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Full-Text Articles in Law
Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol
Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol
Michigan Law Review
Review of The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust: An Examination of US and EU Competition Policy by Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kudrle.
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
Michigan Law Review
The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …
Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White
Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White
Michigan Law Review
Plus factors are economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms, that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action. Possible plus factors are typically enumerated without any attempt to distinguish them in terms of a meaningful economic categorization or in terms of their probative strength for inferring collusion. In this Article, we provide a taxonomy for plus factors as well as a methodology for ranking plus factors in terms of their strength for inferring explicit collusion, the strongest of which are referred to as "super plus factors."
The Hidden Roles Of Boilerplate And Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition Of Transaction Costs, Segmentation Of Consumers, And Anticompetitive Effects, David Gilo, Ariel Porat
The Hidden Roles Of Boilerplate And Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition Of Transaction Costs, Segmentation Of Consumers, And Anticompetitive Effects, David Gilo, Ariel Porat
Michigan Law Review
Standard-form contracts offered to consumers contain numerous terms and clauses, most of which are ancillary to the main terms of the transaction. We call these ancillary terms "boilerplate provisions." Since most consumers do not read boilerplate provisions or, if they do, find them hard to understand, courts are suspicious of boilerplate provisions and sometimes find them unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability. At times, courts conclude that harsh terms have not been accepted by consumers in the first place and therefore are not included in the contract, and on other occasions courts interpret boilerplate provisions in favor of consumers, applying …
Reciprocal Altruism As A Felony: Antitrust And The Prisoner's Dilemma, John Shepard Wiley Jr.
Reciprocal Altruism As A Felony: Antitrust And The Prisoner's Dilemma, John Shepard Wiley Jr.
Michigan Law Review
This essay is about the idea of cooperation in antitrust law. At the outset, ·I clarify my terminology. Biologists often refer to reciprocal altruism. "Reciprocal altruism" in the antitrust context has an odd semantic ring. There is nothing altruistic or self-sacrificing about the cooperation that antitrust rules outlaw: cartel price fixing. Firms do it strictly for the money. I prefer the term reciprocity to describe a firm's strategy to pursue behavior that will profit it only if competing firms engage in similar behavior. This usage can create confusion in the present context, however, because reciprocity is also an antitrust term …
Trade-Marks: Monopoly Or Competition?, Leslie Davidson Taggart
Trade-Marks: Monopoly Or Competition?, Leslie Davidson Taggart
Michigan Law Review
Three articles have appeared in the Georgetown Law Journal in which the thesis is asserted that trade-marks are monopolies in restraint of trade under the Anti-Trust Acts. Their publication seems to have been caused in part by the proposed revision of the United States Trade-Mark Statutes, which was started by a bill originally introduced into the House on January 19, 1938. The thesis of this present article is that a trade-mark in fact distinguishes one man's product from the products of his competitors, with the result that the consumer can make a choice among them.
"Enemy" Under The Trading With The Enemy Act And Some Problems Of International Law, Samuel Anatole Lourie
"Enemy" Under The Trading With The Enemy Act And Some Problems Of International Law, Samuel Anatole Lourie
Michigan Law Review
When the United States entered this war and even before, it was evident that the measures and definitions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, were obsolete instruments with which to cope, in economic and psychological warfare, with such dangerous enemies as the Axis, particularly Germany. Germany's preparations and planning for the war date back two decades, but took on intensified and conspicuous form only after the access of the Nazis to power.
In all types of warfare numerous weapons, devices and means are openly or secretly used. "Camouflage" is not the exclusive domain of military …