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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Northwestern Pritzker School of Law

Series

Antitrust law and trade regulation

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Supervising Managed Services, James B. Speta Jan 2011

Supervising Managed Services, James B. Speta

Faculty Working Papers

Many Internet-access providers simultaneously offer Internet access and other services, such as traditional video channels, video on demand, voice calling, and other emerging services, through a single, converged platform. These other services—which can be called "managed services" because the carrier offers them only to its subscribers in a manner designed to ensure some quality of service—in many circumstances will compete with services that are offered by unaffiliated parties as applications or services on the Internet. This situation creates an important interaction effect between the domains of Internet access and managed services, an effect that has largely been missing from the …


Fcc Regulation And Increased Ownership Concentration In The Radio Industry, Peter Dicola Jan 2010

Fcc Regulation And Increased Ownership Concentration In The Radio Industry, Peter Dicola

Faculty Working Papers

In 1996, Congress increased the limits on how many radio stations one firm can own within a single "radio market." To enforce these limits, the FCC used an idiosyncratic method of defining radio markets, based on the complex geometry of the signal contour patterns of radio stations' broadcasts. Using a unique geographic data set, this paper provides the first calculations of the pre- and post-1996 limits on local radio ownership as actually implemented by the FCC. The limits are surprisingly permissive and vary considerably from city to city. While the limits were seldom binding on radio firms, I find a …


Competition Policy And Financial Distress, Ezra Friedman, Marco Ottaviani Ottaviani Jan 2010

Competition Policy And Financial Distress, Ezra Friedman, Marco Ottaviani Ottaviani

Faculty Working Papers

Traditional analyses of competition policy assume that firms operate in perfect credit markets. We argue that imperfections in credit markets should be taken into account, and show one channel by which accounting for financial conditions could alter the welfare effects of a merger. In line with empirical evidence, we posit that the presence of financial distress might diminish price competition by reducing firms' willingness to undertake long-term investments in their customer base. Mergers that reduce the probability of financial distress can induce the merging firms to compete more fiercely for customers, thus partly offsetting the traditional effects of an increase …


Selection Neglect In Mutual Fund Advertisements, Jonathan Koehler, Molly Mercer Jan 2009

Selection Neglect In Mutual Fund Advertisements, Jonathan Koehler, Molly Mercer

Faculty Working Papers

Mutual fund companies selectively advertise their better-performing funds. However, investors respond to advertised performance data as if those data were unselected (i.e., representative of the population). We identify the failure to discount selected or potentially selected data as selection neglect. We examine these phenomena in an archival study (Study 1) and two controlled experiments (Studies 2 and 3). Study 1 identifies selection bias in mutual fund advertising by showing that the median performance rank for advertised funds is between the 79th and 100th percentile. Study 2 finds that both novice investors and financial professionals fall victim to selection neglect in …


A Single-License Approach To Regulating Insurance, Henry N. Butler, Larry E. Ribstein Jan 2008

A Single-License Approach To Regulating Insurance, Henry N. Butler, Larry E. Ribstein

Faculty Working Papers

State regulation of insurance companies has been criticized for many years because of the burden imposed on insurers by having to comply with the laws of many jurisdictions. These higher costs are passed on to consumers. The problems with the current regulatory structure are prompting calls for increased federal regulation of insurance. However, all proposals to federalize insurance regulation create opportunities for abuse at the hands of the federal government and fail to utilize the benefits of a federal system. This article shows how many of the problems of the current system can be addressed without resorting to a large …