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Full-Text Articles in Law
Accounting For The Employee-Employer Relationship In Antitrust Analysis, Justin Mccrary, Bryan Ricchetti
Accounting For The Employee-Employer Relationship In Antitrust Analysis, Justin Mccrary, Bryan Ricchetti
Faculty Scholarship
Recent years have seen increased regulatory scrutiny of and private litigant claims regarding potential monopsony power in labor markets. In this paper, we discuss a defining feature of that analysis — a feature that differentiates it from antitrust analysis of product-market restraints. That feature is the employee-employer relationship. Employer-employee relationships, and investments that workers and firms make in such relationships, are central to analysis of antitrust issues in labor markets.
Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Faculty Scholarship
Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Data limitations have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that trade openness and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears …
The Ideological Roots Of America's Market Power Problem, Lina M. Khan
The Ideological Roots Of America's Market Power Problem, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
Mounting research shows that America has a market power problem. In sectors ranging from airlines and poultry to eyeglasses and semiconductors, just a handful of companies dominate. The decline in competition is so consistent across markets that excessive concentration and undue market power now look to be not an isolated issue but rather a systemic feature of America’s political economy. This is troubling because monopolies and oligopolies produce a host of harms. They depress wages and salaries, raise consumer costs, block entrepreneurship, stunt investment, retard innovation, and render supply chains and complex systems highly fragile. Dominant firms’ economic power allows …