Law Commons^™

Antitrust Balancing, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

Antitrust litigation often confronts situations where effects point in both directions. Judges sometimes describe the process of evaluating these factors as “balancing.” In its e-Books decision the Second Circuit believed that the need to balance is what justifies application of the rule of reason. In Microsoft the D.C. Circuit stated that “courts routinely apply a …balancing approach” under which “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm… outweighs the procompetitive benefit.” But then it decided the case without balancing anything.

The term “balancing” is a very poor label for what courts actually do in these cases. Balancing requires that …

Judicial Treatment Of The Antitrust Treatise, Hillary Greene, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

This essay examines Herbert Hovenkamp's influence in antitrust law and policy in the courts. This essay focuses its attention primarily with the Treatise and primarily in the area of merger law – procedural with issues of antitrust injury and substantively with merger efficiencies. The essay provides a case count citation analysis of Hovenkamp's scholarship and compares Hovenkamp to other major figures in antitrust scholarship (Bork and Posner) and to the other antitrust treatises (Kintner and Sullivan) in the courts. Our meta-level findings show that Hovenkamp is far more cited than other treatise writers or scholars who have been recognized for …

Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

This essay explores the factors that drive merger outcomes under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). While there are currently only a small number of published merger decisions, this paper overcomes that obstacle by utilizing a unique practitioner survey of antitrust lawyers across multiple jurisdictions. This survey captures transactions contemplated, but never undertaken (deterred by the merger regime), as well as mergers notified for approval under the AML. The survey allows for broader inferences to be drawn about the development of Chinese antitrust law, including: the welfare standard used in merger analysis, what industrial policy and other political factors may impact merger …

The Transformation Of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, The Rule Of Reason, And Per Se Legality, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

Robert Bork probably had the single most lasting influence on antitrust law and policy of anyone in the past 50 years. To read the 1978 Antitrust Paradox today, one is struck by how closely contemporary case law tracks Bork's policy prescriptions. The speed at which the transformation in law and policy occurred in antitrust is perhaps unprecedented across any area of common law. In the 1970s, antitrust jurisprudence and enforcement policies were in tension with industrial organization economics. Bork created a unified goal for antitrust based on a “consumer welfare prescription” to shape the development of the case law. The …

Policing The Firm, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

Criminal price fixing cartels are a serious problem for consumers. Cartels are hard both to find and punish. Research into other kinds of corporate wrongdoing suggests that enforcers should pay increased attention to incentives within the firm to deter wrongdoing. Thus far, antitrust scholarship and policy have ignored this insight in the cartel context. This Article suggests how to improve antitrust enforcement by focusing enforcement efforts on changing the incentives of internal firm compliance.

Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

The appropriate role of merger efficiencies remains unresolved in US antitrust law and policy. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has led to a significant shift in health care delivery. The ACA promises that increased integration and a shift from quantity of performance through increased competition will create a system in which quality will go up and prices will go down. Increasingly, due to the economic trends that respond to the ACA, including considerable consolidation both horizontally and vertically, it is imperative that the antitrust agencies provide an economically sound and administrable legal approach to efficiency enhancing mergers. …

Economic Authority And The Limits Of Expertise In Antitrust Cases, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page

William H. Page

In antitrust litigation, the factual complexity and economic nature of the issues involved require the presentation of economic expert testimony in all but a few cases. This dependence on economics has increased in recent years because of the courts' narrowing of per se rules of illegality and the courts' expansion of certain areas of factual inquiry. At the same time, however, courts have limited the scope of allowable expert testimony through the methodological strictures of Daubert and its progeny and through heightened sufficiency requirements. In this Article, Professors Page and Lopatka make four important points about these judicially imposed constraints …

Course Materials On East-West Trade Law, Julian Juergensmeyer, A. Burzynski

Julian C. Juergensmeyer

No abstract provided.

Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally means a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost savings …

Promoting Innovation, Matthew Sag, Spencer Weber Waller

Spencer Weber Waller

No abstract provided.

Antitrust, Innovation, And Product Design In Platform Markets: Microsoft And Intel, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers

William H. Page

The Antitrust Division’s Microsoft case and the Federal Trade Commission’s Intel case both rested on claims that antitrust intervention was necessary to preserve innovation in technological platforms at the heart of the personal computer. Yet, because those very platforms support markets that are among the most innovative in the American economy, injudicious intervention might well have jeopardized the very innovation that antitrust should promote. In this article, we review the role of platforms in technological innovation and consider how antitrust standards should apply to them. We then examine how Microsoft resolved antitrust issues affecting platform design at various stages of …

Josh Wright’S “Chicago School Papers”: An Overview, William H. Page

William H. Page

In what follows, I consider three of FTC Commissioner Josh Wright's “Chicago School Papers.” In these papers, Commissioner Wright considers the past, present, and future role of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis in the shaping of law and policy, offering along the way some interesting insights into what his priorities at the FTC are likely to be. The papers discussed have common themes: the mischaracterization of the “Chicago School,” the scientific advantage of dispensing altogether with “School” labels, and a focus on empirical findings in shaping antitrust analysis.

Devising A Microsoft Remedy That Serves Consumers, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page

William H. Page

According to Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, Microsoft was a “predacious” monopolizer that did extensive “violence . . . to the competitive process.” Through a “single, well-coordinated course” of anticompetitive action, it suppressed competition from Netscape's Navigator, an Internet browser, and from Sun's Java programming language and related technologies. Microsoft “mounted a deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts, . . . placed an oppressive thumb on the scale of competitive fortune, . . . and trammeled the competitive process.” Having colorfully concluded that Microsoft's offenses were extreme, Judge Jackson deferred to the government's demand for a drastic remedy. He ordered that Microsoft …

Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William Page, Seldon Childers

William H. Page

Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft's server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft's documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs' technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for up to five more …

Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/Rand And Antitrust Injury, William H. Page

William H. Page

In a 2013 opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge James Robart calculated “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” or RAND royalties that Motorola could lawfully charge Microsoft for licenses to use Motorola patents that were essential to two industry standards. Although the case involved only a claim for breach of contract, Judge Robart’s opinion regulated monopoly pricing, a task courts try to avoid in other contexts, claiming institutional incapacity. In this instance, however, Judge Robart identified standards that he believed adequately guided him in the task. He recognized that the economic purposes of the RAND commitment were to prevent owners of standards-essential patents …

A Neo-Chicago Approach To Concerted Action, William H. Page

William H. Page

In this article, I offer an approach to concerted action that builds on traditional Chicago School analyses of the issue, but adds a focus on the role of communication. Chicago scholars uniformly identify cartels as the primary target of antitrust enforcement. They have also established much of the framework within which courts and economists analyze concerted action. George Stigler’s seminal theory of oligopoly, which sought to identify the determinants of effective collusion, has spawned an enormous literature in game theory that models the pricing behavior of oligopolists. Richard Posner’s early analysis of tacit collusion - rivals’ coordination of noncompetitive pricing …

The Ftc's Procedural Advantage In Discovering Concerted Action, William H. Page

William H. Page

Scholars have long argued that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act can or should be interpreted to reach more conduct than Section 1 of Sherman Act - whether, in other words, there are gaps in the coverage of Section 1 that allow certain forms of anticompetitive conduct that Section 5 should condemn. Perhaps the most important issue in the interpretation of Section 1 concerns how courts should distinguish conscious parallelism from unlawful concerted action. In this paper, I argue that there is no substantive gap between the two antitrust statutes on this issue-both statutes prohibit (and permit) the …

Objective And Subjective Theories Of Concerted Action, William H. Page

William H. Page

Communication is useful and often necessary for rivals to coordinate price and output decisions. All would agree that evidence of communication on these issues is relevant to the issue of whether firms reached an illegal agreement or engaged in concerted action in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Most courts and commentators would go further and define agreement and concerted action to require communication of one kind or another. I call this view the objective theory of concerted action. Louis Kaplow has recently challenged this approach in three important articles, all of which argue that the focus on …

Cumulation Of Import Statistics In Injury Investigations Before The International Trade Commission, 7 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 433 (1986), William B.T. Mock

William B.T. Mock

No abstract provided.

The Chamber Of Secrets: The Repudiation Of The Isds, Emanuela Matei

Emanuela A. Matei

The unlawfulness of the intra-EU BITs, the experiences of the new Member States unremittingly involved in investor-to state disputes and the tumultuous debates during the T-TIP negotiations are first and foremost examined from a legal perspective underlining the clash between a system designed for preferential treatment and the EU legal order based on the prohibition of discrimination. The ISDS clause represents an attribute of procedural inequality, which is furthermore convoluted by the constitutional structure of the Union i.e. the strictly limited access of private persons to supranational courts. This article enlarges the scope of the review of incompatibility by placing …

Setting Standards: Should The Federal Circuit Give Greater Deference To Decisions Of The U.S. Court Of International Trade In International Trade Cases?, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 721 (2003), Mark E. Wojcik, Lawrence Friedman

Mark E. Wojcik

No abstract provided.

The Perilous Process Of Protecting Process Patents From Infringing Importations, 14 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 207 (1992), Mark E. Wojcik

Mark E. Wojcik

No abstract provided.

Elementos De Derecho Y Regulacion Economica, Críspulo Marmolejo

Críspulo Marmolejo

No abstract provided.

“What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever”: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny As An Alternative To Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 Hastings L.J. 471 (1987), Donald L. Beschle

Donald L. Beschle

No abstract provided.

Doing Well, Doing Good And Doing Both: A Framework For The Analysis Of Noncommercial Boycotts Under The Antitrust Laws, 30 St. Louis U. L.J. 385 (1986), Donald L. Beschle

Donald L. Beschle

No abstract provided.

Harm To Competition And The Competitive Process: A Circular Charade In The Libor Antitrust Litigation, Sharon E. Foster

Sharon E. Foster

No abstract provided.

Congress & Sports Agents: A Legislative History Of The Sports Agent Responsibility And Trust Act, Edmund P. Edmonds, William H. Manz, Thomas J. Kettleson.

Edmund P. Edmonds

No abstract provided.

Baseball And Antitrust: The Legislative History Of The Curt Flood Act Of 1998, Edmund P. Edmonds, William H. Manz.

Edmund P. Edmonds

No abstract provided.

Deactivating Actavis: The Clash Between The Supreme Court And (Some) Lower Courts, Joshua Davis, Ryan Mcewan

Joshua P. Davis

Numerous trial courts have misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s recent decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. An interesting question is why they have done so. Perhaps lower courts disagree with the Supreme Court about so-called “reverse payment” cases, the subject of the Actavis opinion. Or perhaps they simply have made random mistakes, as is perhaps inevitable, particularly in a challenging area of the law like antitrust. This Article suggests an alternative account: that lower courts are seeking clear guidance from Actavis, clear guidance that the Supreme Court has not tended to provide in antitrust cases in general and that it did …

Regulating Access To Databases Through Antitrust Law, 2006 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 7 (2006), Daryl Lim

Daryl Lim

It is largely uncontroversial that the “creative” effort in a database will be protected by copyright. However, any effort to extend protection to purely factual databases creates difficulties in determining the proper method and scope of protection. This Paper argues that antitrust law can be used to supplement intellectual property law in maintaining the “access-incentive” balance with respect to databases. It starts from the premise that a trend toward “TRIPs-plus” rights in databases, whatever its form, is inevitable. The reason is a simple, but compelling one: business needs shape the law. Various means of database access regulation are explored and …