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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Role Of Design Choice In Intellectual Property And Antitrust Law, Stacey Dogan Nov 2016

The Role Of Design Choice In Intellectual Property And Antitrust Law, Stacey Dogan

Faculty Scholarship

When is it appropriate for courts to second-guess decisions of private actors in shaping their business models, designing their networks, and configuring the (otherwise non-infringing) products that they offer to their customers? This theme appears periodically but persistently in intellectual property and antitrust, especially in disputes involving networks and technology. In both contexts, courts routinely invoke what I call a “non-interference principle” — the presumption that market forces ordinarily bring the best outcomes for consumers, and that courts and regulators should not meddle in the process. This non-interference principle means, for example, that intermediaries need not design their networks to …


Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller Apr 2016

Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller

Economics Department Working Papers

We show if a speculator can benefit from reducing a monopoly’s rents through short selling, then a speculator may take a short position in a monopoly, overcome the barriers to entry, and compete with the monopoly. The competition drives down the monopoly’s rents, and as a result, the short position becomes profitable and covers the cost of entry. If entry is impossible, then the speculator may coordinate and pay the firm’s counter-parties to stop trading with the monopoly rather than entering. Either way, increasing a speculator’s ability to short a firm’s rents results in a constraint on the monopoly and …


The Evolution Of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: A Work In Progress Integrating Global Consensus And Domestic Imperatives, Susan Beth Farmer Mar 2016

The Evolution Of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: A Work In Progress Integrating Global Consensus And Domestic Imperatives, Susan Beth Farmer

Susan Beth Farmer

China is among the most recent entrants into global competition enforcement, having adopted the first competition law of general application, the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) after more than a decade of drafting. The AML and Merger Notification Thresholds, rules issued by decree of the State Council, became effective on August 3, 2008. Both the law and the guidelines were subject to public review and comment, and went through a number of drafts before final adoption.

This article is a comprehensive comparison of merger standards across jurisdictions, with particular focus on the evolution of merger regulation in China. It comprises six parts; …


Resolving Competition Related Disputes Under The Aml: Theory & Practice, Susan Beth Farmer Mar 2016

Resolving Competition Related Disputes Under The Aml: Theory & Practice, Susan Beth Farmer

Susan Beth Farmer

This presentation was given at the European China Law Studies 2014 Conference, Making, Enforcing and Accessing the Law, in Hong Kong. The presentation addresses the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the MOFCOMM, NDRC, and SAIC, and litigation before the Supreme People's Court.


Monopoly Sports Leagues, Stephen Ross Jan 2016

Monopoly Sports Leagues, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

This Article argues that the government should break up both Major League Baseball and the NFL to provide for competing economic entities in each sport. Part I details the harm monopoly sports leagues cause in several different markets and explains why a competitive league structure can correct such harms. Part II discusses why regulatory solutions are poor substitutes for competition as a means of redressing these harms. Part III explains why neither baseball nor football is a "natural monopoly" and argues that no persuasive evidence suggests that rival leagues cannot exist in those sports. Part IV examines how the antitrust …


Antitrust Options To Redress Anticompetitive Restraints And Monopolistic Practices By Professional Sports Leagues, Stephen Ross Jan 2016

Antitrust Options To Redress Anticompetitive Restraints And Monopolistic Practices By Professional Sports Leagues, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

The hallmark of an antitrust violation is an agreement which has the effect of raising price, lowering output, or rendering output unresponsive to consumer demand. Owners of clubs comprising Major League Baseball, the National Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League engage in a variety of exploitative activities that consumers cannot avoid by substituting rival products. The purpose of this Article is to analyze specific areas where these monopoly sports leagues harm a variety of groups, through the maintenance of a monopolistic structure that precludes competitive entry, or through specific restraints that have demonstrable anticompetitive effects. …


Re-Imagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work Of Richard S. Markovits, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2016

Re-Imagining Antitrust: The Revisionist Work Of Richard S. Markovits, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This review discusses Richard Markovits’ two volume book "Economics and the Interpretation" and "Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law" (2014), focusing mainly on Markovits’ approaches to antitrust tests of illegality, pricing offenses, market definition and the assessment of market power, and his important work anticipating unilateral effects theory in merger cases. Markovits argues forcefully that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were intended to employ different tests of illegality. As a result, even when they cover the same practices, such as mergers, exclusive dealing, or tying, they address them under different tests. He then shows how he would analyze various …


What Iron Pipefittings Can Teach Us About Public And Private Power In The Market, Sandeep Vaheesan Jan 2016

What Iron Pipefittings Can Teach Us About Public And Private Power In The Market, Sandeep Vaheesan

Indiana Law Journal

Government restrictions on competition, whether in the market for cars, hotel rooms, or taxicabs, have attracted a great deal of attention of late. As a basic matter, government is not exogenous to the market: a functioning state is, in reality, a precondition for modern markets. Because it establishes the rules necessary for markets to develop and potentially flourish, government unavoidably shapes the bounds and structures of the private economic sphere. And more specifically, public limitations on competition are not intrinsically hostile to the interests of ordinary Americans and can, in fact, advance vital social goals, such as full employment and …