Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Antitrust, Industrial Organization, and Competition Policy (12)
- Antitrust (6)
- Law and Economics (5)
- FTC (4)
- Drugs (3)
-
- Hatch-Waxman (3)
- Innovation (3)
- Paragraph IV (3)
- Patent (3)
- Pay for delay (3)
- Pharmaceuticals (3)
- Regulation (3)
- Reverse payment (3)
- Settlement (3)
- Actavis (2)
- Featured Works (2)
- Op-Eds (2)
- Recent Works (2)
- Barriers to entry (1)
- Competition (1)
- Competitive process (1)
- DOJ (1)
- Derivative Contracts (1)
- Entry (1)
- FDIC (1)
- FIRA (1)
- Hart-Scott-Rodino (1)
- Journals (1)
- Limit pricing (1)
- Mergers and acquisition (1)
- Publication Year
Articles 1 - 22 of 22
Full-Text Articles in Law
Hunting Unicorns, Aaron Edlin
Hunting Unicorns, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
2018 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases, Aaron Edlin
2018 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.This paper is an effort to assist courts and …
Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …
Letting Dentists Feel The Bite Of Competition, Aaron Edlin
Letting Dentists Feel The Bite Of Competition, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
The Supreme Court ruling in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission ruling will force state licensing boards to be more reasonable in their regulations and to be less cartel-like.
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron Edlin, Herbert Hovenkamp, Scott Hemphill, Carl Shapiro
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron Edlin, Herbert Hovenkamp, Scott Hemphill, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered “reverse payment” settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.
This paper is an effort to assist courts …
Professors Update 2015, Antitrust Analysis, 7th Ed., Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Louis Kaplow
Professors Update 2015, Antitrust Analysis, 7th Ed., Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Louis Kaplow
Aaron Edlin
Professors Update for Antitrust Analysis, 7th edition Includes updates to American Express v. Italian Colors, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, Text Messaging, and ZF Meritor v. Eaton.
Actavis And Error Costs, Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Actavis And Error Costs, Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.
As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to …
Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell
Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell
Aaron Edlin
Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.
The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris
The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin
Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Judge Breyer famously worried that aggressive prohibitions of predatory pricing throw away a bird in hand (low prices during the alleged predatory period) for a speculative bird in the bush (preventing higher prices thereafter). Here, I argue that there is no bird in hand because entry cannot be presumed. Moreover, it is plausibly commonplace that low prices or the threat of low prices produce anticompetitive results by reducing entry, inducing exit, and keeping prices high. I analyze three potential standards for identifying predatory pricing. Two are traditional but have been tangled together and must be distinguished. First, a price-cost test …
2011 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis, Problems, Text, And Cases, Philip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin
2011 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis, Problems, Text, And Cases, Philip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
It Works For Mergers, Why Not Finance, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert
It Works For Mergers, Why Not Finance, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin
Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Academic Testimony On Unilateral Conduct Before The U.S. Dept. Of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Aaron S. Edlin
Academic Testimony On Unilateral Conduct Before The U.S. Dept. Of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
The Accident Externality From Driving, Aaron S. Edlin, Pinar Karaca Mandic
The Accident Externality From Driving, Aaron S. Edlin, Pinar Karaca Mandic
Aaron Edlin
The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Aaron Edlin
Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.
The American Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell
The American Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin
Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, And Can Antitrust Rise To The Challenge?, Aaron S. Edlin
Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, And Can Antitrust Rise To The Challenge?, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Price-matching policies can be highly anticompetitive. They allow firms to raise their prices above competition levels by discriminating in price between informed and uninformed customers. The resulting high prices can persist even when new firms enter the industry, a fact that gives price matching the potential to be much more socially costly than an ordinary monopoly or cartel. At the same time, widespread entry implies that the agreement among sellers that is typical of a Sherman Act price-fixing case may be absent. In this article, Professor Edlin argues that there is nonetheless an analogy between a seller offering (and agreeing) …