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Articles 1 - 30 of 97
Full-Text Articles in Law
Regulation And The Marginalist Revolution, Herbert Hovenkamp
Regulation And The Marginalist Revolution, Herbert Hovenkamp
Florida Law Review
The marginalist revolution in economics became the foundation for the modern regulatory State with its “mixed” economy. For the classical political economists, value was a function of past averages. Marginalism substituted forward looking theories based on expectations about firm and market performance. Marginalism swept through university economics, and by 1920 or so virtually every academic economist was a marginalist.
This Article considers the historical influence of marginalism on regulatory policy in the United States. My view is at odds with those who argue that marginalism saved capitalism by rationalizing it as a more defensible buttress against incipient socialism. While marginalism …
Vertical Mergers And Entrepreneurial Exit, D. Daniel Sokol
Vertical Mergers And Entrepreneurial Exit, D. Daniel Sokol
Florida Law Review
The idea that tech companies should be permitted to acquire nascent start-ups is under attack from antitrust populists. Yet, this debate on vertical mergers has overlooked important empirical contributions regarding innovation-related mergers in the strategy literature. This Article explores the extant empirical strategy literature, which generally identifies a procompetitive basis that supports vertical mergers as efficiency enhancing. This literature solidifies the current general vertical merger presumption that favors a procompetitive vertical merger policy for purposes of government merger enforcement. However, the procompetitive benefit for a presumption of merger approval for most vertical mergers does not end with the synthesis of …
Antitrust's "Curse Of Bigness" Problem, D. Daniel Sokol
Antitrust's "Curse Of Bigness" Problem, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Tim Wu’s most recent book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the Gilded Age, is an attempt to reframe contemporary antitrust debates by returning antitrust to its more populist roots. Given the global implications of his ideas and policy proposals (including breakup of tech platforms) for many of the large corporations that he takes on, The Curse of Bigness offers profound insights for how society and business should be organized. The first part of this Review summarizes Wu’s major claims. It then highlights some of his critiques as to “bigness,” the multiple goals of antitrust, and the missed opportunities as …
The Rise And (Potential) Fall Of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, Vivek Ghosal, D. Daniel Sokol
The Rise And (Potential) Fall Of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, Vivek Ghosal, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Government enforcement against collusion, now viewed by the Supreme Court as the “supreme evil” in antitrust, has gone through various phases of enforcement in the United States. There have been periods in which cartels have been able to collude more or less effectively given various institutional tools at the disposal of the government. By analyzing enforcement and prosecutions data over a long time horizon, 1969–2016, this Article examines the attributes of cartel enforcement over time and the changing use of tools to assist with detection and punishment. We provide a comprehensive description of critical cartel enforcement events and institutional developments …
The Ncaa’S Transfer Rules: An Antitrust Analysis, Roger D. Blair, Wenche Wang
The Ncaa’S Transfer Rules: An Antitrust Analysis, Roger D. Blair, Wenche Wang
UF Law Faculty Publications
In Deppe v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Seventh Circuit accepted the NCAA’s argument that its transfer rules are presumptively procompetitive. It also approved the NCAA’s no-poaching agreement. This Article analyzes these NCAA-imposed restraints and finds them inconsistent with current antitrust policy.
Direct Evidence Of A Sherman Act Agreement, William H. Page
Direct Evidence Of A Sherman Act Agreement, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
In cases that allege price fixing or other per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts usually begin their opinions by saying there is no direct evidence of agreement—evidence like a “recorded phone call” that is “explicit and requires no inferences to establish” that the necessary direct communications occurred. Only at that point do the courts turn to the sufficiency of the inferences of agreement from circumstantial evidence. Courts highlight the absence of direct evidence of agreement in this way because of its special role on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, when courts do not …
Analyzing Vertical Mergers: Accounting For The Unilateral Effects Tradeoff And Thinking Holistically About Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, Christine Wilson, D. Daniel Sokol, Keith Klovers, Jeremy Sandford
Analyzing Vertical Mergers: Accounting For The Unilateral Effects Tradeoff And Thinking Holistically About Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, Christine Wilson, D. Daniel Sokol, Keith Klovers, Jeremy Sandford
UF Law Faculty Publications
With the adoption of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, the U.S. antitrust agencies have updated their guidance on vertical mergers for the Twenty-First Century. Although economists have long recognized the procompetitive benefits most vertical mergers generate, the law has not always followed suit, and has sometimes condemned vertical mergers for making the merged firm more efficient. In this article, we attempt to catalogue the extensive list of efficiencies that vertical mergers can generate, trace the often halting efforts to incorporate these insights into the law, and propose a framework that courts and agencies can use to assess the likely competitive …
After Forty Years Of Antitrust Revision And Apple V. Pepper, What Now Illinois Brick?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
After Forty Years Of Antitrust Revision And Apple V. Pepper, What Now Illinois Brick?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
Nineteen seventy-seven was a paradigm-shifting year in antitrust law. Decisions by the Supreme Court greatly limited the type of parties who could successfully bring antitrust actions and what types of activities would violate the antitrust laws. First, in January of that year, the Court, in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, ruled that to mount a case the plaintiff had to have suffered an antitrust injury. In other words, even if the antitrust laws were violated, the party raising the issue had to have suffered the type of harm the laws were designed to avoid. Then in a fourteen day span the …
Ebay, Permanent Injunctions, And Trade Secrets, Elizabeth A. Rowe
Ebay, Permanent Injunctions, And Trade Secrets, Elizabeth A. Rowe
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article presents the first qualitative empirical review of permanent injunctions in trade secret cases. In addition, it explores the extent to which the Supreme Court’s patent decision in eBay v. MercExchange has influenced the analysis of equitable principles in federal trade secret litigation. Among the more notable findings are that while equitable principles are generally applied in determining whether to grant a permanent injunction to a prevailing party after trial, the courts are not necessarily strictly applying the four factors from eBay. The award of monetary relief does not preclude equitable injunctive relief, and courts can find irreparable harm …
Bundled Discounts, Loyalty Discounts And Antitrust Policy, Roger D. Blair, Thomas Knight
Bundled Discounts, Loyalty Discounts And Antitrust Policy, Roger D. Blair, Thomas Knight
UF Law Faculty Publications
In this paper, we explore the competitive significance of both bundled and loyalty discounts. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we examine the antitrust treatment of both bundled discounts and loyalty discounts in the United States. In Section III, we examine bundled discounts and discuss their competitive significance. In Section IV, we examine loyalty discounts as well as their competitive significance. In Section V, we suggest that the courts evaluate bundled discounts and loyalty discounts under the Rule of Reason. In Section VI, we close with some concluding remarks and policy recommendations.
Rethinking Major League Baseball’S Antitrust Exemption, Roger D. Blair, Wenche Wang
Rethinking Major League Baseball’S Antitrust Exemption, Roger D. Blair, Wenche Wang
UF Law Faculty Publications
For nearly a century, Major League Baseball (MLB) has enjoyed antitrust immunity. No other sports league or organization is similarly exempt. Shielded by precedent from antitrust prosecution, MLB clubs are free to exploit both monopolistic and monopsonistic power. In this paper, we call for a repeal of MLB’s antitrust exemption. In doing so, we examine some recent antitrust challenges to MLB conduct, the current interest of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in labor market issues, the welfare consequences of the exemption, and a policy recommendation for legislative action.
The Rule Of Reason, Herbert Hovenkamp
The Rule Of Reason, Herbert Hovenkamp
Florida Law Review
Antitrust’s rule of reason was born out of a thirty-year Supreme Court debate concerning the legality of multi-firm restraints on competition. By the late 1920s the basic contours of the rule for restraints among competitors was roughly established. Antitrust policy toward vertical restraints remained much more unstable, however, largely because their effects were so poorly understood. This Article provides a litigation field guide for antitrust claims under the rule of reason—or more precisely, for situations when application of the rule of reason is likely. At the time pleadings are drafted and even up to the point of summary judgment, the …
A Knowledge Theory Of Tacit Agreement, Wentong Zheng
A Knowledge Theory Of Tacit Agreement, Wentong Zheng
UF Law Faculty Publications
A persistent puzzle in antitrust law is whether and when an unlawful agreement could arise from conduct or verbalized communications that fall short of an explicit agreement. While courts have found such tacit agreements to exist in idiosyncratic scenarios, they have failed to articulate a clear and consistent logic for such findings. This Article attempts to fill this gap by proposing a unified theory of tacit agreement. It defines a tacit agreement as an agreement formed by non-explicit communications that enable the alleged coconspirators to have constructive knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent. This approach to tacit agreement is more …
Parker V. Brown, The Eleventh Amendment, And Anticompetitive State Regulation, William H. Page, John E. Lopatka
Parker V. Brown, The Eleventh Amendment, And Anticompetitive State Regulation, William H. Page, John E. Lopatka
UF Law Faculty Publications
The Parker v. Brown (or “state action”) doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution impose differen limits on antitrust suits challenging anticompetitive state regulation. The Supreme Court has developed these two versions of state sovereign immunity separately, and lower courts usually apply the immunities independently of each another (even in the same cases) without explaining their relationship. Nevertheless, the Court has derived the two immunities from the same principle of sovereign immunity, so it is worth considering why and how they differ, and what the consequences of the differences are for antitrust policy. The state action immunity is based …
Ohio V. American Express: Misunderstanding Two-Sided Platforms, The Charge Card 'Market,' And The Need For Procompetitive Justifications, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Ohio V. American Express: Misunderstanding Two-Sided Platforms, The Charge Card 'Market,' And The Need For Procompetitive Justifications, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
In Ohio v. American Express Co., the United States Supreme Court had its first knowing encounter with what it incorrectly viewed as a two-sided platform in the context of American Express’ Non Disclosure Provisions (NDP). Under these provisions merchants accepting the American Express card for payment are not permitted to inform consumers that other cards charge merchants less for their use and that this could be reflected in the final price paid. The opinion includes poor reasoning, a lack of attention to precedent, and bad news for those who thought antitrust law was due for a revival. Yet, and perhaps …
Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, D. Daniel Sokol
Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Contemporary rhetoric surrounding antitrust in an age of populism has potential implications with regard to criminal antitrust enforcement. In areas such as resale price maintenance, monopolization, and Robinson-Patman violations, antitrust criminalization remains the law on the books. Antitrust populists and traditional antitrust thinkers who embrace a singular economic goal of antitrust push to enforce antitrust law that is already “on the books.” A natural extension of enforcement by the antitrust populists would be to advocate the use of criminal sanctions, outside of collusion, for various antitrust violations which are “on the books” but have not been used in over a …
Understanding Online Markets And Antitrust Analysis, D. Daniel Sokol, Jingyuan Ma
Understanding Online Markets And Antitrust Analysis, D. Daniel Sokol, Jingyuan Ma
UF Law Faculty Publications
Antitrust analysis of online markets is a hot topic around the world. In a number of jurisdictions, online markets already have been subject to antitrust review in merger or conduct cases. In other jurisdictions, these issues are in a nascent stage of policy. A number of lessons can be learned from the cases to date involving online markets with regard to optimal antitrust policy. What these cases tend to share are some basic features as to how online markets work. Some jurisdictions understand the particular dynamics of multi-sided online markets. Other competition authorities sometimes may misidentify these markets. This essay …
Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol
Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Antitrust is an important area of law and policy for most companies in the world. Having divergent rules across antitrust systems means that the same economic behavior may be treated differently depending on the jurisdiction, leading to disparate outcomes in which one jurisdiction finds illegal behavior (but the other does not) when the underlying behavior may be pro-competitive. This disparate set of outcomes creates a world in which the most stringent antitrust system may produce the global standard. As a result, if the antitrust rules applied are too rigid, they threaten to hurt consumers not merely in the jurisdiction where …
Untangling The Market And The State, Wentong Zheng
Untangling The Market And The State, Wentong Zheng
UF Law Faculty Publications
The government plays increasingly active and diversified roles in the modern economy. How to draw the boundary between the market and the state has emerged as a contentious issue in various areas of law, including constitutional law, antitrust, and international trade. This Article surveys and critiques the law’s current approaches to the market-versus-state divide, embodied in four tests based on ownership, control, function, and role, respectively. This Article proposes an alternative market-versus-state test based on the nature of the power being exercised in the challenged action. This power-based test not only better distinguishes between the market and the state, but …
Other Markets, Other Costs: Modernizing Antitrust, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Other Markets, Other Costs: Modernizing Antitrust, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
Today’s antitrust law is characterized by stagnation and indeterminacy. The failure is so thorough that it is not clear that U.S. competition law actually leads to any outcomes that are defendable except at the most superficial level. Moreover, when enforcement does result in a desirable outcome, it not clear that it is the best outcome. The principal reason for this state of affairs is that antitrust scholars and courts cling to misguided goals and theories that have not evolved despite an avalanche of information now available that can modernize the discipline.
This Article has two main sections that necessarily overlap. …
Remarks From The 5th Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum / Antitrust: Helping Drive The Innovation Economy, Renata B. Hesse Antitrust
Remarks From The 5th Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum / Antitrust: Helping Drive The Innovation Economy, Renata B. Hesse Antitrust
Journal of Technology Law & Policy
The year 2015 was a busy year for the Antitrust Division (Division) of the U.S. Department of Justice (Department)—we opened a number of investigations, logged a lot of trial time, and recorded several victories of note, all of which I will quickly highlight in a moment. But while these actions give you a snapshot of what we do on a day-to-day basis, they don’t fully capture our role in helping drive innovation. What I want to discuss first is how all of that work that we do maintaining competitive markets intersects with an economy that is constantly changing. Today, there …
Rems-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs And The Antitrust Economics Of Refusals To Deal With Potential General Competitors, Henry N. Butler
Rems-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs And The Antitrust Economics Of Refusals To Deal With Potential General Competitors, Henry N. Butler
Florida Law Review
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) from drug manufacturers to ensure that a certain drug’s benefits outweigh its risks. Through REMS, the FDA restricts the distribution of drugs with dangerous characteristics, such as high toxicities and severe side effects, to qualified medical professionals. Such restrictions limit the ability of generic drug manufacturers to obtain samples of the REMS-restricted drugs for bioequivalence testing for an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).Without the ability to demonstrate bioequivalence in the ANDAs, potential generic …
Antitrust Limits On Targeted Patent Aggregation, Alan Devlin
Antitrust Limits On Targeted Patent Aggregation, Alan Devlin
Florida Law Review
Patent-assertion entities (PAEs) are non-technology-practicing companies that aggregate and license patents under threat of suit. Their activities have drawn fire, including presidential condemnation, and spurred proposed legislation to protect operating firms against them. PAEs leverage flaws in the patent system to extort firms that independently invent and sell technological goods to consumers. Since PAEs tax innovators and appear to restrict rather than facilitate wealth transfer to original patentees, their worst rent-seeking practices almost certainly reduce net incentives to innovate and harm consumers. This result is more likely if the principal desirable incentive that PAEs create is to file patents rather …
Rems-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs And The Antitrust Economics Of Refusals To Deal With Potential General Competitors, Henry N. Butler
Rems-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs And The Antitrust Economics Of Refusals To Deal With Potential General Competitors, Henry N. Butler
Florida Law Review
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) from drug manufacturers to ensure that a certain drug’s benefits outweigh its risks. Through REMS, the FDA restricts the distribution of drugs with dangerous characteristics, such as high toxicities and severe side effects, to qualified medical professionals. Such restrictions limit the ability of generic drug manufacturers to obtain samples of the REMS-restricted drugs for bioequivalence testing for an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).Without the ability to demonstrate bioequivalence in the ANDAs, potential generic …
Rems-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs And The Antitrust Economics Of Refusals To Deal With Potential General Competitors, Henry N. Butler
Rems-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs And The Antitrust Economics Of Refusals To Deal With Potential General Competitors, Henry N. Butler
Florida Law Review
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) from drug manufacturers to ensure that a certain drug’s benefits outweigh its risks. Through REMS, the FDA restricts the distribution of drugs with dangerous characteristics, such as high toxicities and severe side effects, to qualified medical professionals. Such restrictions limit the ability of generic drug manufacturers to obtain samples of the REMS-restricted drugs for bioequivalence testing for an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).Without the ability to demonstrate bioequivalence in the ANDAs, potential generic …
Antitrust Limits On Targeted Patent Aggregation, Alan Devlin
Antitrust Limits On Targeted Patent Aggregation, Alan Devlin
Florida Law Review
Patent-assertion entities (PAEs) are non-technology-practicing companies that aggregate and license patents under threat of suit. Their activities have drawn fire, including presidential condemnation, and spurred proposed legislation to protect operating firms against them. PAEs leverage flaws in the patent system to extort firms that independently invent and sell technological goods to consumers. Since PAEs tax innovators and appear to restrict rather than facilitate wealth transfer to original patentees, their worst rent-seeking practices almost certainly reduce net incentives to innovate and harm consumers. This result is more likely if the principal desirable incentive that PAEs create is to file patents rather …
Antitrust Limits On Targeted Patent Aggregation, Alan Devlin
Antitrust Limits On Targeted Patent Aggregation, Alan Devlin
Florida Law Review
Patent-assertion entities (PAEs) are non-technology-practicing companies that aggregate and license patents under threat of suit. Their activities have drawn fire, including presidential condemnation, and spurred proposed legislation to protect operating firms against them. PAEs leverage flaws in the patent system to extort firms that independently invent and sell technological goods to consumers. Since PAEs tax innovators and appear to restrict rather than facilitate wealth transfer to original patentees, their worst rent-seeking practices almost certainly reduce net incentives to innovate and harm consumers. This result is more likely if the principal desirable incentive that PAEs create is to file patents rather …
Do Automated Trading Systems Dream Of Manipulating The Price Of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets For Improper Trading Practices By Algorithmic Robots, Gregory Scopino
Do Automated Trading Systems Dream Of Manipulating The Price Of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets For Improper Trading Practices By Algorithmic Robots, Gregory Scopino
Florida Law Review
This Article seeks to determine if the CFTC needs new tools to combat disruptive, manipulative, or otherwise harmful trading practices that originate solely from the “minds” of ATSs. Part I of this Article provides a brief regulatory background of the derivatives markets, then examines the increased automation in those markets today, and concludes by looking at the CFTC’s initial responses to the issues raised by automation. Part II briefly looks at the law concerning different mental states for causes of action. Part III examines the CFTC’s pre and post-Dodd–Frank Act tools to police disruptive and manipulative trading practices, which are …
Hospital Mergers And Economic Efficiency, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, D. Daniel Sokol
Hospital Mergers And Economic Efficiency, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Consolidation via merger both from hospital-to-hospital mergers and from hospital acquisitions of physician groups is changing the competitive landscape of the provision of health care delivery in the United States. This Article undertakes a legal and economic examination of a recent Ninth Circuit case examining the hospital acquisition of a physician group. This Article explores the Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd. (St. Luke’s) decision—proposing a type of analysis that the district court and Ninth Circuit should have undertaken and that we hope future courts undertake when analyzing mergers in the …
Reregulation And The Regulatory Timeline, Peter Molk, Arden Rowell
Reregulation And The Regulatory Timeline, Peter Molk, Arden Rowell
UF Law Faculty Publications
Regulation is often casually conceived of as functioning like a binary on/off switch: as if an area, issue, or industry is either regulated or not. While this binary model of regulation can be useful, it also decontextualizes regulatory decisions from their position in time, and thus obscures important ways in which regulators are constrained and incentivized by past and future decisions. As an alternative, we present a timeline approach to regulation. The timeline approach is particularly helpful in illustrating the ways that earlier regulatory decisions create vestigial effects for later related decisions, and for highlighting the informational advantage that later …