Law Commons^™

Did At&T Die In Vain? An Empirical Comparison Of At&T And Bell Canada, Eli M. Noam

Federal Communications Law Journal

"The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective."' Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18-19, 2008.

Did the Divestiture of AT&T achieve its purpose? It is helpful to turn to Canada, whose telecommunications industry and regulation were similar but which did not experience a divestiture. Since AT&T was split up in 1982-4, national telecom market concentration in the U.S. has bounced back to a national duopoly structure, with an HHI concentration index of 2,986, higher than for Canada's similar national duopoly with an HHI of 2,463. Local telecom wireline competition is …

The Bell System Divestiture: Background, Implementation, And Outcome, Joseph H. Weber

Federal Communications Law Journal

"The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective."' Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18-19, 2008.

By 1982, the Bell System had operated an integrated telecommunications network connecting almost everyone in the United States for almost 100 years. That system had been designed and operated as a monopoly, but by the 1960s, new technologies were being developed which led to pressure to allow competitive entry. After many incremental changes, the Bell System divestiture--complete separation of long-distance service and manufacturing fiom local service provision-was finally adopted as a way of implementing this …

Toward A Unified Theory Of Access To Local Telephone Networks, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo

Federal Communications Law Journal

"The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective."' Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18-19, 2008.

Over the past several decades, regulatory authorities have imposed an increasingly broad array of access requirements on local telephone providers. In so doing, policymakers typically applied previous approaches to access regulation without fully considering whether the regulatory justifications used in favor of those previous access requirements remained valid. They also allowed each access regime to be governed by a different pricing methodology and set access prices in a way that treated each network component as …

Reexamining The Legacy Of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review By The Doj And The Fcc, Philip J. Weiser

Federal Communications Law Journal

"The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective."' Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on April 18-19, 2008.

A central challenge for competition policy merger review is to structure the analysis of merger remedies so that the antitrust agencies play an effective and central role, with regulatory agencies complementing-as opposed to overlapping or contradicting--their judgments. At present, the U.S. system sometimes veers towards a worst-case scenario where federal antitrust authorities-the FTC and DOJ-impose regulatory remedies that overlap with regulatory policy and regulatory agencies perform duplicative merger reviews and impose remedies unrelated to the …

The Lawful Acquisition And Exercise Of Monopoly Power And Its Implications For The Objectives Of Antitrust, Keith N. Hylton, David S. Evans

Faculty Scholarship

The antitrust laws of the United States have, from their inception, allowed firms to acquire significant market power, to charge prices that reflect that market power, and to enjoy supra-competitive returns. This article shows that this policy, which was established by the U.S. Congress and affirmed repeatedly by the U.S. courts, reflects a tradeoff between the dynamic benefits that society realizes from allowing firms to secure significant rewards, including monopoly profits, from making risky investments and engaging in innovation; and the static costs that society incurs when firms with significant market power raise price and curtail output. That tradeoff results …

The Fundamental Goal Of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The conventional wisdom in the antitrust community is that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That view is incorrect. As this article shows, the fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This article defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, analyzes recent case law in more depth than any prior article, and explores the most likely bases for current popular support of the antitrust laws. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that …

World War 4.0: The Intel Antitrust Wars, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This short piece gives an overview of antitrust actions filed around the world against Intel for allegedly undertaking anticompetitive actions in the market for X 86 PC chips.

The Politics Of Competition: Review Of Clifford Winston's Government Failure Versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research And Government Performance And Mark K. Landy, Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro, Eds., Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics Of Regulatory Reform, Russell P. Hanser

Federal Communications Law Journal

Two recent books focus attention on the role of regulation in the modem economy and the reasons why efforts at deregulation succeed or fail. Clifford Winston's Government Failure Versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research and Government Performance reviews empirical studies of regulation and its alternatives, arguing that economic regulation has quite often done more harm than good. In Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics of Regulatory Reform, editors Mark K. Landy, Martin A. Levin and Martin Shapiro collect essays addressing the political dangers faced by those pursuing market liberalization, both before and (especially) after reform is enacted. Read together, these books …

Striking A Balance Between Competition Law Enforcement And Patent Policy: A Developing Country's Perspective, Thomas K. Cheng

Thomas K. Cheng

This book chapter examines the tension between competition law enforcement and patent policy in developing countries. Based on the framework proposed by Louis Kaplow in an article in the early 1980s, this book chapter suggests how developing countries should balance consumer welfare against the need to provide incentives to innovate. The book chapter argues that the balance depends on the developing country at issue, in particular on that country's capacity to innovate. For those developing countries with little capacity to innovate, this book chapter suggests that the balance should be tilted towards competition law enforcement. The degree of patent protection …

A Tale Of Two Competition Law Regimes--The Telecom-Sector Competition Regulation In Hong Kong And Singapore, Thomas K. Cheng

Thomas K. Cheng

Competition law has seen very active development in Asia in recent years. Ironically, Hong Kong and Singapore, as two of the freest and most competitive economies in the region, long held a skeptical attitude towards competition law. Singapore enacted its first cross-sector competition law in 2004, some say only due to American pressure. For years, the Hong Kong government defended its sectoral model and insisted that the city had no need for a cross-sector competition law. However, that obstinate attitude shifted in March 2007, when the government announced that Hong Kong would follow Singapore's footsteps. Until the new law is …

Exclusionary Bundled Discounts And The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A bundled discount occurs when a seller charges less for a bundle of goods than for its components when sold separately. A characteristic of such discounting is that a rival who makes only one of the products in the bundle may have to give a larger per item discount in order to compensate the buyer for the foregone discount on goods that the rival does not sell. For example, if I sell A and B and offer a 20% discount only to customers who purchase one A and one B together, a rival in the B market might be able …

The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Chicago School antitrust policy rests on the premise that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That foundation is flawed. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This essay defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, and analyzes recent case law. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare …

Innovation And The Domain Of Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust policy and the IP laws are both concerned with practices that restrain competition unnecessarily by reducing the size of the public domain beyond that which the Constitution contemplates, or as Congress intended for them to be expanded. In fact, antitrust has a dual role as promoter of competition in IP intensive markets. It regulates both restraints on competition and restraints on innovation. The first line protector of the competitive process in innovation is the IP statutes themselves. The Constitutional Mandate to Congress to create intellectual property regimes in order to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts is …