Law Commons^™

Sacred Cows, Holy Wars: Exploring The Limits Of Law In The Regulation Of Raw Milk And Kosher Meat, Kenneth Lasson

Kenneth Lasson

SACRED COWS, HOLY WARS Exploring the Limits of Law in the Regulation of Raw Milk and Kosher Meat By Kenneth Lasson Abstract In a free society law and religion seldom coincide comfortably, tending instead to reflect the inherent tension that often resides between the two. This is nowhere more apparent than in America, where the underlying principle upon which the first freedom enunciated by the Constitution’s Bill of Rights is based ‒ the separation of church and state – is conceptually at odds with the pragmatic compromises that may be reached. But our adherence to the primacy of individual rights …

"Apple Vs. Samsung: Three Possible Outcomes" (Quotes: Mark Mckenna) Cnn Money, Mark Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

Apple vs. Samsung: Three possible outcomes article by David Goldman quotes: Mark McKenna in CNN Money on Aug 24, 2012.

"I have been surprised that Samsung seems to have been on the defensive so much," said Mark McKenna, a law professor and intellectual property specialist at the University of Notre Dame.

Mark Mckenna Quoted In The Mac News World Article "Apple Breaks Legal Serve In Samsung’S Home Court.", Mark Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

Mark McKenna was quoted in the Mac News World article Apple Breaks Legal Serve in Samsung’s Home Court on December 13. "Neither of these companies wants to give an inch because the cumulative effect of these cases is to make it as difficult on each other as possible," Mark McKenna, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, told MacNewsWorld.

The Role Of Monopolization And Abuse Of Dominance In Competition Law, Spencer Weber Waller

Spencer Weber Waller

No abstract provided.

The Monopolization/Abuse Offense, Spencer Weber Waller

Spencer Weber Waller

No abstract provided.

Professional Activities And The Antitrust Laws, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

No abstract provided.

Mark Mckenna Quoted In The Guardian Article "Samsung Says $52m, Not $380m, Is Owed For Apple Patent Infringement, Mark Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

Mark McKenna quoted in The Guardian article by Charles Arthur "Samsung says $52m, not $380m, is owed for Apple patent infringement. “Most cases with these enormous stakes would have settled by now – particularly once the court ordered a new trial on damages, which could substantially increase or decrease the damage award," McKenna said by email. "But once the court took off the table the possibility of an injunction (which would have taken Samsung products off the market), the risk to Samsung was significantly lower, reducing its incentive to settle. And Apple wants something significant to show for its efforts. …

Mark Mckenna Quoted In Ap Article On Apple, Samsung Trial, Mark Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

Mark McKenna was quoted in the Associated Press article by PAUL ELIAS Apple, Samsung resume court battle over smartphone patents as trial opens in Silicon Valley "Most cases with these enormous stakes would have settled by now — particularly once the court ordered a new trial on damages, which could substantially increase or decrease the damage award," said Notre Dame law school professor Mark McKenna, who specializes in technology. But McKenna said a key incentive for both companies to reach a settlement was removed by U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh when she refused to ban U.S. sales of the Samsung …

Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, Avishalom Tor

Avishalom Tor

Behavioral antitrust – the application to antitrust analysis of empirical evidence of robust behavioral deviations from strict rationality – is increasingly popular and hotly debated by legal scholars and the enforcement agencies alike. This Article shows, however, that both proponents and opponents of behavioral antitrust frequently and fundamentally misconstrue its methodology, treating concrete empirical phenomena as if they were broad hypothetical assumptions. Because of this fundamental methodological error, scholars often make three classes of mistakes in behavioral antitrust analyses: First, they fail to appreciate the variability and heterogeneity of behavioral phenomena; second, they disregard the concrete ways in which markets, …

Overcoming Impediments To Information Sharing, Avishalom Tor, Amitai Aviram

Avishalom Tor

When deciding whether to share information, firms consider their private welfare. Discrepancies between social and private welfare may lead firms excessively to share information to anti-competitive ends - in facilitating of cartels and other harmful horizontal practices - a problem both antitrust scholarship and case law have paid much attention to. On the other hand, legal scholars have paid far less attention to the opposite type of inefficiency in information sharing among competitors - namely, the problem of sub-optimal information sharing. This phenomenon can generate significant social costs and is of special importance in network industries because the maintenance of …

Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions Of Dominance Or Monopoly Power, Avishalom Tor

Avishalom Tor

The prohibition of certain types of anticompetitive unilateral conduct by firms possessing a substantial degree of market power is a cornerstone of competition law regimes worldwide. Yet notwithstanding the social costs of monopoly modern legal regimes refrain from prohibiting it outright. Instead, competition laws prohibit monopolies or dominant firms from engaging in those types of anticompetitive conduct that amount to monopolizing or an abuse of dominant position. Importantly, anticompetitive conduct can take place both on the road to monopoly and, later on, once substantial market power has been achieved. Legal regimes nevertheless tend either to ignore or pay only limited …

Introduction: Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michael S. Gal, Spencer Weber Waller, Avishalom Tor

Avishalom Tor

This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference on monopolization. It argues that monopolization law has been experiencing simultaneous expansion and contraction processes that are not wholly contradictory but at least partly complementary. Specifically, the authors suggest that the contraction of monopolization law in the United States and the EU might serve to facilitate its expansion and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach internationally also has made its refinement and rationalization …

Illustrating A Behaviorally Informed Approach To Antitrust Law: The Case Of Predatory Pricing, Avishalom Tor

Avishalom Tor

One of the core assumptions of the traditional economic approach to antitrust law is that competitors are perfectly rational, profit-maximizing, decision makers. Sometimes, this assumption serves as a useful simplification of business behavior, providing an effective foundation for antitrust doctrine. At other times, however, assuming strictly rational behavior on the part of competitors is not “approximately right” but, instead, “perfectly wrong.” In these latter cases, the reliance on the perfect rationality assumption can lead scholars to mispredict market behavior and, possibly, advocate erroneous prescriptions for antitrust policy. In contrast, a behaviorally informed approach to antitrust law is based on scientific …

Insurance (Annual Survey Of The Law Of New Jersey, 1954-55), Robert Rodes

Robert Rodes

No abstract provided.

Trademark Law's Faux Federalism, Mark Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

Federal and state trademark laws regulate concurrently: The Lanham Act does not preempt state law, and in fact many states have statutorily and/or judicially developed trademark or unfair competition laws of their own. This state of affairs, which is now well-accepted even if it has not always been uncontroversial, distinguishes trademark law from patent and copyright law, since federal patent and copyright statutes preempt state law much more broadly. The Patent Act entirely preempts state law with respect to non-secret inventions and the 1976 Copyright Act preempts state copyright law with respect to all works fixed in a tangible medium …

Back To The Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion In Trademark Cases, Mark P. Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

Courts in recent years have increasingly made blunt use of their equitable powers in trademark cases. Rather than limiting the scope of injunctive relief so as to protect the interests of a mark owner while respecting the legitimate interests of third parties and of consumers, courts in most cases have viewed injunctive relief in binary terms. This is unfortunate, because greater willingness to tailor injunctive relief could go a long way to mitigating some of the most pernicious effects of trademark law’s modern expansion. This Essay urges courts to reverse this trend towards crude injunctive relief, and to re-embrace their …

Is Pepsi Really A Substitute For Coke? Market Definition In Antitrust And Ip, Mark Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

No abstract provided.

Senator Rufus Blodgett: The Sherman Anti-Trust Act’S Lone Dissenter, Steven Lavender

Steven Lavender

No abstract provided.

Emerging Issues With Respect To Merger Enforcement Standards, Daniel F. Kolb, Edward W. Large, David Boies, Thomas Dieterich, Malcolm R. Pfunder, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Exemptions For Private Requests For Governmental Action: A Critical Analysis Of The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, Earl W. Kintner, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for persons to engage in a combination or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. A variety of undertakings by persons seeking legislative action, judicial relief, administrative agency activity, or action by the executive branch of government may result in governmental steps which restrain competitors or diminish competition. Indeed, the very act of seeking governmental intervention, even if unsuccessful, may have adverse competitive effects. Similarly, monopolization or attempts to monopolize, proscribed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, might actually be advanced by governmental activities or by an individual merely seeking governmental assistance. …

Developments In Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

The issues raised in this Symposium are of great interest and timeliness. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court explored the role of Section 2 of the Sherman Act as an essential element in the antitrust regime. As was true with antitrust generally, courts expanded the reach of Section 2, frequently concluding that the complained-of conduct constituted unlawful monopolization or attempts to monopolize, and approving injunctions forbidding the continuation of exclusionary or predatory practices and orders leading to the breakup of the monopoly itself. However, after the Grinnell decision in 1966, and the Otter Tail case almost a decade …

The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We Really Want To Return To American Banana?, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

No abstract provided.

Reflections On The Manifold Means Of Enforcing The Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, Or Just Right?, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Lately, much attention has been given to the scope of the antitrust laws. This discussion has two overlapping components: (1) consideration of the substantive doctrines specifying the behavioral or structural changes that are or are not unlawful and the appropriate methodology; and (2) analysis for making those determinations with attention given to the appropriate vehicles for enforcing the antitrust laws. Some argue that the antitrust laws proscribe activities that are either pro-competitive or at worst benign. Further, they assert that the multiplicity of antitrust enforcers and enforcement devices has resulted in undue burdens, including excessive cost, time delay, and forestalling …

Per Se Illegality Of Concerted Refusals To Deal: A Rule Ripe For Reexamination, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes [e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. Early Supreme Court cases interpreting this provision held that it required a determination by the trier of fact of the reasonableness of the challenged conduct in each case — an approach which came to be known as the rule of reason. In subsequent cases, however, the Court has held that certain conduct is unreasonable per se. That is, once a court has determined that such conduct has taken place, it is foreclosed from undertaking an inquiry into the reasonableness of that …

Apple's Court-Appointed Watchdog May Not Have Much Bite, Joseph Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Joe Bauer was quoted in the MacNewsWorld article Apple's Court-Appointed Watchdog May Not Have Much Bite on October 18. "Apple has been bullheaded about this," Joseph P. Bauer, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, told MacNewsWorld. "It's been so uncooperative with the court that the court has reacted a little more harshly than it would with a defendant who said, 'We will violate no more.'" - See more at: http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/Apples-Court-Appointed-Watchdog-May-Not-Have-Much-Bite-79221.html#sthash.WR6UdvAH.dpuf

A Federal Law Of Unfair Competition: What Should Be The Reach Of Section 43(A) Of The Lanham Act?, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Statutes, like human beings, may experience a mid-life crisis. One notable illustration of this phenomenon is Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act of 1946. This provision, offering federal protection to businesses against many forms of unfair competition engaged in by their rivals, has been the subject of varied and inconsistent judicial treatment. Just as with a growing child, the first eight years of this statute's existence were characterized by few lasting achievements.

Then a landmark decision in 1954 recognized and liberated Section 43(a)'s potential. The past two decades have seen an explosion in the kinds of actions brought under this …

Competition At The Teller's Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards For Banks And Other Financial Institutions, Joseph P. Bauer, Earl W. Kintner

Joseph P. Bauer

Congressional and judicial attitudes towards the banking industry have reflected two, sometimes conflicting, goals-the maintenance of the solvency of financial institutions to protect the interests of depositors, other creditors and the economy at large; and the promotion of competition among these institutions and in the economy. The advancement of these goals has been reflected in the application of the antitrust laws to the industry. For the most part, the Sherman and Clayton Acts apply with the same force and scope to financial institutions as to other industries. In some cases, however, the goal of institutional protection is favored, and the …

A Simplified Approach To Tying Arrangements: A Legal And Economic Analysis, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

Few types of antitrust conduct have received as much treatment from the Supreme Court as tying arrangements. This practice, which is unlawful per se when certain prerequisites are met, may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product [the tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier. Notwithstanding this extensive Supreme Court attention, there is as much heat as light in this area. The doctrine that has developed is often unpredictable and frequently …

The Stealth Assault On Antitrust Enforcement: Raising The Barriers For Antitrust Injury And Standing, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

The first Annual Conference sponsored by the American Antitrust Institute featured a number of prominent speakers and explored a number of important issues. The Conference had two principal focuses: substantive questions of antitrust liability and the future direction of public enforcement of the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and by the Federal Trade Commission. However, an issue of at least equal importance was barely discussed, although it has seriously affected the scope and direction of the antitrust laws. That issue: Private enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the significant undermining of those efforts by a number …

Antitrust And Sports: Must Competition On The Field Displace Competition In The Market?, Joseph P. Bauer

Joseph P. Bauer

A casual glance at the daily newspapers would suggest that athletes and sports teams spend almost as much time squaring off in the courts as they do on the playing fields. Professional football players complain that the teams for which they play and the National Football League have conspired to impose illegal restraints on their ability to offer their services to other teams. A baseball team went to court to challenge the decision by the now-deposed Commissioner of Baseball to shift it from one division to another. College players, coaches, and universities all contend that various rules imposed by the …