Law Commons^™

Comment On Daniel A. Crane: A Premature Postmortem On The Chicago School Of Antitrust, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

A central question raised by the recent surge of neo-Brandeisian scholarship and advocacy is whether the nascent movement will deliver any form of lasting change to antitrust. In his essay for this issue of Business History Review, Daniel Crane is doubtful. He argues that critiques of the Chicago School are often simplistic and misunderstand its legacy, which includes institutionalizing economic theory in antitrust analysis in ways that even its post-Chicago critics absorbed and built on. The “consumer welfare” standard, Crane notes, still draws wide support across the ideological spectrum and may be capacious enough to accommodate a variety of approaches …

Competition Enforcement, Trade And Global Governance: A Few Comments, Petros C. Mavroidis, Damien J. Neven

Faculty Scholarship

The debate on international antitrust has come from two perspectives. On the one hand, the trade community has emphasised the interface between trade policy and competition (policy and) enforcement. This interface, which was recognised from the outset of multilateral efforts to liberalise trade in what would become the GATT and eventually the WTO, focuses on the prospect that trade liberalisation through border instruments should not be undone by restrictive business practices (RBPs), placing a particular responsibility in this respect on competition enforcement. On the other hand, the antitrust community has emphasised the risk of inefficient enforcement when several jurisdictions can …

After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The "Protection Of Competition" Standard In Practice, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

The consumer welfare standard in antitrust has been heavily criticized. But would, in fact, abandoning the “consumer welfare” standard make the antitrust law too unworkable and indeterminate?

I argue that there is such a thing as a post-consumer welfare antitrust that is practicable and arguably as predictable as the consumer welfare standard. In practice, the consumer welfare standard has not set a high bar. The leading alternative standard, the “protection of competition” is at least as predictable, and arguably more determinate than the exceeding abstract abstract consumer welfare test, while being much truer the legislative intent underlying the antitrust laws. …