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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

University of Michigan Law School

Michigan Law Review

Federal Trade Commission Act

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

Full-Text Articles in Law

State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester Dec 2016

State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester

Michigan Law Review

The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …


The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo Oct 2000

The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo

Michigan Law Review

There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …


Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer Feb 2000

Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer

Michigan Law Review

Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second- best tradeoffs. The lesson of second-best analysis is that one market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible …


Guides To Harmonizing Section 5 Of The Federal Trade Commission Act With The Sherman And Clayton Acts, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim Apr 1961

Guides To Harmonizing Section 5 Of The Federal Trade Commission Act With The Sherman And Clayton Acts, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim

Michigan Law Review

This topic is a constellation of antitrust highlights. Within the past five years the Federal Trade Commission has ventured into borderlands of its claim of jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in testing the scope of section 5 itself and its relation to the Commission's jurisdiction under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.


Administrative Law-Federal Trade Commission-Constitutional And Statutory Authority To Order Additional Compliance Reports, Charles Myneder S. Ed. Jan 1951

Administrative Law-Federal Trade Commission-Constitutional And Statutory Authority To Order Additional Compliance Reports, Charles Myneder S. Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Proceeding under section 5 of its organic act, the Federal Trade Commission issued an order requiring defendants to cease and desist from engaging in certain trade practices. The court of appeals, in its decree affirming the order, directed compliance reports to be filed with the commission within a specified time, reserving jurisdiction to enter further orders. Four years after the compliance reports were filed, the commission, on its own motion, ordered additional reports to show continued compliance. Defendants refused to report, challenging the authority of the commission to issue the order. The district court dismissed suit by the commission for …


Federal Anti-Trust Law And The National Industrial Recovery Act, Howard E. Wahrenbrock Jun 1933

Federal Anti-Trust Law And The National Industrial Recovery Act, Howard E. Wahrenbrock

Michigan Law Review

The economic struggle for existence - the competitive system - which has been principally depended upon to equate the production and consumption of economic goods, is not self-sustaining. Extreme forms of that struggle - engrossing, forestalling, regrating, contracts in restraint of trade, monopoly, unfair competition, to mention some forms at the higher stages of legal development - have had to be restrained by law. Their restriction has been called for to protect the poor and economically weak from oppression by the rich and economically powerful; under a system of complete laissez faire, competition would bring about the elimination of the …


Federal Trade Commission - False And Misleading Advertising Apr 1933

Federal Trade Commission - False And Misleading Advertising

Michigan Law Review

The law provided neither practical remedies nor suitable means of preventing false and misleading advertising before the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914. The doctrine of caveat emptor had long prevented the effectual protection of misled customers and of competitors consequently injured. True, competitors could enjoin or recover damages-for injury by misleading advertising which took the form of common law "unfair competition." The courts had found no great difficulty in extending established common law principles to make unlawful such obvious violations of the proprietary rights of particular competitors as "simulation" and "disparagement." Although there is little question …