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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

University of Cincinnati College of Law

2021

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng Oct 2021

Market Power And Switching Costs: An Empirical Study Of Online Networking Market, Shin-Ru Cheng

University of Cincinnati Law Review

In recent years, states have launched several antitrust investigations targeting digital platforms. A major difficulty in these investigations is demonstrating the extent of a digital platform’s market power. Market power is defined as the control of the output or the price without the loss of business to competitors. As will be explored in this Article, market power is a critical component in an antitrust analysis. On several occasions, courts have adopted the switching costs approach in their analysis of market power. According to this approach, market power may be inferred when the costs of switching from one supplier to another …


Monopoly And Monopsony: Antitrust Standing, Injury, And Damages, Roger D. Blair, Tirza J. Angerhofer Feb 2021

Monopoly And Monopsony: Antitrust Standing, Injury, And Damages, Roger D. Blair, Tirza J. Angerhofer

University of Cincinnati Law Review

This article examines the economic consequences of collusion in both the output market and one of the input markets. It examines the results of sequential collusion, which leads to complications and inconsistencies in measuring antitrust damages. It also examines simultaneous collusion in both the input and output markets. Ultimately, the profit maximizing equilibrium is identical but there are complications along the way to the final collusive equilibrium. The article explores the private plaintiff problems involving antitrust standing, proving antitrust injury, and estimating antitrust damages.