Law Commons^™

Tying Law For The Digital Age, Daniel A. Crane

Notre Dame Law Review

Tying arrangements, a central concern of antitrust policy since the early days of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, have come into renewed focus with respect to the practices of dominant technology companies. Unfortunately, tying law’s doctrinal structure is a self-contradictory and incoherent wreck. A conventional view holds that this mess is due to errant Supreme Court precedents, never fully corrected, that expressed hostility to tying based on faulty economic understanding. That is only part of the story. Examination of tying law’s origins and development shows that tying doctrine was built on a now-dated paradigm of what constitutes a tying arrangement. …

Note: Trust In The Digital Marketplace: Amazon, Third-Party Sellers, And Informational Fiduciaries, Jesse-Paul Crane

Notre Dame Journal on Emerging Technologies

The rise of e-commerce has created a number of online marketplaces where digital platforms connect buyers and sellers. Consumers use platforms like Amazon, Etsy, Instacart, Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb to purchase goods and services from third parties while the platform itself takes a fee for operating the marketplace. Online platforms are not the only businesses that use such a “two-sided” marketplace model. The Supreme Court recently addressed antitrust concerns in this type of marketplace in Ohio v. Am. Express Co. 1 Two-sided markets invoke a number of novel legal issues that impact both those who buy and sell over them, …

Product Hopping: A New Framework, Michael A. Carrier, Steve D. Shadowen

Notre Dame Law Review

One of the most misunderstood and anticompetitive business behaviors in today’s economy is “product hopping,” which occurs when a brand-name pharmaceutical company switches from one version of a drug to another. These switches, benign in appearance but not necessarily in effect, can significantly decrease consumer welfare, impairing competition from generic drugs to an extent that greatly exceeds any gains from the “improved” branded product.

The antitrust analysis of product hopping is nuanced. It implicates the intersection of antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws. In fact, the behavior is even more complex because it …