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Full-Text Articles in Law
Parker V. Brown, The Eleventh Amendment, And Anticompetitive State Regulation, William H. Page, John E. Lopatka
Parker V. Brown, The Eleventh Amendment, And Anticompetitive State Regulation, William H. Page, John E. Lopatka
William & Mary Law Review
The Parker v. Brown (or “state action”) doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution impose different limits on antitrust suits challenging anticompetitive state regulation. The Supreme Court has developed these two versions of state sovereign immunity separately, and lower courts usually apply the immunities independently of each other (even in the same cases) without explaining their relationship. Nevertheless, the Court has derived the two immunities from the same principle of sovereign immunity, so it is worth considering why and how they differ, and what the consequences of the differences are for antitrust policy. The state action immunity is based …
Wickard Through An Antitrust Lens, Alan J. Meese
Wickard Through An Antitrust Lens, Alan J. Meese
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Present New Antitrust Era, Barak Orbach
The Present New Antitrust Era, Barak Orbach
William & Mary Law Review
Antitrust scholars frequently refer to an “ideological pendulum” to describe the rise and fall of trends in the evolution of antitrust law. This pendulum arguably swings between fairness and laissez-faire visions, while a technocracy vision moderates its motion. Mapping key phases in the evolution of antitrust law, I argue that a new antitrust era with distinctive characteristics has been forming in recent years.
The present new antitrust era is a product of growing tensions and contradictions among policy prescriptions. After several decades in which antitrust was a specialized field that drew little public attention, in the aftermath of the Great …
The (Limited) Constitutional Right To Compete In An Occupation, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
The (Limited) Constitutional Right To Compete In An Occupation, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
William & Mary Law Review
Is there a constitutional right to compete in an occupation? The “right to earn a living” movement, gaining steam in policy circles and winning some battles in the lower courts, says so. Advocates for this right say that the right to compete in an occupation stands on equal footing with our most sacred constitutional rights such as the right to be free from racial discrimination. This Article takes a different view, arguing that while there is a limited constitutional right to compete in an occupation, it is—and should be—weaker than these advocates claim. Some state licensing laws run afoul of …
Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Constitutional And Antitrust Commitments, Jonathan B. Baker
Accommodating Competition: Harmonizing National Constitutional And Antitrust Commitments, Jonathan B. Baker
William & Mary Law Review
This Article shows how the norm supporting governmental action to protect and foster competitive markets was harmonized with economic rights to contract and property during the 19th century, and with the development of the social safety net during the 20th century. It explains why the Constitution, as understood today, does not check the erosion of the entrenched but threatened national commitment to assuring competitive markets.
Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane
Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane
William & Mary Law Review
State and local regulations that anticompetitively favor certain producers to the detriment of consumers are a pervasive problem in our economy. Their existence is explicable by a variety of structural features—including asymmetry between consumer and producer interests, cost externalization, and institutional and political factors entrenching incumbent technologies. Formulating legal tools to combat such economic parochialism is challenging in the post-Lochner world, where any move toward heightened judicial review of economic regulation poses the perceived threat of a return to economic substantive due process. This Article considers and compares two potential tools for reviewing such regulations—a constitutional principle against anticompetitive parochialism …
Antitrust As Speech Control, Hillary Greene, Dennis A. Yao
Antitrust As Speech Control, Hillary Greene, Dennis A. Yao
William & Mary Law Review
Antitrust law, at times, dictates who, when, and about what people can and cannot speak. It would seem then that the First Amendment might have something to say about those constraints. And it does, though perhaps less directly and to a lesser degree than one might expect. This Article examines the interface between those regimes while recasting antitrust thinking in terms of speech control.
Our review of the antitrust-First Amendment legal landscape focuses on the role of speech control. It reveals that while First Amendment issues are explicitly addressed relatively infrequently within antitrust decisions that is, in part, because certain …
“Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense:” Michael Pertschuk’S Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, William E. Kovacic
“Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense:” Michael Pertschuk’S Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, William E. Kovacic
William & Mary Law Review
In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) undertook an ambitious program of reforms. Among other measures, the agency expanded the focus of antitrust enforcement to address economic concentration, including the use of Section 5 of the FTC Act to restructure dominant firms and oligopolies. In many ways Michael Pertschuk, who chaired the agency from 1977 to 1981, became the symbol of the FTC’s efforts to stretch the boundaries of antitrust policy—to pursue a conception of “competition policy in its broadest sense.” Despite a number of valuable accomplishments, the FTC achieved relatively few litigation successes, …
Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar
Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar
William & Mary Law Review
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Court refused to exempt the board from the second element of Parker immunity—active supervision by the state—because the Board was made up largely of “active market participants.” This Article argues that the “active market participant” rule laid out in North Carolina State Board, while intuitively appealing, ignores important political values represented by antitrust law, values most evident in the context of state action immunity. By focusing on the potential market harm from self-interested regulators, the Court ignored a series of political harms inherent in the structure of the North …
Religious Freedom Through Market Freedom: The Sherman Act And The Marketplace For Religion, Barak D. Richman
Religious Freedom Through Market Freedom: The Sherman Act And The Marketplace For Religion, Barak D. Richman
William & Mary Law Review
In prior work, I examined certain restraints by private religious organizations and concluded that the First Amendment did not immunize these organizations from antitrust liability. In short, the First Amendment did not preempt enforcing the Sherman Act against certain religious monopolies or cartels.
This Article offers a stronger argument: First Amendment values demand antitrust enforcement. Because American religious freedoms, enshrined in the Constitution and reflected in American history, are quintessentially exercised when decentralized communities create their own religious expression, the First Amendment’s religion clauses are best exemplified by a proverbial marketplace for religions. Any effort to stifle a market organization …
Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, D. Daniel Sokol
Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, D. Daniel Sokol
William & Mary Law Review
Contemporary rhetoric surrounding antitrust in an age of populism has potential implications with regard to criminal antitrust enforcement. In areas such as resale price maintenance, monopolization, and Robinson-Patman violations, antitrust criminalization remains the law on the books. Antitrust populists and traditional antitrust thinkers who embrace a singular economic goal of antitrust push to enforce antitrust law that is already “on the books.” A natural extension of enforcement by the antitrust populists would be to advocate the use of criminal sanctions, outside of collusion, for various antitrust violations which are “on the books” but have not been used in over a …