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Articles 1 - 30 of 34
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Antitrusting Of Patentability, Saurabh Vishnubhakat
The Antitrusting Of Patentability, Saurabh Vishnubhakat
Faculty Scholarship
Deciding a patent’s validity is costly, and so is deciding it incorrectly. Judges and juries must expend significant resources in order to reach a patent validity determination that is properly informed by the relevant facts. At the same time, patent validity determinations reached quickly and cheaply may conserve resources today while creating future costs. Wrongly preserving an invalid patent can distort the competitive market and enable abuses, such as nuisance litigation. Meanwhile, wrongly striking down a valid patent can undermine incentives for continued investment and commercialization in knowledge assets. Courts facing patent validity issues have begun to strike this balance …
Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach To Dominant Firms Under The Antitrust Laws?, Edward D. Cavanagh
Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach To Dominant Firms Under The Antitrust Laws?, Edward D. Cavanagh
Maine Law Review
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. The § 2 prohibitions are rooted in concerns "that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone." At the same time, courts have recognized that size alone cannot be the basis of condemnation under § 2, for as Learned Hand observed in Alcoa, "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged …
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.This paper is an effort to assist courts and …
Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …
Uber, Lyft, And Regulating The Sharing Economy, Brett Harris
Uber, Lyft, And Regulating The Sharing Economy, Brett Harris
Seattle University Law Review
The “sharing economy” goes by many names such as the “gig economy,” the “1099 economy,” and the “on-demand economy,” all of which describe the economic system that uses online platforms to connect workers and sellers with clients and consumers, primarily through smartphone applications. Many of the sharing economy companies are also called the “tech disruptors.” They earned this title because they have changed the way that people do business. But in changing the way that people do business, they have also created unique regulatory challenges for governments across the country. The news is rife with stories about when these regulations …
Further Reflections On Antitrust And Wealth Inequality, Daniel A. Crane
Further Reflections On Antitrust And Wealth Inequality, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Since I have already published a lengthy academic article on antitrust and wealth inequality, I have the freedom of using this piece to present the key arguments unvarnished by dense citations or technical details (readers interested in those things should consult my earlier article) and to respond to some of the criticisms of my article that have since been levied. My thesis, before and now, is this: claims that antitrust enforcement advances income or wealth progressivity are overstated and rest on simplistic and unrealistic understandings of how antitrust actually operates. While some enforcement actions may generate progressive results, others will …
The Horizons Of Antitrust, Richard M. Steuer
The Horizons Of Antitrust, Richard M. Steuer
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
Critics have been complaining that there are too few jobs in America and too much inequality. They have been calling for broadening the goals of antitrust and, at the very least, for more antitrust enforcement. More enforcement could be expected to have an impact on the concentration of power and on jobs, but even recalibrating the goals of antitrust law cannot, by itself, realistically be considered a panacea for eliminating unemployment or inequality overnight.
At the same time, other countries already have broader goals written into their own laws, including their competition laws, which protect jobs and limit foreign …
Antitrust Policy And Inequality Of Wealth, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust Policy And Inequality Of Wealth, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Why would anyone want to use antitrust law as a wealth distribution device when far more explicit statutory tools are available for that purpose? One feature of antitrust is its open-textured, nonspecific statutes that are interpreted by judges. As a result, using antitrust to redistribute wealth may be a way of invoking the judicial process without having to go to Congress or a state legislature that is likely to be unsympathetic. Of course, a corollary is that someone attempting to use antitrust law to redistribute wealth will have to rely on the existing antitrust statutes rather than obtaining a new …
United States Versus Microsoft: A Case Study, Michael Betts
United States Versus Microsoft: A Case Study, Michael Betts
Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology
No abstract provided.
Standardization In Information Technology Industries: Emerging Issues Under Section Two Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, Michael Betts
Standardization In Information Technology Industries: Emerging Issues Under Section Two Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, Michael Betts
Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology
No abstract provided.
Plunging Into The Information Age: The Effect Of Current Competition Policy On United States Science And Technology Policy, Michael Betts
Plunging Into The Information Age: The Effect Of Current Competition Policy On United States Science And Technology Policy, Michael Betts
Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology
No abstract provided.
Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, Andrew J. Fuller
Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, Andrew J. Fuller
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
If the antitrust remedy a private party pursues would likely have anticompetitive consequences, would only the government constitute an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Imagine that a plaintiff sues for a remedy so large that the award of the remedy would meaningfully increase market concentration by sending the defendants into bankruptcy. Is such a plaintiff an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Should courts hold that in this situation only the government should be able to challenge the alleged conduct? These questions have gone unaddressed in academic literature because litigation rarely raises the specter of the anticompetitive remedy. Recently, …
The Ncaa And The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Ncaa And The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This brief essay considers the use of antitrust’s rule of reason in assessing challenges to rule making by the NCAA. In particular, it looks at the O’Bannon case, which involved challenges to NCAA rules limiting the compensation of student athletes under the NCAA rubric that protects the “amateur” status of collegiate athletes. Within that rubric, the Ninth Circuit got the right answer.
That outcome leads to a broader question, however: should the NCAA’s long held goal, frequently supported by the courts, of preserving athletic amateurism be jettisoned? Given the dual role that colleges play, that is a complex question, raising …
Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker
Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker
Presentations
Market concentration measures the extent to which market shares are concentrated between a small number of firms. It is often taken as a proxy for the intensity of competition. Indeed, in recent years changes in concentration have increasingly been used to argue that the intensity of competition is falling, that the growth of large firms with high market shares is driving up profits, damaging innovation and productivity, and increasing inequality. Some have argued that the competition rules need to be rewritten and a crackdown by overly antitrust agencies is required. The simplicity of this framing has found supporters across the …
The Never-Ending Quest For Clarity Amidst Uncertainty: Hospital M&A And Antitrust Scrutiny, Ross E. Bautista
The Never-Ending Quest For Clarity Amidst Uncertainty: Hospital M&A And Antitrust Scrutiny, Ross E. Bautista
San Diego Law Review
Although critics say hospitals justify mergers in the same way as they did during the M&A boom of the 1990s, these critics frequently link the current wave of mergers with the purpose of becoming more integrated and efficient to achieve the level of cost savings and improved quality that the United States and patients currently require. However, the results from hospital consolidation remain uncertain because of the limited and mixed evidence about its impact on quality of care and price. Part I of this Article discusses the recent surge in hospital M&A activity. Part II brings some clarity by discussing …
Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep Landing On "Park Place" And How The Game Is Rigged, Mark S. Levy
Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep Landing On "Park Place" And How The Game Is Rigged, Mark S. Levy
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Ultimate Fighting Championship And Zuffa: From ‘Human Cock-Fighting' To Market Power, Carl J. Gaul Iv
The Ultimate Fighting Championship And Zuffa: From ‘Human Cock-Fighting' To Market Power, Carl J. Gaul Iv
American University Business Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Perks Of Being A Whistleblower: Designing Efficient Leniency Programs In New Antitrust Jurisdictions, Sandra M. Colino
The Perks Of Being A Whistleblower: Designing Efficient Leniency Programs In New Antitrust Jurisdictions, Sandra M. Colino
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
This Article develops a framework for effective leniency policy design in jurisdictions that have limited or no mileage enforcing antitrust laws. Through an extensive review of legal and economic studies of leniency and comparative analysis, the Article identifies hurdles common to young systems that may be tackled with analogous solutions. Some issues simply require a methodological enforcement strategy and time. Others, however, call for a readjustment of either the leniency programs or the antitrust systems they help to enforce. While the latter approach is preferable, it is more difficult to implement. This Article focuses on leniency and recommends three general …
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
Faculty Publications & Other Works
No abstract provided.
Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, And At-Last Denied, Michael A. Carrier, Carl Minniti
Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, And At-Last Denied, Michael A. Carrier, Carl Minniti
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Promoting Access Over Ownership: Realigning Antitrust And Intellectual Property Law To Usher In An Era Of Collaborative Consumption, Adrian Kuenzler
Promoting Access Over Ownership: Realigning Antitrust And Intellectual Property Law To Usher In An Era Of Collaborative Consumption, Adrian Kuenzler
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
Following the US Supreme Court's endorsement of the promotion of consumer welfare as the single goal of antitrust and intellectual property laws, many courts have reasserted their commitment to the market access doctrine for antitrust and intellectual property law liability. These courts have rejected the Court's submission in GTE Sylvania to adhere to a strict output/profitability test concentrating predominantly on the positive and negative welfare effects regarding allegedly infringing conduct. This Article examines several important antitrust and intellectual property law decisions and locates within them a common flaw to express an intelligible, distinct doctrinal function for giving precedence to market …
Comment On “The Empirical Basis For Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, And Remedies”, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
Comment On “The Empirical Basis For Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, And Remedies”, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
In this journal, James Langenfeld critically reviewed four of the present authors’ articles that analyze the size of cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his criticism of our work. In particular, this comment discusses the variation in research quality of the sources used to compile a large sample of historical cartel overcharges; the advisability of trimming outliers or large estimates from the sample; alleged publication bias; why our 25% median estimate is much more likely to be correct than the US Sentencing Guideline’s 10% presumption; and the implications …
Louis Brandeis And Contemporary Antitrust Enforcement, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Micah Webber
Louis Brandeis And Contemporary Antitrust Enforcement, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Micah Webber
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol
Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Antitrust is an important area of law and policy for most companies in the world. Having divergent rules across antitrust systems means that the same economic behavior may be treated differently depending on the jurisdiction, leading to disparate outcomes in which one jurisdiction finds illegal behavior (but the other does not) when the underlying behavior may be pro-competitive. This disparate set of outcomes creates a world in which the most stringent antitrust system may produce the global standard. As a result, if the antitrust rules applied are too rigid, they threaten to hurt consumers not merely in the jurisdiction where …
Understanding Online Markets And Antitrust Analysis, D. Daniel Sokol, Jingyuan Ma
Understanding Online Markets And Antitrust Analysis, D. Daniel Sokol, Jingyuan Ma
UF Law Faculty Publications
Antitrust analysis of online markets is a hot topic around the world. In a number of jurisdictions, online markets already have been subject to antitrust review in merger or conduct cases. In other jurisdictions, these issues are in a nascent stage of policy. A number of lessons can be learned from the cases to date involving online markets with regard to optimal antitrust policy. What these cases tend to share are some basic features as to how online markets work. Some jurisdictions understand the particular dynamics of multi-sided online markets. Other competition authorities sometimes may misidentify these markets. This essay …
The Raising Rivals' Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, And The Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test, Steven C. Salop
The Raising Rivals' Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, And The Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
There are two overarching legal paradigms for analyzing exclusionary conduct in antitrust – predatory pricing and the raising rivals’ costs characterization of foreclosure. Sometimes the choice of paradigm is obvious. Other times, it may depend on the structure of the plaintiff’s allegations. Some types of conduct, notably conditional pricing practices (CPPs), might appear by analogy to fit into both paradigms. CPPs involve pricing that is conditioned on exclusivity or some other type of favoritism in a customer’s purchases or input supplier’s sales. The predatory pricing paradigm would attack the low prices of CPPs. By contrast, the RRC foreclosure paradigm would …
Trade Association, State Building, And The Sherman Act: The U.S. Chamber Of Commerce, 1912-25, Laura Phillips Sawyer
Trade Association, State Building, And The Sherman Act: The U.S. Chamber Of Commerce, 1912-25, Laura Phillips Sawyer
Scholarly Works
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC), and "organization of organizations," was conceived in 1912 in coordination with administrators at the Department of Commerce and Labor to promote the collection of commercially valuable trade information. A critical though often neglected, aspect of administrative state building has been the information-gathering and dissemination practices spearheaded by the Department of Commerce and later the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in conjunction with the USCC. Rather than a strictly adversarial relationship, in the early twentieth century business-government relations created mutually constitutive administrative capacities in both private trade associations and public administrative agencies.
Not Everyone Qualifies: A Comparative Look At Antitrust Law And Nascar's Charter System, Tyler M. Helsel
Not Everyone Qualifies: A Comparative Look At Antitrust Law And Nascar's Charter System, Tyler M. Helsel
Marquette Sports Law Review
None
Restoring The Legitimacy Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
Restoring The Legitimacy Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
All Faculty Scholarship
This is a draft chapter from the American Antitrust Institute's 2017 recommendations to the 45th President of the United States. It contains a brief but well-deserved defense of the benefits of private antitrust enforcement and a critique of the claims that private enforcement in the United States is excessive, that it leads to overdeterrence, and that the courts are plagued with widespread frivolous antitrust lawsuits. It also offer a number of specific recommendations for the new administration to implement in the private antitrust enforcement area, including:
* Educate the courts, the public, and federal and state legislatures about the virtues …