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Cartel Overcharges And Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
Cartel Overcharges And Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
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This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter illegal price fixing cartels optimally. The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a U.S. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% …