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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Cleveland State University

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Lundbeck

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Ftc V. Lundbeck: Is Anything In Antitrust Obvious, Like, Ever?, Chris Sagers, Richard M. Brunell Oct 2014

Ftc V. Lundbeck: Is Anything In Antitrust Obvious, Like, Ever?, Chris Sagers, Richard M. Brunell

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

In FTC v. Lundbeck, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bench verdict finding a merger to monopoly, followed by a 1400% price increase, not only legal, but effectively not even subject to antitrust. The result followed from the district court's view that peculiarities in the market for hospital-administered drugs rendered it essentially immune from price competition. That being the case, the court found that even products very plainly substitutable on any traditional "functional interchangeability" analysis are not in the same "relevant market" for purposes of rules governing horizontal mergers. We think the court's analysis was incorrect for a number of …


Brief Of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute In Support Of Appellants And Reversal Of The District Court's Decision, Federal Trade Commission And State Of Minnesota V. Lundbeck, Inc. Nos. 10-3548 And 10-3549, United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth District (2011), Christopher L. Sagers, W. Joseph Bruckner, Richard M. Brunell Jan 2011

Brief Of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute In Support Of Appellants And Reversal Of The District Court's Decision, Federal Trade Commission And State Of Minnesota V. Lundbeck, Inc. Nos. 10-3548 And 10-3549, United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth District (2011), Christopher L. Sagers, W. Joseph Bruckner, Richard M. Brunell

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

The basis for the District Court’s ruling was its view that cross-price elasticity of demand was “very low” between the two drugs acquired by Lundbeck, and therefore that they could not be in the same relevant market.2 AAI urges reversal on three grounds. First, assuming arguendo that crossprice elasticity was low – even if it were zero – the court’s approach fundamentally misapprehended the law. A lack of price competition between two functionally interchangeable products does not preclude a determination that they are in the same relevant market. Second, regardless of “low” cross-price elasticity, the acquisition removed an actual or …