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An Examination Of Product Hopping By Brand-Name Prescription Drug Manufacturers: The Problem And A Proposed Solution, Daniel Burke
An Examination Of Product Hopping By Brand-Name Prescription Drug Manufacturers: The Problem And A Proposed Solution, Daniel Burke
Cleveland State Law Review
The balance between incentivizing innovation through exclusivity protection and maintaining competitive market conditions—including prices for consumers—is a difficult line to toe. Product hopping has characteristics that constitute a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act because companies can maintain monopoly power in the pharmaceutical market. While some monopoly power is justified as an incentive for incredibly costly innovation, extended periods of exclusivity harms consumers by keeping prescription drug prices artificially inflated. Allowing generic drug manufacturers to compete sooner in the prescription drug market by disallowing product hopping by name-brand pharmaceutical drug companies will aid in driving down prices. Courts should adopt …
Brief Of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute In Support Of Appellants And Reversal Of The District Court's Decision, Federal Trade Commission And State Of Minnesota V. Lundbeck, Inc. Nos. 10-3548 And 10-3549, United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth District (2011), Christopher L. Sagers, W. Joseph Bruckner, Richard M. Brunell
Brief Of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute In Support Of Appellants And Reversal Of The District Court's Decision, Federal Trade Commission And State Of Minnesota V. Lundbeck, Inc. Nos. 10-3548 And 10-3549, United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth District (2011), Christopher L. Sagers, W. Joseph Bruckner, Richard M. Brunell
Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents
The basis for the District Court’s ruling was its view that cross-price elasticity of demand was “very low” between the two drugs acquired by Lundbeck, and therefore that they could not be in the same relevant market.2 AAI urges reversal on three grounds. First, assuming arguendo that crossprice elasticity was low – even if it were zero – the court’s approach fundamentally misapprehended the law. A lack of price competition between two functionally interchangeable products does not preclude a determination that they are in the same relevant market. Second, regardless of “low” cross-price elasticity, the acquisition removed an actual or …