Law Commons^™

Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

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This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom is that the current level of sanctions is adequate or excessive. The article demonstrates, however, that the combined level of current United States cartel sanctions is only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. Consequently, the average level of United States anti-cartel sanctions should be approximately quintupled.

The United States imposes a diverse arsenal of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines and restitution payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest and fines for the corporate …

All Of The Economic Aid The U.S., Eu, And Japan Give To The Developing World Is Stolen Back By Our Illegal Price-Fixing Cartels, Robert H. Lande

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This compares the magnitudes of two forms of economic interaction between the developed and developing world. The first is the amount of economic foreign aid provided by the developed world to the developing world during a single year. The second is an estimate of the yearly amount that illegal price fixing cartels, comprised of companies from the U.S., the EU, and Japan, overcharge – steal! – from purchasers in these same countries. This comparison shows these amounts are roughly equivalent. If anything, cartels probably steal more from the developing world than the developed world gives them in economic assistance.

This …

Cartel Overcharges And Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

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This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter illegal price fixing cartels optimally. The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a U.S. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% …

How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

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This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter cartels optimally The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a US. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% and 22%. They …

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

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Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …