Law Commons^™

Tying Conspiracies, Christopher R. Leslie

William & Mary Law Review

Antitrust law has long condemned tying arrangements when they are imposed by a single dominant firm. However, tying jurisprudence does not recognize that tie-ins can also occur as the result of a conspiracy among competitors. Consequently, antitrust doctrine fails to appreciate the unique anticompetitive dangers of concerted tying arrangements. After providing real-world examples of tying conspiracies, Professor Leslie explains how concerted tying arrangements present a far greater threat to competitive markets than traditional, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. Because tying jurisprudence evolved without considering the existence or effects of concerted tie-ins, the current test for evaluating the legality of tying arrangements …

Communication And Concerted Action, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

It is a familiar scenario in U.S. antitrust litigation: The plaintiffs allege that a pattern of identical pricing (or refusals to deal) is "concerted" and therefore per se illegal; the defendant responds that the practice is merely "consciously parallel" or "interdependent" and therefore legal. Under U.S. law, to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, a plaintiff must produce a "plus factor," evidence that "tends to exclude the possibility" that the defendants' actions were merely interdependent. Courts have identified various plus factors -- for example, evidence that the alleged conduct was against the defendant's interest unless it …

Keeping The Door Ajar For Foreign Plaintiffs In Global Cartel Cases After Empagran, Jeremy M. Suhr

Michigan Law Review

In many ways, the Supreme Court's opinion of F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A. raised more questions than it answered. Growing out of the massive international vitamins cartel uncovered in the 1990s, Empagran presented a scenario in which all parties were foreign and all conduct occurred abroad. Although it is "well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States," Empagran presented the Court with the first truly foreign antitrust case. It involved not only foreign conduct, but also foreign plaintiffs …

Academic Testimony On Unilateral Conduct Before The U.S. Dept. Of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Hit And Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, And Refusal To Deal In The Supreme Court Decision In Trinko, Nicholas Economides

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Under the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange carriers, including Verizon, were obligated to lease parts of their local telecommunications network to any firm, at "cost plus a reasonable profit" prices, that could combine them at will, add retailing services, and sell local telecommunication service as a rival to the incumbent. AT&T, an entrant into the local telecommunications market, leased parts of Verizon's network. Curtis Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued Verizon, alleging various anti-competitive actions of Verizon against AT&T, including that Verizon raised the costs of AT&T, its downstream retail rival. The …

Restraints On Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Beginning with the work of Joseph Schumpeter in the 1940s and later elaborated by Robert W. Solow's work on the neoclassical growth model, economics has produced a strong consensus that the economic gains from innovation dwarf those to be had from capital accumulation and increased price competition. An important but sometimes overlooked corollary is that restraints on innovation can do far more harm to the economy than restraints on traditional output or pricing. Many practices that violate the antitrust laws are best understood as restraints on innovation rather than restraints on pricing.

While antitrust models for assessing losses that result …