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Full-Text Articles in Law

Reexamining The Legacy Of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review By The Doj And The Fcc, Philip J. Weiser Dec 2008

Reexamining The Legacy Of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review By The Doj And The Fcc, Philip J. Weiser

Federal Communications Law Journal

"The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective."' Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18-19, 2008.

A central challenge for competition policy merger review is to structure the analysis of merger remedies so that the antitrust agencies play an effective and central role, with regulatory agencies complementing-as opposed to overlapping or contradicting--their judgments. At present, the U.S. system sometimes veers towards a worst-case scenario where federal antitrust authorities-the FTC and DOJ-impose regulatory remedies that overlap with regulatory policy and regulatory agencies perform duplicative merger reviews and impose remedies unrelated to the …


The Role Of Market Definition In Unilateral Effects Analysis And In The Litigation Of Unilateral Effects Cases, Jonathan Baker, Kathryn Fenton, Richard Parker, Daniel Wall, Jeffrey Schmidt Feb 2008

The Role Of Market Definition In Unilateral Effects Analysis And In The Litigation Of Unilateral Effects Cases, Jonathan Baker, Kathryn Fenton, Richard Parker, Daniel Wall, Jeffrey Schmidt

Presentations

The Federal Trade Commission is planning to host a public workshop on February 12, 2008 to examine the application of unilateral effects theory to mergers of firms that sell competing, but differentiated products. ”Unilateral effects” as a formal theory of competitive harm was added to the joint FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1992. The theory recognizes that, in some instances, mergers may create or enhance market power by allowing the merged firm to profitably raise prices, without accommodation of other rival market incumbents. While section 2.2 of the Guidelines explains that unilateral competitive effects can arise in a variety of …


"Perfectly Properly Triable" In The United States: Is Extradition A Real And Significant Threat To Foreign Antitrust Offenders?, Daseul Kim Jan 2008

"Perfectly Properly Triable" In The United States: Is Extradition A Real And Significant Threat To Foreign Antitrust Offenders?, Daseul Kim

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Seeking extradition of foreign officers in charge of foreign corporations for trial in the United States is one of the latest policies that the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has adopted to enforce U.S. antitrust laws internationally. As a result, the world has become a much riskier place for foreign officers and executives, who, in the past, could practically ignore U.S. antitrust laws and still hide safely behind the protection of their own countries' borders. The DOJ expects this "real and significant" threat of extradition to incentivize foreign corporate officers to comply with U.S. antitrust laws by altering their conduct, …