not check the erosion of the entrenched but threatened national commitment to assuring competitive markets.
Health Care's Market Bureaucracy, Allison K. Hoffman
Health Care's Market Bureaucracy, Allison K. Hoffman
All Faculty Scholarship
The last several decades of health law and policy have been built on a foundation of economic theory. This theory supported the proliferation of market-based policies that promised maximum efficiency and minimal bureaucracy. Neither of these promises has been realized. A mounting body of empirical research discussed in this Article makes clear that leading market-based policies are not efficient — they fail to capture what people want. Even more, this Article describes how the struggle to bolster these policies — through constant regulatory, technocratic tinkering that aims to improve the market and the decision-making of consumers in it — has …
Ohio V. American Express: Misunderstanding Two-Sided Platforms, The Charge Card 'Market,' And The Need For Procompetitive Justifications, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Ohio V. American Express: Misunderstanding Two-Sided Platforms, The Charge Card 'Market,' And The Need For Procompetitive Justifications, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
In Ohio v. American Express Co., the United States Supreme Court had its first knowing encounter with what it incorrectly viewed as a two-sided platform in the context of American Express’ Non Disclosure Provisions (NDP). Under these provisions merchants accepting the American Express card for payment are not permitted to inform consumers that other cards charge merchants less for their use and that this could be reflected in the final price paid. The opinion includes poor reasoning, a lack of attention to precedent, and bad news for those who thought antitrust law was due for a revival. Yet, and perhaps …
Is Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Is Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle stands for the proposition that antitrust policy should encourage markets to produce output as high as is consistent with sustainable competition, and prices that are accordingly as low. Such a policy does not protect every interest group. For example, it opposes the interests of cartels or other competition-limiting associations who profit from lower output and higher prices. It also runs counter to the interest of less competitive firms that need higher prices in order to survive. Market structure is relevant to antitrust policy, but its importance is contingent rather than absolute – that is, market structure …
Whatever Did Happen To The Antitrust Movement?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Whatever Did Happen To The Antitrust Movement?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust in the United States today is caught between its pursuit of technical rules designed to define and implement defensible economic goals, and increasing calls for a new antitrust “movement.” The goals of this movement have been variously defined as combating industrial concentration, limiting the economic or political power of large firms, correcting the maldistribution of wealth, control of high profits, increasing wages, or protection of small business. High output and low consumer prices are typically unmentioned.
In the 1960s the great policy historian Richard Hofstadter lamented the passing of the antitrust “movement” as one of the “faded passions of …
Anticompetitive Manipulation Of Rems: A New Exception To Antitrust Refusal-To-Deal Doctrine, Tyler A. Garrett
Anticompetitive Manipulation Of Rems: A New Exception To Antitrust Refusal-To-Deal Doctrine, Tyler A. Garrett
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Revising The Vertical Merger Guidelines (Ftc Hearings), Steven C. Salop
Revising The Vertical Merger Guidelines (Ftc Hearings), Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This slide deck was the author’s presentation at the FTC Hearings on Vertical Mergers (November 1, 2018). The deck sets out a summary of the author’s economic analysis and proposed revisions to the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines.
Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker
Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, And Antitrust Enforcement: My Qualified Agreement With Professor Elhauge, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
As is well known among financial economists but not previously recognized within the antitrust community, large and diversified institutional investors such as BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard collectively own roughly two-thirds of the shares of publicly traded U.S. firms overall, up from about one-third in 1980. Recent economic research involving airlines and banking raises the possibility that overlapping ownership of horizontal rivals by diversified financial institutions facilitates anticompetitive conduct throughout the economy, and that the problem has been growing for decades, unnoticed until now. This response to an article by Professor Einer Elhauge, explains why it may be more …
Closing Fireside Chat With The Assistant Attorney General For The U.S. Department Of Justice Antitrust Division, William Baer, Philip J. Weiser
Closing Fireside Chat With The Assistant Attorney General For The U.S. Department Of Justice Antitrust Division, William Baer, Philip J. Weiser
Publications
This Closing Fireside Chat was the final session of the 16th annual Silicon Flatirons Center conference, The Digital Broadband Migration: The Evolving Industry Structure of the Digital Broadband Landscape, held on Feb. 1, 2016 in the Wittemyer Courtroom of the University of Colorado Law School.
"At the time this conference was held, William J. Baer was Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in the United States Department of Justice. On April 17, 2016, President Obama asked Mr. Baer to become Acting Associate Attorney General of the United States. Video of this interview with Assistant Attorney General Baer is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C351xEX0h4g …
Gandhi’S Prophecy: Corporate Violence And A Mindful Law For Bhopal, Nehal A. Patel
Gandhi’S Prophecy: Corporate Violence And A Mindful Law For Bhopal, Nehal A. Patel
Nehal A. Patel
AbstractOver thirty years have passed since the Bhopal chemical disaster began,and in that time scholars of corporate social responsibility (CSR) havediscussed and debated several frameworks for improving corporate responseto social and environmental problems. However, CSR discourse rarelydelves into the fundamental architecture of legal thought that oftenbuttresses corporate dominance in the global economy. Moreover, CSRdiscourse does little to challenge the ontological and epistemologicalassumptions that form the foundation for modern economics and the role ofcorporations in the world.I explore methods of transforming CSR by employing the thought ofMohandas Gandhi. I pay particular attention to Gandhi’s critique ofindustrialization and principle of swadeshi (self-sufficiency) …