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Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande
Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande
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The House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee asked me to submit suggestions concerning the adequacy of existing antitrust laws, enforcement policies, and enforcement levels insofar as they impact the state of competition in the digital marketplace. My submission recommends the following nine reforms:
1. A textualist analysis of the Sherman Act shows that Section 2 actually is a no-fault monopolization statute. At a minimum Congress should enact a strong presumption that every firm with a 67% market share has violated Section 2. This would move the Sherman Act an important step in the right direction, the direction Congress intended in 1890. My …
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
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The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the
firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the
first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation
originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the
Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision.
Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman
Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired
a monopoly. …
A Traditional And Textualist Analysis Of The Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft From Consumers, And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande
A Traditional And Textualist Analysis Of The Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft From Consumers, And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande
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This Article ascertains the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two very different ways. First, it performs a traditional analysis of the legislative history of the antitrust laws by analyzing relevant legislative debates and committee reports. Second, it undertakes a textualist or "plain meaning" analysis of the purpose of the antitrust statutes, using Justice Scalia's methodology. It does this by analyzing the meaning of key terms as they were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises, common law cases, and the earliest U.s. antitrust cases, and it does this in light of the history of the relevant times.
Both approaches …
The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande
The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande
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Chicago School antitrust policy rests on the premise that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That foundation is flawed. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.
This essay defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, and analyzes recent case law. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare …
What Do Exit Polls And Flu Vaccine Shortages Have In Common?, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande, F.M. Scherer
What Do Exit Polls And Flu Vaccine Shortages Have In Common?, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande, F.M. Scherer
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What do exit polls and flu vaccine shortages have in common? Both involve situations where society has come to rely excessively on too few entities. When even one company makes a mistake society can suffer significantly. This short piece advocates that we abandon our almost laissez faire tolerence towards high concentration, and rely upon competition, rather than on monopoly or a small number of producers.
Beware Buyer Power, Robert H. Lande
Beware Buyer Power, Robert H. Lande
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The conventional antitrust wisdom is that buyer side market power or monopsony is so unusual and so rarely anticompetitive that it should not merit more than a scholarly afterthought. Moreover, these brief mentions typically say it is essentially the mirror image of seller power or that, while seller-side power is suspect since it leads to higher consumer prices, buyer-side power is usually benign, because the public should not care which layer of a distribution channel gets any potential savings that can arise. This short article discusses how buyer power can be anticompetitive. It also discusses how buyer power or monopsony …
Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, Robert H. Lande
Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, Robert H. Lande
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The conventional wisdom is that current antitrust damage levels are too high, lead to overdeterrence, and should be cut back. Although most agree that threefold damages are fine, at least for cartels, the combination of treble damages to direct purchasers and another treble damages to indirect purchasers typically is denounced as duplicative, a "mess," or the equivalent of the use of "cluster bombs" on defendants. This article, however, will assert the opposite. This article will argue that, if the current antitrust damage levels are examined carefully, they do not even total treble damages, and overall are not high enough to …
Ub Viewpoint – Aol/Microsoft Settlement Could Harm Consumers, Robert H. Lande
Ub Viewpoint – Aol/Microsoft Settlement Could Harm Consumers, Robert H. Lande
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No abstract provided.
Why Are We So Reluctant To "Execute" Microsoft?, Robert H. Lande
Why Are We So Reluctant To "Execute" Microsoft?, Robert H. Lande
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On June 28, 2001, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws repeatedly, relentlessly, and over a multi-year period. The court ruled eight separate times that Microsoft engaged in conduct that illegally maintained its monopoly in PC operating systems. Despite these strongly worded conclusions concerning Microsoft’s liability, the court was extremely cautious when it considered whether to break up the company. It held that divestiture was a “radical” remedy that should be imposed with “great caution.”
The Perfect Caper?: Private Damages And The Microsoft Case, Robert H. Lande, James Langenfeld
The Perfect Caper?: Private Damages And The Microsoft Case, Robert H. Lande, James Langenfeld
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As readers of crime novels know, there are many definitions of the perfect caper. Under most, the perpetrator gets to keep its ill-gotten gains and goes unpunished. Even if the perpetrator is arrested and brought to trial, he or she still typically escapes punishment completely due to a variety of unusual circumstances. This is essentially what Professors John E. Lopatka and William H. Page are arguing about Microsoft's actions. They assert that even though Microsoft has violated the antitrust laws, it will not be made to pay for its anticompetitive conduct, at least not by private plaintiffs.
Legalizing Merger To Monopoly And Higher Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Wrong, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Stephen F. Ross
Legalizing Merger To Monopoly And Higher Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Wrong, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Stephen F. Ross
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This article analyzes the Canadian Superior Propane decision, apparently the first merger decision in world history to consider explicitly what to do when a merger was predicted to lead to both higher consumer prices and to net efficiencies. The article advocates analyzing the merger under a "price to consumers" or "consumer welfare" standard, rather than a total efficiency standard, and advocates that the enforcers and the courts block such mergers.
After Microsoft Wins, Robert H. Lande
The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande
The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande
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As the world’s nations rapidly move from systems in which central planning and monopoly are replaced by free markets,2 it becomes increasingly valuable to consider the histories of competition policy experienced in different nations, on a comparative basis.3 In this article, we focus on the history of antitrust in the United States, the first nation to develop and fully-articulate a competition policy, drawing out themes that may be useful to other countries as they contemplate the shape and direction of their own competition regimes. We show that the American competition policy has reflected an underlying stability and bi-partisanship, but that …
Post-Chicago School Paradigm Emerges: A New Foundation For Antitrust Law, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande
Post-Chicago School Paradigm Emerges: A New Foundation For Antitrust Law, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande
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No abstract provided.
Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande
Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande
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Chicago School antitrust policy rests upon the premise that the sole purpose of antitrust is to promote economic efficiency. This article shows that this foundation is flawed. The fundamental purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers. To protect purchasers from paying supracompetitive prices when they buy goods or services. This is the "wealth transfer," "theft", "consumer welfare" or "purchaser protection" explanation for antitrust.
The article shows that the efficiency view originated in a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act undertaken by Robert Bork. Bork purported to show that Congress only cared about enhancing economic efficiency.
To …