Law Commons^™

Una Experiencia Comparada Del Derecho Antitrust: La Defensa Passing-On (A Comparative Experience Of The Antitrust Law: The Passing-On Defence), Jesús A. Soto

Jesús Alfonso Soto Pineda

RESUMEN: El artículo presenta la passing–on defence, como argumento de defensa de las empresas demandadas en el marco de procesos de reparación por daños y perjuicios surgidos de infracciones a las normas de libre competencia, haciendo referencia a las experiencias y actualidad de la figura en Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea, en busca de extraer el catálogo de beneficios e inconveniencias que apareja en la construcción de un sistema de defensa de la competencia que le acoja.

ABSTRACT: The article shows the passing–on defence, as an argument in favour of the cartel member in the liability process founded in …

Internet Regulation And Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, And Cable Bundling, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page

William H. Page

The goal of telecommunications policy has shifted from the control of natural monopoly to the promotion of competition. But the question remains how extensive and persistent the government's regulatory role should be in the operation of communications markets. One might think that regulators could find the answer to this question in antitrust law. But antitrust has itself been torn between interventionist and laissez-faire tendencies. Over the past two decades, the dominant Chicago School approach to antitrust has focused on economic efficiency, a standard that has led to the abandonment or contraction of some categories of liability. More recently, however, post-Chicago …

Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Worse Than The Tower Of Babel? Remedying Antitrust’S False Dichotomy Through De Novo Appellate Review, Steven Semeraro

William & Mary Business Law Review

Modern antitrust analysis rests on a strange perch. Its paradigmatic method—pretentiously entitled the Rule of Reason—appears (but only appears) to be a dichotomous analytic. At the first stage, a court supposedly defines the relevant market and determines, as a matter of fact, whether marketplace forces constrain the defendant from profitably raising price above the level that would prevail in a competitive market. Only when market forces are inadequate to protect consumers, that is, the defendant has market power, does the court proceed to stage two, at which it assesses, as a matter of law, whether the defendant used its power …

Robert Bork's Forgotten Role In The Transaction Cost Revolution, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The last few decades have witnessed a scientific revolution in the field of industrial organization in the form of transaction cost economics (TCE). This revolution has radically altered economists’ understanding and interpretation of both partial and complete economic integration. Not surprisingly, this sea change has substantially influenced antitrust law and policy, impelling the Supreme Court to reverse or greatly modify various precedents.

This essay supplements the received historiography of the TCE revolution. It contends that Robert Bork played a hitherto underappreciated role in that revolution. In particular, the essay contends that in 1966, before the official onset of the transaction …