Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Fascism And Monopoly, Daniel A. Crane
Fascism And Monopoly, Daniel A. Crane
Michigan Law Review
The recent revival of political interest in antitrust has resurfaced a longstanding debate about the role of industrial concentration and monopoly in enabling Hitler’s rise to power and the Third Reich’s wars of aggression. Proponents of stronger antitrust enforcement argue that monopolies and cartels brought the Nazis to power and warn that rising concentration in the American economy could similarly threaten democracy. Skeptics demur, observing that German big business largely opposed Hitler during the crucial years of his ascent. Drawing on business histories and archival material from the U.S. Office of Military Government’s Decartelization Branch, this Article assesses the historical …
All I Really Need To Know About Antitrust I Learned In 1912, Daniel A. Crane
All I Really Need To Know About Antitrust I Learned In 1912, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Herbert Hovenkamp has indisputably earned the deanship of contemporary antitrust scholarship. One could point to many different attributes by which he has earned his laurels: fantastic scholarly productivity; clarity and precision in the craft of writing; analytical depth in both law and economics; moderation in a field apt to polarization; and custodianship of the influential Areeda treatise. In this Essay, I hope to honor another quality that has contributed significantly to Herb’s tremendous success as an antitrust scholar—his engagement with history. Much contemporary antitrust scholarship bursts with excitement at the discovery of new phenomena or theories that in all actuality …
A Neo-Chicago Perspective On Antitrust Institutions, Daniel A. Crane
A Neo-Chicago Perspective On Antitrust Institutions, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
It has long been fashionable to categorize antitrust by its "schools." From the Sherman Act's passage to World War II, there were (at least) neo-classical marginalism, populism, progressivism, associationalism, business commonwealthism, and Brandeisianism. From World War II to the present, we have seen (at least, and without counting the European Ordo-Liberals) PaleoHarvard structuralism, the Chicago School, Neo-Harvard institutionalism, and Post -Chicagoans. So why not Neo-Chicago? I am already on record as suggesting the possible emergence of such a school, so it is too late for me to dismiss the entire "schools" conversation as window-dressing. This Symposium is dedicated to defining …
Did We Avoid Historical Failures Of Antitrust Enforcement During The 2008-2009 Financial Crisis?, Daniel A. Crane
Did We Avoid Historical Failures Of Antitrust Enforcement During The 2008-2009 Financial Crisis?, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
During both economic crises and wars, times of severe national anxiety, antitrust has taken a back seat to other political and regulatory objectives. Antitrust enforcement has often been a political luxury good, consumed only during periods of relative peace and prosperity. In 1890, the Sherman Act's adoption kicked off the era of national antitrust enforcement. Barely three years later, the panic of 1893 provided the first major test to the national appetite for antitrust enforcement. Perhaps 1893 should not be included in the story: antitrust was still young, and it was not even clear that the Sherman Act applied to …
Canadian Merger Policy And Its International Implications, Eric K. Gressman
Canadian Merger Policy And Its International Implications, Eric K. Gressman
Michigan Journal of International Law
The implications of Canadian merger policy are of deep concern to U.S. and other foreign investors who have invested or are considering investing in Canada. U.S. interests own 60 percent of Canada's manufacturing industry. In 1978, approximately 250 mergers in Canada involved a foreign-owned or foreign-controlled buyer (usually U.S.). Therefore, it is not surprising that Canada's merger policy is no less important to the decisions of foreign investors in Canada than the Justice Department's policies are to domestic investors in the United States. At the same time, the Canadian government and public are concerned with their merger policy as a …