Law Commons^™

Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert Hovenkamp

William & Mary Law Review

Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “combine or conspire” to monopolize—all without explanation. Section 2 is the antitrust law’s only provision that reaches entirely unilateral conduct, although it has often been used to reach collaborative conduct as well. In general, § 2 requires greater amounts of individually held market power than do the other antitrust statutes, but it is less categorical about conduct. With one exception, however, the statute reads so broadly that criticisms of the nature that it is outdated cannot be based on faithful readings of the text.

The one …

Impediments To Renewed And Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement, Edward D. Cavanagh

William & Mary Business Law Review

Antitrust Division head Jonathan Kanter recently proclaimed that “the era of lax enforcement is over, and the new era of vigorous and effective antitrust law enforcement has begun.” Federal enforcers have indeed been active; the DOJ has sued Google in two separate actions, and the FTC has brought an action against Facebook.

While bringing these cases is an important first step to achieving a more robust antitrust enforcement regime, a significant obstacle to an antitrust renaissance remains—overcoming the strong gravitational pull of Chicago School theory that has dominated antitrust thought for the past half-century. Chicago School principles have not kept …

The Factor/Element Distinction In Antitrust Litigation, Christopher R. Leslie

William & Mary Law Review

Most price-fixing litigation turns on whether the plaintiffs can present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants did, in fact, conspire to raise prices. This generally entails the proffering of plus factors, a type of evidence that suggests parallel conduct by the defendants was the product of collusion, not independent decisions. As their name suggests, plus factors are just that—factors. Proving a collection of factors may be necessary for a plaintiff’s case, but no individual factor is ever required. If it were, it wouldn’t be a factor; it would be an element.

Several federal …

The Constitutional Moment That Wasn't: 1912-1914 And The Meaning Of The Sherman Act, Alan J. Meese

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Atomistic Antitrust, Robin C. Feldman, Mark A. Lemley

William & Mary Law Review

Antitrust is atomistic: deliberately focused on trees, not forests. It pays attention to the consequences of individual acts alleged to be anticompetitive.

That focus is misplaced. Companies and markets don't focus on one particular act to the exclusion of all else. Business strategy emphasizes holistic, integrated planning. And market outcomes aren't determined by a single act, but by the result of multiple acts by multiple parties in the overall context of the structure and characteristics of the market.

The atomistic nature of modern antitrust law causes it to miss two important classes of potential competitive harms. First, the focus on …

Old Macdonald Had A Trust: How Market Consolidation In The Agricultural Industry, Spurred On By A Lack Of Antitrust Law Enforcement, Is Destroying Small Agricultural Producers, Cody Mccracken

William & Mary Business Law Review

The U.S. agricultural industry is controlled by a handful of large corporations. Unprecedented levels of market consolidation has created a power disparity, where controlling corporations alone shape markets, often to the disadvantage of small agricultural producers. A primary, and often overlooked, cause of this consolidationdriven bargaining disadvantage, and its resulting harm, can be found in the lacking enforcement of the nation’s antitrust laws. Faulty metrics and lax legal interpretations employed by regulatory agencies have permitted large corporations to grab control of nearly every sector of the industry. From the seeds farmers plant to the markets they sell their goods into; …

Treble, Treble Toil And Trouble: The New Per Se Rule As A Protection Against The Curse Of The "Supreme Evil", Seth Konopasek

William & Mary Business Law Review

The Supreme Court has called collusion between firms the “supreme evil” of antitrust. Despite public and private enforcement efforts, collusive firms and the cartels they form cost American consumers billions of dollars a year and undermine the virtues of our free market economy. The Chicago School theory of antitrust enforcement, which has dominated antitrust scholarship, vehemently disapproves of private antitrust actions that enable plaintiffs to recover treble damages. Recent scholarship, however, has rejected the Chicago School’s concerns of overdeterrence and embraced the treble damages remedy. This Note follows the recent scholarship and proposes the New Per Se Rule, which would …

Artificial Stupidity, Clark D. Asay

William & Mary Law Review

Artificial intelligence is everywhere. And yet, the experts tell us, it is not yet actually anywhere. This is because we are yet to achieve artificial general intelligence, or artificially intelligent systems that are capable of thinking for themselves and adapting to their circumstances. Instead, all the AI hype—and it is constant—concerns narrower, weaker forms of artificial intelligence, which are confined to performing specific, narrow tasks. The promise of true artificial general intelligence thus remains elusive. Artificial stupidity reigns supreme.

What is the best set of policies to achieve more general, stronger forms of artificial intelligence? Surprisingly, scholars have paid little …

No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao

William & Mary Law Review

The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …