Law Commons^™

Textualism As An Ally Of Antitrust Enforcement: Examples From Merger And Monopolization Law, Robert H. Lande

Utah Law Review

This Article will first briefly present an overview of the textualist method of statutory interpretation. It will then briefly engage in a textualist analysis of important portions of two antitrust statutes: Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. At least in these areas, textualist analysis should, if anything, help re-invigorate antitrust enforcement.

Reviving Antitrust Enforcement In The Airline Industry, Jonathan Edelman

Michigan Law Review

The Department of Transportation (DOT) has broad but oft overlooked power to address antitrust issues among airlines through section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act. However, the DOT’s unwillingness to enforce antitrust more aggressively may be translating into higher fares and fees for airline travelers.

More aggressive antitrust enforcement is urgently needed. Recent research has revealed a widespread practice of common ownership in the airline industry, whereby investment firms own large portions of rival airline companies. Although this practice leads to higher prices and reduced competition, antitrust regulators, from the DOT to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade …

Privity Vs. Proximity: The Supreme Court’S Erroneous Reading Of The Illinois Brick Doctrine In Apple Inc. V. Pepper, Suzin A. Win

Golden Gate University Law Review

The rapid development of the digital marketplace led the United States Supreme Court to revisit the forty-two year old antitrust precedent set in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court decided that under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, direct purchasers have standing to sue for treble damages due to unfair business practices, while indirect purchasers do not. Over four decades later, in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Court reevaluated this doctrine. This time, the Court had to determine which party received the “direct purchaser” status in a situation where plaintiffs bought apps from …

Farmer Cooperatives "Take Cover": The Capper-Volstead Exemption Is Under Siege, Donald M. Barnes, Jay L. Levine

Arkansas Law Review

"When tillage begins, other arts follow. The farmers, therefore, are the founders of human civilization." There can be little dispute that food production is of vital interest to any nation’s security and economy. For this reason, the United States Congress, like many other legislatures around the world, has accorded special treatment to the agricultural industry, and particularly to farmers. One example of this special treatment is the Capper-Volstead Act, which provides farmers with immunity from antitrust liability for joint conduct undertaken by and through an “association” of producers.

Healthcare Mergers And Acquisitions In An Era Of Consolidation: A Review And A Call For Agency Collaboration In Antitrust Enforcement, Anna Molinari

Pepperdine Law Review

Healthcare companies are consolidating at an alarming rate. From hospitals, to providers’ offices, to insurance companies, there are increasingly fewer consumer choices and more monopolies, which calls for heightened antitrust enforcement. Interestingly, antitrust enforcement authority in the healthcare industry is shared between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which presides over hospital and provider mergers, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which presides over health insurance mergers. Although the FTC has challenged many hospital and provider mergers, the DOJ has only challenged six health insurance mergers. Furthermore, last year, the DOJ ultimately approved all health insurance mergers. In 2017, in United …

The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really Want To Return To American Banana?, Joseph P. Bauer

Maine Law Review

It keeps getting worse and worse. Over the past three and a half decades, the Supreme Court has made countless changes to substantive antitrust doctrine, making successful assertion of an antitrust claim more and more difficult. We have known for at least a century—at least since the Standard Oil decision—that the language in section 1 of the Sherman Act, providing that “every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . , is declared to be illegal” is not to be read literally. “Every” does not mean “every.” It means only “some”—generally, only those …

Astroturf Campaigns: Transparency In Telecom Merger Review, Victoria Peng

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Large telecommunications companies looking to merge spend millions of dollars in their lobbying efforts to clear regulatory hurdles and obtain approval for their proposed mergers. Corporations such as AT&T, Comcast, and Time Warner use public participation processes as vehicles to influence regulatory decision-making. In the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) merger review context, the notice- and-comment process and public hearings have become fertile breeding grounds for hidden corporate influence. Corporations spend millions on corporate social responsibility programs and call upon nonprofit organizations that receive their largesse to represent their corporate interests as grassroots interests when the FCC seeks public comment. This …

The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article argues for a paradigm shift in modern antitrust policy. Rather than being concerned exclusively with consumer welfare, antitrust law should also be concerned with consolidated corporate power. Regulators and courts should consider the social and political, as well as the economic, consequences of corporate mergers. The vision that antitrust must be a key tool for limiting consolidated corporate power has a venerable legacy, extending back to the origins of antitrust law in early seventeenth century England, running throughout American history, and influencing the enactment of U.S. antitrust laws. However, the Chicago School’s view that antitrust law should be …

Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell

Michigan Law Review

In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) to resolve uncertainties about the international reach and effect of U.S. antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the FTAIA has provided more questions than answers. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court most recently interpreted the FTAIA, and crucial questions and circuit splits abound. One of these questions is how to understand the convergence of the direct purchaser rule (frequently referred to as the Illinois Brick doctrine) and the FTAIA. Under the direct purchaser rule, only those who purchase directly from antitrust violators are typically permitted to sue under section …

The Liability Of Foreign Governments Under United States Antitrust Laws, James F. Ponsoldt, Jesse Stone

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Lessons From At&T'S Flop: How To Grow In The Technology Industry While Avoiding Section 7 Antitrust Obstacles, John Soma

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Pay-To-Play: The Impact Of Group Purchasing Organizations On Drug Shortages, Christian Deroo

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law And Virtual Worlds, Marques Tracy

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Much has been written about the law in virtual worlds, though the focus has been on the more obviously applicable areas of the law, namely property, copyright, and crime. Indeed, in the few instances when disputes involving virtual worlds have reached a federal court, the focus has usually been on contract or copyright claims. It is the purpose of this paper to argue for the use of the antitrust laws as set forth in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and possibly the Clayton Act, to forestall the anticompetitive behavior of virtual world developers. First, this paper will …

Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs

William & Mary Law Review

Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …

Guideline Institutionalization: The Role Of Merger Guidelines In Antitrust Discourse, Hillary Greene

William & Mary Law Review

With the growth of the administrative state, agency-promulgated enforcement policy statements, typically referred to as guidelines, have become ubiquitous in the U.S. federal system. Yet, the actual usage and impact of such guidelines is poorly understood. Often the issuing agencies declare the guidelines to be nonbinding, even for themselves. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the government, private parties, and even the courts frequently rely on the guidelines in a precedent-like manner. In this Article, Professor Greene examines the evolution of one system of enforcement policy guidelines-the U.S. federal antitrust merger guidelines--and finds that these guidelines have acted as a stealth force on …

The Elephant In The Courtroom: Litigating The Premerger Fix In Arch Coal And Beyond, Katherine A. Ambrogi

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

New E.C. Merger Control Test Under Article 2 Of The Merger Control Regulation, The Symposium On European Competition Law , Alexander Riesenkampff

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

On November 25, 2003, the Council reached a political accord on amending the Merger Control Regulation. On January 20, 2003, the Council formally adopted the amendment as new Regulation No.139/2004. Article 2, Sec. 3 of the new regulation provides: "A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market." This article begins by outlining the legislative history of the new Article 2. That preface is followed by the identification …

E.U. Competition And Private Actions For Damages, The Symposium On European Competition Law , Georg Berrisch, Eve Jordan, Rocio Salvador Roldan

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

There are numerous reasons why private enforcement of E.U. competition law remains underdeveloped in Europe. The main reason is perhaps that it is not regulated by E.U. law but by Member State law. This in itself creates legal uncertainty. A system that creates optimal conditions for individuals to challenge infringements of competition rules before national courts ensures a high level of compliance. It is therefore no surprise that the European Commission ("Commission") is keen to see the general use of private enforcement, and in particular of actions for damages, in Europe increase. This paper focuses on one particular aspect of …

The Report Of The Attorney General's National Committee To Study The Antitrust Laws: A Retrospective, Thomas E. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

In 1955, the third year of the Eisenhower administration, the Michigan Law Review published what I believe to be the only symposium on antitrust law ever to appear in its pages. The occasion was the release in March of that year of a Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,2 a nearly fourhundred- page examination of virtually all facets of federal antitrust doctrine and enforcement. The pages of the symposium led me of course to revisit the Report itself, a visit a little like seeing an old high school friend long forgotten some forty years …

Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation Law, Michael F. Urbanski, James R. Creekmore, Beth G. Hungate-Noland

University of Richmond Law Review

This year witnessed the advance of a wide variety of antitrust and trade regulation theories, most of which met with little success. Of the antitrust cases, Continental Airlines waged a successful battle to eliminate carry-on baggage restrictions at Dulles Airport. Additionally, Maryland's price-setting scheme for liquor was not accorded state action immunity. On the other side of the ledger, another antitrust litigant failed to overcome the requirement that efforts to petition the government must be objectively baseless in order to meet the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Difficulties in proving an antitrust injury and the intent element of a …

The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo

Michigan Law Review

There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …

Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer

Michigan Law Review

Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second- best tradeoffs. The lesson of second-best analysis is that one market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible …

Antitrust And Market Power, Milton A. Marquis

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

The antitrust laws have been described as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise."

Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation Law, Michael F. Urbanski, James R. Creekmore

University of Richmond Law Review

During the past year, this country has devoted much attention, with good reason, to the Microsoft trial and appeal. Not since the breakup of Ma Bell's stronghold on the telecommunications industry in the early 1980s has a single legal battle posed so significant a change for both an industry and its consumers. In fact, given the far-reaching effects of this decision on other related industries and consumers, it likely will be years before its ultimate impact can be assessed.

Antitrust: Systemcare, Inc. V. Wang Laboratories Corp.: Evaluating Unilateral Behavior In The Tenth Circuit, Michael R. Barnett

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, Francis H. Casola

University of Richmond Law Review

Once again this past year, the Fourth Circuit and the federal courts in Virginia proved inhospitable to antitrust plaintiffs. Plaintiffs consistently lost on summary judgment and only one plaintiff survived a motion to dismiss. The only major development in the law in the Fourth Circuit came from the Western District of Virginia where Judge James C. Turk refused to recognize the theory of monopoly leveraging under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Fraudulent Concealment, Self-Concealing Conspiracies, And The Clayton Act, Richard F. Schwed

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that courts should apply a self-concealment standard to section 4B of the Clayton Act rather than require a showing of additional affirmative acts. Part I examines the history of the fraudulent concealment doctrine and its application to antitrust cases. It identifies three different standards used by courts to satisfy the concealment element and finds that courts apply the doctrine inconsistently. Part II analyzes the relationship between the fraudulent concealment doctrine and the self-concealment standard in antitrust cases by examining the judicial development of the doctrine and Congress' intent in enacting section 4B. Part II concludes that the …

Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski

University of Richmond Law Review

Virginia federal courts have shown a reluctance this past year to summarily dismiss plaintiffs' antitrust claims on Rule 12(b)(6) motions where there is no factual record. However, once a sufficient record has been established, the courts have continued their rigorous scrutiny of antitrust claims. While this year's decisions contain few victories for antitrust plaintiffs on the merits, surprisingly, their holdings are mixed and cannot be categorized as decidedly pro-plaintiff or defendant. This past year, the Fourth Circuit has limited plaintiffs' actions by broadening the sweep of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine established in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. to include …

Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforcement. That premise is controversial. Nonetheless, several economic and legal theorists, primarily among the Chicago School of economics and antitrust scholarship, have developed an Optimal Deterrence Model based on this assumption. The Model is designed to achieve the optimum, or ideal, amount of antitrust enforcement. The Model's originators generally believe that there is too much antitrust enforcement, particularly enforcement initiated by private plaintiffs. I intend to show that, even if efficiency is the only antitrust policy goal, a broader array of lawsuits should …